The political economy of mobile telecommunications liberalization: Evidence from the OECD countries

Journal of Comparative Economics

Volumn 38, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 199-216

  Duso, Tomaso ^a   Seldeslachts, Jo ^b  

^a WZB BERLIN SOCIAL SCIENCE CENTER   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Entry liberalization; Ideology; Institutions; Mobile telecom; OECD; Political economy; Private interests

Indexed keywords

EID: 77953121682     PISSN: 01475967     EISSN: 10957227     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jce.2009.09.001     Document Type: Article

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