Reluctant regulation

Journal of Comparative Economics

Volumn 41, Issue 3, 2013, Pages 804-828

  Bortolotti, Bernardo ^a,b   Cambini, Carlo ^c   Rondi, Laura ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TURIN   (Italy)

^b BOCCONI UNIVERSITY   (Italy)

^c POLITECNICO DI TORINO   (Italy)

Author keywords

Firm value; Political institutions; Privatization; Regulatory independence

Indexed keywords

EID: 84880798862     PISSN: 01475967     EISSN: 10957227     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jce.2012.12.003     Document Type: Article

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