Adjustments in different government systems

Economics and Politics

Volumn 16, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 117-146

  Spolaore, Enrico ^a  

^a BROWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DECISION MAKING; MODEL; POLICY MAKING; POLITICAL SYSTEM; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 3142769014     PISSN: 09541985     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0343.2004.00134.x     Document Type: Article

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