Repeat offenders: If they learn, we punish them more severely

International Review of Law and Economics

Volumn 30, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 173-177

  Mungan, Murat C ^a,b  

^a BOSTON COLLEGE   (United States)

^b GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Crime and deterrence; Optimal sanctions; Repeat offenders

Indexed keywords

EID: 77952889364     PISSN: 01448188     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2009.11.002     Document Type: Article

References (22)

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