Experimental comparison of multi-stage and one-stage contests

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 68, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 731-747

  Sheremeta, Roman M ^a  

^a CHAPMAN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Contest; Contest design; Experiments; Over dissipation; Rent seeking; Risk aversion

Indexed keywords

EID: 75349093077     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2009.08.001     Document Type: Article

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