Simultaneous decision-making in competitive and cooperative environments

Economic Inquiry

Volumn 51, Issue 2, 2013, Pages 1311-1323

  Savikhin, Anya C ^a   Sheremeta, Roman M ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

^b CHAPMAN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84874346623     PISSN: 00952583     EISSN: 14657295     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1465-7295.2012.00474.x     Document Type: Article

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