Strategic defense and attack for series and parallel reliability systems

European Journal of Operational Research

Volumn 186, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 856-881

  Hausken, Kjell ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF STAVANGER   (Norway)

Author keywords

Attack; Conflict; Contest success function; Defense; Game theory; OR in military; Parallel system; Protection; Reliability theory; Series system; Terrorism; Utility theory; War

Indexed keywords

BUDGET CONTROL; GAME THEORY; INVESTMENTS; MILITARY OPERATIONS;

CONTEST SUCCESS FUNCTION; PARALLEL SYSTEM; SERIES SYSTEM; STRATEGIC DEFENSE; TERRORISM; UTILITY THEORY; WAR;

RELIABILITY THEORY;

EID: 35348950536     PISSN: 03772217     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2007.02.013     Document Type: Article

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