Can groups solve the problem of over-bidding in contests?

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 35, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 175-197

  Sheremeta, Roman M ^a   Zhang, Jingjing ^b  

^a CHAPMAN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b MCMASTER UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77953651927     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-009-0434-0     Document Type: Article

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