Software assistants for randomized patrol planning for the lax airport police and the Federal Air Marshal Service

Interfaces

Volumn 40, Issue 4, 2010, Pages 267-290

  Jain, Manish ^a   Tsai, Jason ^a   Pita, James ^a   Kiekintveld, Christopher ^a   Rathi, Shyamsunder ^a   Tambe, Milind ^a   Ordóñez, Fernando ^a,b  

^a University of Southern California ^*  (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CHILE   (Chile)

Author keywords

Game theory: Stackelberg games; Programming: Integer, applications; Programming: Integer, theory

Indexed keywords

EID: 77955458634     PISSN: 00922102     EISSN: 1526551X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/inte.1100.0505     Document Type: Article

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