Accountability in government and regulatory policies: Theory and evidence

Journal of Comparative Economics

Volumn 39, Issue 4, 2011, Pages 453-469

  Guerriero, Carmine ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Election; Electricity; Judges; Regulation

Indexed keywords

EID: 82755182810     PISSN: 01475967     EISSN: 10957227     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jce.2011.07.001     Document Type: Article

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