Criminalizing normal adolescent behavior in communities of color: The role of prosecutors in juvenile justice reform

Cornell Law Review

Volumn 98, Issue 2, 2013, Pages 383-462

  Henning, Kristin ^a  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84874072813     PISSN: 00108847     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (344)

1. See ELIZABETH S. SCOTT & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE 37-40 (2008) (noting that adolescents are more susceptible to peer influences, more likely to discount the future, and more likely to engage in activities perceived to be dangerous);
2. Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 547, 555-56 (2000) [hereinafter Scott, Adolescence] (stating that adolescents' "inexperience and immature judgment may lead them to make poor choices").
3. See Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1014 (2003) [hereinafter Steinberg & Scott, Less Guilty].
4. See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2467-68 (2012) (murder in the course of arson);
5. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2032-33 (2010) (armed burglary with assault or battery);
6. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 557, 572-73 (2005) (murder).
7. Roper, 543 U.S. at 568-70.
8. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026-27, 2030.
9. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463-66.
10. See Aaron Kupchik & Torin Monahan, The New American School: Preparation for Post- Industrial Discipline, 27 BRIT. J. SOC. EDUC. 617, 620-21, 623-24 (2006) (discussing the increased presence of police in schools and their growing role in student discipline).
11. See Patricia Soung, Social and Biological Constructions of Youth: Implications for Juvenile Justice and Racial Equity, 6 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL'Y 428, 437 (2011)
12. citing Sandra Graham & Brian S. Lowery, Priming Unconscious Racial Stereotypes About Adolescent Offenders, 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 483, 499 (2004).
13. GEOFF K. WARD, THE BLACK CHILD-SAVERS: RACIAL DEMOCRACY & JUVENILE JUSTICE 23 (2012).
14. Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 MINN. L. REV. 691, 693-94 (1991) [hereinafter Feld, Transformation].
15. See Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court-Part II: Race and the "Crack Down" on Youth Crime, 84 MINN. L. REV. 327, 335-36 (1999) [hereinafter Feld, Transformation Part II].
16. See David S. Tanenhaus, Degrees of Discretion: The First Juvenile Court and the Problem of Difference in the Early Twentieth Century, in OUR CHILDREN, THEIR CHILDREN 105, 107 (Darnell F. Hawkins & Kimberly Kempf-Leonard eds., 2005)
17. citing Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 107 (1909).
18. See Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction of Childhood, in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 113, 117 (Margaret K. Rosenheim et al. eds., 2002) [hereinafter Scott, Childhood] (noting that juvenile court founders believed that children lacked "the capacity for reasoning, moral understanding, and judgment on which attributions of blameworthiness must rest").
19. See Donna M. Bishop & Hillary B. Farber, Joining the Legal Significance of Adolescent Developmental Capacities with the Legal Rights Provided by In re Gault, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 125, 127-31 (2007) (discussing the view that children are not predisposed to committing bad acts and such behavior must be due to the influence of adults);
20. Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, The Evolution of Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective on Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137, 141-42 (1997) (discussing the view that criminal conduct was believed to be the "symptom of an underlying condition . . . caused by poor parental guidance, care and supervision as well as social harms associated with poverty").
21. Barry C. Feld, Unmitigated Punishment: Adolescent Criminal Responsibility and LWOP Sentences, 10 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 11, 16 (2007) [hereinafter Feld, Unmitigated Punishment];
22. see also Barry C. Feld, Race, Politics, and Juvenile Justice: The Warren Court and the Conservative "Backlash," 87 MINN. L. REV. 1447, 1456-58 (2003) [hereinafter Feld, Race, Politics, and Juvenile Justice] (discussing Progressives' view of juvenile courts as a "therapeutic agency");
23. Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEX. L. REV. 799, 804-05 (2003) [hereinafter Scott & Steinberg, Blaming Youth] (describing the belief that juvenile courts could "redirect[ ]" delinquents);
24. Kim Taylor-Thompson, States of Mind/States of Development, 14 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 143, 146 (2003) (noting Progressives' view of adolescents as misguided and "likely to benefit from treatment and intervention").
25. Sanford J. Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187, 1189 (1970).
26. Kristin Henning, Eroding Confidentiality in Delinquency Proceedings: Should Schools and Public Housing Authorities Be Notified?, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 520, 525-38 (2004) [hereinafter Henning, Eroding Confidentiality] (reviewing the history of confidentiality in juvenile courts);
27. David S. Tanenhaus, The Evolution of Juvenile Courts in the Early Twentieth Century: Beyond the Myth of Immaculate Construction, in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 19, at 42, 43 (discussing founders' intent to shield youth from "stigmatizing publicity").
28. see also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1967) (noting that the early conception of the juvenile court envisioned a "fatherly judge touch[ing] the heart and conscience of the erring youth by talking over his problems [and] by paternal advice and admonition");
29. Feld, Race, Politics, and Juvenile Justice, supra note 21, at 1459-60 (noting that judges tailored sentences to match a child's best interests).
30. Feld, Transformation, supra note 13, at 694-95.
31. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 15;
32. Richard Kay & Daniel Segal, The Role of the Attorney in Juvenile Court Proceedings: A Non-Polar Approach, 61 GEO. L.J. 1401, 1402-03 (1973).
33. Feld, Race, Politics, and Juvenile Justice, supra note 21, at 1482-89.
34. See, e.g., Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 263 (1984) (discussing the need for due process in the characteristically informal juvenile court);
35. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365-66 (1970) (same);
36. Feld, Race, Politics, and Juvenile Justice, supra note 21, at 1480-94 (discussing the expansion of procedural safeguards for juveniles during the "Due Process Revolution" of the civil rights era).
37. See, e.g., Janet E. Ainsworth, Youth Justice in a Unified Court: Response to Critics of Juvenile Court Abolition, 36 B.C. L. REV. 927, 941-44 (1995) [hereinafter Ainsworth, Youth Justice].
38. See Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal Order: The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1083, 1118-32 (1991) [hereinafter Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood] (calling for abolition of the juvenile courts and urging criminal courts to treat youth as a mitigating factor at sentencing);
39. Ainsworth, Youth Justice, supra note 35, at 948-51 (same);
40. Katherine Hunt Federle, The Abolition of the Juvenile Court: A Proposal for the Preservation of Children's Legal Rights, 16 J. CONTEMP. L. 23, 25 (1990) (same);
41. Barry C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court: Youthfulness, Criminal Responsibility, and Sentencing Policy, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 68, 69 (1997) (same).
42. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 544 (1971) (plurality opinion) (referring to the creation of the juvenile court as an "experiment").
43. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18 n.23 (1967)
44. quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966).
45. But see McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 543-50 (discussing the Court's unwillingness to abandon the juvenile court experiment despite disappointment in the juvenile court system).
46. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 33, 41, 55, 57-58 (declining to rule on whether juveniles have a right to appeal);
47. see also Martin Guggenheim & Randy Hertz, Reflections on Judges, Juries, and Justice: Ensuring the Fairness of Juvenile Delinquency Trials, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 553, 558-62 (1998) (detailing the Court's decision in Gault to recognize some rights for juveniles but not others).
48. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970).
49. See Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 528-31 (1975).
50. See Barry C. Feld, The Constitutional Tension Between Apprendi and McKeiver: Sentence Enhancements Based on Delinquency Convictions and the Quality of Justice in Juvenile Courts, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1111, 1145 (2003) [hereinafter Feld, Constitutional Tension] (noting that the juvenile court would benefit from a jury's check against the unequal administration of justice as well as racial bias);
51. cf. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) (acknowledging that juries may provide an important safeguard against "the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge").
52. see also Gayle W. Hill, Group Versus Individual Performance: Are N+1 Heads Better Than One?, 91 PSYCHOL. BULL. 517, 535 (1982) (discussing studies that have shown that group performance was generally "qualitatively and quantitatively superior to the performance of the average individual").
53. But see Mona Lynch & Craig Haney, Mapping the Racial Bias of the White Male Capital Juror: Jury Composition and the "Empathic Divide," 45 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 69, 92 (2011) (finding that, contrary to expectations, differences in the way black and white defendants acare treated are more divided after deliberations, showing that strong punitive and likely biased opinions were accentuated rather than moderated in a deliberative setting).
54. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 540-41, 545, 547 (1971) (plurality opinion) (finding neither a Sixth Amendment nor a due process right to jury trial for youths facing delinquency proceedings).
55. See Gerald P. Hill, II, Revisiting Juvenile Justice: The Requirement for Jury Trials in Juvenile Proceedings Under the Sixth Amendment, 9 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 143, 160-67 (2008) (arguing the right to a jury trial should be extended to juvenile proceedings because the juvenile justice system is not in fact rehabilitative);
56. Sandra M. Ko, Note, Why Do They Continue to Get the Worst of Both Worlds? The Case for Providing Louisiana's Juveniles with the Right to a Jury in Delinquency Adjudications, 12 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 161, 189-90 (2004) (arguing that the current system impedes rehabilitation but that a jury system would better advance it by improving procedural fairness).
57. In re L.M., 186 P.3d 164, 170 (Kan. 2008) (emphasis added).
58. See, e.g., Henning, Eroding Confidentiality, supra note 26, at 530 (noting that reform- ers in the 1960s argued for reduced confidentiality and increased scrutiny of the juvenile courts as a check on racism and ineffective counsel);
59. See, e.g., Perry L. Moriearty, Combating the Color-Coded Confinement of Kids: An Equal Protection Remedy, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 285, 306-08 (2008) (noting that the confidential nature of juvenile court proceedings shields decision makers from accountability and fosters inequity);
60. Michele Benedetto Neitz, A Unique Bench, a Common Code: Evaluating Judicial Ethics in Juvenile Court, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 97, 130 (2011) (pointing out that the wide discretion given to judges in the "private world of juvenile court" leaves much room for unethical judicial conduct).
61. See United States v. A.D., 28 F.3d 1353, 1357-58 (3rd Cir. 1994);
62. Steven A. Drizin & Greg Luloff, Are Juvenile Courts a Breeding Ground for Wrongful Convictions?, 34 N. KY. L. REV. 257, 308-09 (2007);
63. Gordon A. Martin, Jr., Open the Doors: A Judicial Call to End Confidentiality in Delinquency Proceedings, 21 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 393, 400-01 (1995);
64. Moriearty, supra note 48, at 299. 50
65. Henning, Eroding Confidentiality, supra note 26, at 527-30;
66. Ellen Marrus,"That Isn't Fair, Judge": The Costs of Using Prior Juvenile Delinquency Adjudications in Criminal Court Sentencing, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 1323, 1353 (2004);
67. Leila R. Siddiky, Note, Keep the Court Room Doors Closed so the Doors of Opportunity Can Remain Open: An Argument for Maintaining Privacy in the Juvenile Justice System, 55 HOW. L.J. 205, 222-31 (2011).
68. Cf. RICHARD A. MENDEL, LESS HYPE, MORE HELP: REDUCING JUVENILE CRIME, WHAT WORKS-AND WHAT DOESN'T 29-30 (2000) (discussing the media's increasing coverage of juvenile crime despite its decline).
69. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 25 (1967) (noting that due process does not prohibit states from continuing to provide for confidentiality of police and court records regarding juveniles);
70. cf. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 547 (1971) (plurality opinion) ("We are reluctant to disallow the States to experiment further . . . and we feel that we would be impeding that experimentation by imposing the jury trial.").
71. But see Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 319-20 (1974) (holding that a juvenile confidentiality statute cannot interfere with defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses in order to establish bias).
72. E.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-129 (LexisNexis Supp. 2011) (presumptively closed proceedings, but allow judges to open proceedings to interested parties);
73. D.C. CODE § 16- 2316(e) (LexisNexis 2001) (same); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 610.070(3) (West 2006) (same);
74. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-B:34 (Supp. 2012) (mandatory closed proceedings);
75. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-6-114(1)(c) (LexisNexis 2008) (open hearing for specific enumerated offenses);
76. N.J. CT. R. 5:19-2(a)(1) to (a)(2) (presumptively closed proceedings, but allow judges to open proceedings to interested parties);
77. OHIO JUV. R. 27(A)(1) (LexisNexis 2011) (open hearings for "serious youthful offender proceedings");
78. see also Henning, Eroding Confidentiality, supra note 26, at 536-37 (discussing confidentiality statutes).
79. Feld, Transformation Part II, supra note 16, at 340 (discussing causes of shifting phi- losophy during the "turbulent 1960s").
80. See Ralph A. Rossum, Holding Juveniles Accountable: Reforming America's "Juvenile Injustice System," 22 PEPP. L. REV. 907, 907-09, 918-20 (1995) (contending that serious juvenile crime was soaring while the public's confidence in the juvenile justice system's effectiveness was plummeting, and advocating for a "justice model" in juvenile court that relies on proportional and determinate dispositions and increased offender accountability);
81. Scott & Grisso, supra note 20, at 137, 148-49;
82. Scott & Steinberg, Blaming Youth, supra note 21, at 799-800, 805;
83. Arthur R. Blum, Comment, Disclosing the Identities of Juvenile Felons: Introducing Accountability to Juvenile Justice, 27 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 349, 363-72 (1996) (describing the erosion of faith in the ability of the juvenile justice system to rehabilitate juvenile criminals successfully).
84. But see Mark W. Lipsey, Can Rehabilitative Programs Reduce the Recidivism of Juvenile Offenders? An Inquiry into the Effectiveness of Practical Programs, 6 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 611, 611-16, 640 (1999) (discussing how meta-analysis of the efficacy of rehabilitative programs shows these programs can reduce recidivism rates).
85. Kristin Henning, What's Wrong with Victims' Rights in Juvenile Court?: Retributive Versus Rehabilitative Systems of Justice, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1107, 1112-15 (2009) [hereinafter Henning, Victims' Rights] (detailing the punitive-policy wave of the 1980s and 1990s);
86. HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 2006 NATIONAL REPORT 127 (2006) (reporting that between 1994 and 2003 there were substantial declines in arrests for overall juvenile violent crime (32%), murder (68%), forcible rape (25%), robbery (43%), and aggravated assault (26%), and noting that declines were proportionately greater for juveniles than for adults);
87. David S. Tanenhaus & Steven A. Drizin, "Owing to the Extreme Youth of the Accused": The Changing Legal Response to Juvenile Homicide, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 641, 642-43 (2002) (discussing data that casts doubt on the validity of the perception of an increase in youth violent crime).
88. Dole Seeks to Get Tough on Young Criminals, L.A. TIMES, July 7, 1996, at A16.
89. Michael D. Bradbury, Op-Ed., More Tools Are Needed to Curb Juvenile Crime, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 29, 2000, at B7 (discussing Proposition 21, which would allow youth who commit certain enumerated felonies to be tried in adult court);
90. see also Tom Gorman, In Law's Eyes, 14-Year-Old Is an Adult, L.A. TIMES, May 11, 1995, at A1 (quoting San Diego County District Attorney Paul Pfingst as saying, "No community can celebrate prosecuting 14-yearolds as adults for murder, but it's something we have to do because of the types of crimes they're committing. I don't know that there's an alternative but to hold them responsible by adult standards.").
91. Feld, Race, Politics, and Juvenile Justice, supra note 21, at 1558-68 (discussing waiver laws and harsher sentences in juvenile courts after the 1980s);
92. See Henning, Eroding Confidentiality, supra note 26, at 537-38, 542-76;
93. see also Jonathan Kimmelman, Risking Ethical Insolvency: A Survey of Trends in Criminal DNA Databanking, 28 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 209, 210, 219 (2000) (listing twenty-six states with laws that include juveniles in DNA collection);
94. Suzanne Meiners-Levy, Challenging the Prosecution of Young "Sex Offenders": How Developmental Psychology and the Lessons of Roper Should Inform Daily Practice, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 499, 505 (2006) (addressing the political climate leading to the harsh prosecution of juvenile sexual offenders and the requirement to register).
95. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Segadelli, Note, Minding the Gap: Extending Adult Jury Trial Rights to Adolescents While Maintaining a Childhood Commitment to Rehabilitation, 8 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 683, 695-99 (2010) (pointing out the changes in Washington State's juvenile code, making it more punitive in the name of rehabilitation).
96. See Dustin Albert & Laurence Steinberg, Judgment and Decision Making in Adolescence, 21 J. RES. ON ADOLESCENCE 211, 216-20 (2011);
97. Laurence Steinberg et al., Are Adolescents Less Mature than Adults? Minors' Access to Abortion, the Juvenile Death Penalty, and the Alleged APA "Flip-Flop," 64 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 583, 586 (2009) [hereinafter Steinberg et al., "Flip- Flop"];
98. Jennifer L. Woolard & N. Dickon Reppucci, Researching Juveniles' Capacities as Defendants, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 173, 176-79 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000).
99. See Elizabeth S. Scott, Criminal Responsibility in Adolescence: Lessons from Developmental Psychology, in YOUTH ON TRIAL, supra note 65, at 291, 303-05 [hereinafter Scott, Criminal Responsibility].
100. See Jeffrey Arnett, Reckless Behavior in Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective, 12 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 339, 351-52 (1992);
101. Melinda G. Schmidt et al., Effectiveness of Participation as a Defendant: The Attorney-Juvenile Client Relationship, 21 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 175, 177 (2003) (noting this deficiency and its potential effect in the context of juvenile offenders' relationships with their attorneys);
102. Scott, Adolescence, supra note 2, at 547, 555-56, 591 (not- ing that inexperience and immature judgments may lead to poor choices).
103. See Brief for the American Medical Association and the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry as Amici Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 14-36, Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (Nos. 10-9646, 10-9647) (collecting and summarizing studies);
104. Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, Developmental Incompetence, Due Process, and Juvenile Justice Policy, 83 N.C. L. REV. 793, 812 (2005) [hereinafter Scott & Grisso, Developmental Incompetence]. Some scholars have cautioned against relying on neuroscientific findings to support arguments for reduced culpability for juvenile offenders.
105. See Terry A. Maroney, The False Promise of Adolescent Brain Science in Juvenile Justice, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 89, 116-18 (2009) (warning that neuroscientific findings have generally been vulnerable to inaccurate conclusions by legal advocates, and that an emphasis on neuroscience inevitably raises autonomy and equality concerns);
106. Laurence Steinberg, Should the Science of Adolescent Brain Development Inform Public Policy?, 64 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 739, 742 (2009).
107. Laurence Steinberg, Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice, 5 ANN. REV. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 459, 466-68 (2009);
108. Steinberg et al., "Flip-Flop," supra note 65, at 586.
109. See Scott & Steinberg, Blaming Youth, supra note 21, at 813-16;
110. see also Elizabeth Cauffman et al., Age Differences in Affective Decision Making as Indexed by Performance on the Iowa Gambling Task, 46 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 193, 206 (2010) (concluding that decision making and risk assessment improves throughout adolescence due to affective processing rather than cognitive maturation);
111. Bonnie L. Halpern-Felsher & Elizabeth Cauffman, Costs and Benefits of a Decision: Decision-Making Competence in Adolescents and Adults, 22 APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 257, 265, 268 (2001) (finding adolescents less likely than adults to identify long-term consequences, evaluate risks and benefits, and examine possible alternative options);
112. Laurence Steinberg et al., Age Differences in Future Orientation and Delay Discounting, 80 CHILD DEV. 28, 38-39 (2009) [hereinafter Steinberg et al., Future Orientation] (finding that adolescents are particularly attuned to immediate rewards and tend to discount long-term consequences);
113. Steinberg & Scott, Less Guilty, supra note 3, at 1009, 1012 (finding that, compared to adults, adolescents place less weight on risk than reward).
114. For additional studies, see Brief for the American Psychological Association et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 6-30, Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (Nos. 10-9646, 10-9647) [hereinafter Brief for APA, Miller].
115. Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, (Im)maturity of Judgment in Adolescence: Why Adolescents May Be Less Culpable than Adults, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 741, 748-49, 754 tbl.4 (2000) [hereinafter Cauffman & Steinberg, (Im)maturity] (emphasis omitted);
116. see Laurence Steinberg et al., Age Differences in Sensation Seeking and Impulsivity as Indexed by Behavior and Self-Report: Evidence for a Dual Systems Model, 44 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1764, 1774-76 (2008) [hereinafter Steinberg et al., Sensation Seeking].
117. see also Adriana Galvan et al., Risk-Taking and the Adolescent Brain: Who Is at Risk?, 10 DEVELOPMENTAL SCI. F8, F9-F13 (2007) (finding that impulse control continues to develop throughout adolescence and early adulthood);
118. Rotem Leshem & Joseph Glicksohn, The Construct of Impulsivity Revisited, 43 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 681, 684-86 (2007) (reporting significant decline in impulsivity from ages fourteen to twenty-two).
119. Margo Gardner & Laurence Steinberg, Peer Influence on Risk Taking, Risk Preference, and Risky Decision Making in Adolescence and Adulthood: An Experimental Study, 41 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 625, 626-34 (2005);
120. Laurence Steinberg & Kathryn C. Monahan, Age Differences in Resistance to Peer Influence, 43 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1531, 1538-39 (2007).
121. Terrie E. Moffitt, Adolescence-Limited and Life-Course-Persistent Antisocial Behavior: A Developmental Taxonomy, 100 PSYCHOL. REV. 674, 686-88 (1993).
122. See He Len Chung et al., The Transition to Adulthood for Adolescents in the Juvenile Justice System: A Developmental Perspective, in ON YOUR OWN WITHOUT A NET: THE TRANSITION TO ADULTHOOD FOR VULNERABLE POPULATIONS 68, 73-85 (D. Wayne Osgood et al. eds., 2005);
123. Scott & Grisso, supra note 20, at 154, 156, 188;
124. Gregory M. Zimmerman, Impulsivity, Offending, and the Neighborhood: Investigating the Person-Context Nexus, 26 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 301, 325-29 (2010). For an additional discussion of how environmental factors influence healthy adolescent transition to adulthood, see infra Part II.C.2.
125. Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman, The Elephant in the Courtroom: A Developmental Perspective on the Adjudication of Youthful Offenders, 6 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 389, 393 (1999).
126. 543 U.S. 551, 569-70 (2005).
127. 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010).
128. 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 n.5 (2012).
129. Roper, 543 U.S. at 561
130. (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988));
131. see also Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465 ("[T]ransient rashness, proclivity for risk, and inability to assess consequences . . . lessen[ ] a child's 'moral culpability' . . . .");
132. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026-27 (arguing that "[f]rom a moral standpoint it would be misguided to equate the failings of a minor with those of an adult"
133. quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 570.
134. Roper, 543 U.S. at 570
135. citing Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 395 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
136. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026;
137. see Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465-66;
138. Roper, 543 U.S. at 570.
139. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2027-29.
140. Roper, 543 U.S. at 571-72;
141. See, e.g., 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/5-130(1)(a) (West Supp. 2012) (limiting the mandatory transfer of youth over fourteen to enumerated serious offenses);
142. Engrossed Substitute S.B. 5746, 61st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2009) (repealing automatic transfer statute enacted in 1994 and prohibiting the transfer of youths under the age of fifteen except for murder and aggravated assault);
143. S. & H.R. B. 1196, Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2007) (amending section 46b-120 of Connecticut General Statutes to raise the age of juvenile court jurisdiction from sixteen to eighteen);
144. see also CONN. JUVENILE JURISDICTION PLANNING & IMPLEMENTATION COMM., FINAL REPORT 2-4 (2007), available at http://www.ncdjjdp.org/resources/ youthAccountabilityTaskForce/systemCosts/connecticut.pdf (citing research on the immaturity of juveniles as a basis for raising the age of juvenile court jurisdiction).
145. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2023 (noting that only 109 juvenile offenders were serving sentences of life without the possibility of parole for nonhomicide offenses);
146. Roper, 543 U.S. at 566-68;
147. Barbara Kaban & James Orlando, Revitalizing the Infancy Defense in the Contemporary Juvenile Court, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 33, 50-51 (2007) (pointing out that even though waiver to adult court is a growing concern, out of the 2.2 million youths who were under eighteen and arrested in 2003, 71% of those eligible were referred to juvenile court, while only 7% were referred to criminal court).
148. C. Puzzanchera et al., Easy Access to FBI Arrest Statistics: 1994-2009, OFF. JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION, www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezaucr/asp/ucr- display.asp (last visited Nov. 6, 2012). In 2008, only 16% of juvenile arrests were for murder, forcible rape, aggravated assault, and robbery.
149. See Jeffrey Fagan & Aaron Kupchik, Juvenile Incarceration and the Pains of Imprisonment, 3 DUKE F. FOR L. & SOC. CHANGE 29, 31-32 (2011).
150. The number of youth adjudicated, committed, and placed in residential placement across the country has decreased since the late 1990s from 76,600 in 1999 to 47,062 in 2010. M. Sickmund et al., Easy Access to the Census of Juveniles in Residential Placement: 1997-2000, OFF. JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION, http:// ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezacjrp/asp/selection.asp (last visited Nov. 6, 2012) (select "Adjudicated, placed here"; then select "Show Table").
151. The number of youth convicted in criminal court, however, has risen from 1,235 in 1999 to 1,365 in 2010. M. Sickmund et al., Easy Access to the Census of Juveniles in Residential Placement: 1997-2000, OFF. JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION, www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezacjrp/asp/State-Offense.asp (last visited Nov. 6, 2012).
152. See, e.g., Kenneth B. Nunn, The Child as Other: Race and Differential Treatment in the Juvenile Justice System, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 679, 681-82, 706-07 (2002) (discussing the juvenile justice system's disparate treatment of African American children).
153. Feld, Transformation Part II, supra note 16, at 332.
154. Tamar R. Birckhead, Delinquent by Reason of Poverty, 38 WASH U. J.L. & POL'Y 53, 63 (2012).
155. Robin Walker Sterling, Still at the Back of the Bus: In re Gault and the Unfinished Due Process Revolution in Juvenile Justice, 72 MD. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 10-29), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2079767;
156. see also JAMES BELL & LAURA JOHN RIDOLFI, W. HAYWOOD BURNS INST., ADORATION OF THE QUESTION: REFLECTIONS ON THE FAILURE TO REDUCE RACIAL & ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 3 (Shadi Rahimi ed., 2008) ("From the earliest days of our nation, segregationist policies dictated that the detention of youth of color would be different than that of [w]hite youth . . . .").
157. quoting ROBERT M. MENNEL, THORNS & THISTLES: JUVENILE DELINQUENTS IN THE United States 1825-1940, at 75 (1973).
158. citing HOUSE OF REFORMATION FOR COLORED CHILDREN, SECOND ANNUAL REPORT, 1875, at 7 (Baltimore Price Current Printing, 1875). Although this Article's scope is limited to the historical treatment of black youth, it is important to note that this country's powerful elite subjected other youth of color to similar treatment. Most notably, disobedient Native American children faced labor and confinement for their purported transgressions in the nineteenth century.
159. quoting WARD CHURCHILL, KILL THE INDIAN, SAVE THE MAN: THE GENOCIDAL IMPACT OF AMERICAN INDIAN RESIDENTIAL SCHOOLS (2004).
160. see also Feld, Transformation Part II, supra note 16, at 340-42 (discussing the demand for black southern laborers to work in northern industrial factories after World War I).
161. See Feld, Race, Politics, and Juvenile Justice, supra note 21, at 1464;
162. Feld, Transformation Part II, supra note 16, at 343-45.
163. citing Cecile P. Frey, The House of Refuge for Colored Children, 66 J. NEGRO HIST. 10, 17 (1981).
164. quoting Mary Huff Diggs, The Problems and Needs of Negro Youth as Revealed by Delinquency and Crime Statistics, 9 J. NEGRO EDUC. 311, 313-16 (1940).
165. Feld, Transformation, Part II, supra note 16, at 340, 345-46.
166. Feld, Race, Politics, and Juvenile Justice, supra note 21, at 1507.
167. Perry L. Moriearty, Framing Justice: Media, Bias and Legal Decisionmaking, 69 MD. L. REV. 849, 870-73 (2010) (surveying media treatment of black youth and crime in the 1990s).
168. For a survey of contemporary juvenile court purpose clauses and a discussion of how victims' rights allow for racial bias, see Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 361, 362, 406-07 (1996);
169. see also Henning, Victims' Rights, supra note 56, at 1112-14, 1118-22, 1143 (summarizing changes in purpose clauses across the country).
170. NAT'L COUNCIL ON CRIME & DELINQUENCY, AND JUSTICE FOR SOME: DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT OF YOUTH OF COLOR IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 3 (2007).
171. Easy Access to Juvenile Populations: 1990-2011, OFF. JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION, www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezapop (last visited Nov. 6, 2012).
172. HOWARD N. SNYDER, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ARREST IN THE United States, 1980-2009, at 22 (2011).
173. Easy Access to Juvenile Court Statistics: 1985-2009, OFF. JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION, www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezajcs (last visited Nov. 6, 2012).
174. Statistical Briefing Book, OFF. JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION, http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/corrections/qa08203.asp?qaDate=2007 (last visited Nov. 6, 2012).
175. NEELUM ARYA & IAN AUGARTEN, CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, 2 CRITICAL CONDITION: AFRICAN-AMERICAN YOUTH IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 25 (2005).
176. NEELUM ARYA ET AL., CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, 3 AMERICA'S INVISIBLE CHILDREN: LATINO YOUTH AND THE FAILURE OF JUSTICE 6 (2009).
177. NEELUM ARYA & ADDIE C. ROLNICK, CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, 1 A TANGLED WEB OF JUSTICE: AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE YOUTH IN FEDERAL, STATE, AND TRIBAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 8 (2008).
178. See, e.g., M. Lynn Sherrod et al., Childish Behavior; Criminal Behavior, HUNTSVILLE TIMES, June 1, 2008, at A23 (noting that referrals from Clayton County schools skyrocketed from 36 in 1995 to 264 in 1998 when police officers were stationed in schools, and to 1,262 in 2003).
179. ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, TEST, PUNISH, AND PUSH OUT: HOW "ZERO TOLERANCE" AND HIGH-STAKES TESTING FUNNEL YOUTH INTO THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE 15 (rev. 2010).
180. Donna St. George, Judge Steve Teske Seeks to Keep Kids with Minor Problems Out of Court, WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ lifestyle/style/judge-steveteske-seeks-to-keep-kids-with-minor-problems-out-of- court/2011/09/21/gIQA1y8ZsL- story.html.
181. Heather Cobb, Note, Separate and Unequal: The Disparate Impact of School-Based Referrals to Juvenile Court, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 581, 583-84 (2009);
182. see also Donna St. George, Black Students Are Arrested More Often, Data Reveal, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 2012, at A2 (discussing a U.S. Department of Education study of school systems that have more than fifty thousand students enrolled and its findings that "African American students represented 24 percent of enrollment but 35 percent of arrests," while "[w]hite students accounted for 31 percent of enrollment and 21 percent of arrests").
183. FERRIS BUELLER'S DAY OFF (Paramount Pictures 1986).
184. LLOYD D. JOHNSTON ET AL., 1 MONITORING THE FUTURE: NATIONAL SURVEY RESULTS ON DRUG USE 1975-2010, at 1 (2011) [hereinafter JOHNSTON ET AL., MONITORING THE FUTURE];
185. Youth Online: High School YRBS, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://apps.nccd.cdc.gov/youthonline (last visited Nov. 6, 2012) [hereinafter CDC].
186. Statistical Briefing Book, OFF. JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION, http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/crime/jar.asp (last visited Nov. 6, 2012) (indicating that African American youth accounted for just 17% of the total youth population but represented 27% of all youth arrests for drug abuse violations).
187. Charles Puzzanchera, Juvenile Arrests 2008, JUV. JUST. BULL., Dec. 2009, at 9.
188. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., YOUTH VIOLENCE: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 30 (2001)
189. (citing ALFRED BLUMSTEIN ET AL., COMM. ON RESEARCH ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & THE ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL CAREERS AND "CAREER CRIMINALS" (1986));
190. Roy L. Austin & Mark D. Allen, Racial Disparities in Arrest Rates as an Explanation of Racial Disparity in Commitment to Pennsylvania's Prisons, 37 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 200, 208-14 (2000);
191. Darnell F. Hawkins et al., Race, Ethnicity, and Serious Juvenile Offending, in SERIOUS & VIOLENT JUVENILE OFFENDERS: RISK FACTORS AND SUCCESSFUL INTERVENTIONS 30-33 (Rolf Loeber & David P. Farrington eds., 1998);
192. Robert J. Sampson & Janet L. Lauritsen, Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Crime and Criminal Justice in the United States, 21 CRIME & JUST. 311, 330-33 (1997).
193. See D. Wayne Osgood et al., Analyzing Multiple-Item Measures of Crime and Deviance I: Item Response Theory Scaling, 18 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 267, 272 (2002) (pointing to the concern that "self-report measures typically over emphasize less serious, and therefore less important, forms of offending");
194. Terence P. Thornberry & Marvin D. Krohn, The Self- Report Method for Measuring Delinquency and Crime, in 4 CRIMINAL JUSTICE 33, 58 (2000) (providing an historical survey of validity and reliability studies of the self-reporting methodology, including those that questioned whether African American males underreport delinquency).
195. N.D. DEP'T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, DO STUDENTS TELL THE TRUTH ON THE YOUTH RISK BEHAVIOR SURVEY (YRBS)? (1990), available at http://www.dpi.state.nd.us/ health/yrbs/truth.pdf (identifying ways in which survey design ensures reliable responses, including comparison with other surveys showing that YRBSs receive similar results, consistency over time, removal of inconsistent answers on the same answer sheet from the data set, logic within groups of questions, psychometric studies confirming the validity of the test, logical subgroup differences such as greater male reported use of smokeless tobacco than female, and a survey environment ensuring anonymity of students).
196. Statistical Briefing Book, OFF. JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION, http://ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/population/qa01402.asp?qaDate=2010 (last visited Nov. 6, 2012).
197. Heidi E. Grunwald et al., Influences of Neighborhood Context, Individual History and Parenting Behavior on Recidivism Among Juvenile Offenders, 39 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 1067, 1068-69, 1076 (2010) (discussing social disorganization theory and effects of neighborhood processes on adolescent recidivism, and noting that youths living in environments with ethnic homogeneity, poverty, and well-organized drug trafficking will easily turn to illicit activities);
198. Beverly Kingston et al., A Test of Social Disorganization Theory in High-Risk Urban Neighborhoods, 41 YOUTH & SOC'Y 53, 55-61 (2009) (discussing the history of social disorganization theory, including neighborhood effects and opportunity structures);
199. Jeremy Mennis et al., The Effect of Neighborhood Characteristics and Spatial Spillover on Urban Juvenile Delinquency and Recidivism, 63 PROF. GEOGRAPHER 174, 175-76 (2011) (summarizing the history of the theory of "neighborhood effects" on crime, including the role of neighborhoods in promoting or prohibiting crime and delinquency through cohesion among neighbors and community-level social control).
200. See generally John P. Hoffmann & Timothy O. Ireland, Strain and Opportunity Structures, 20 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 263, 266-71 (2004) (discussing "legitimate" opportunity structures such as education that facilitate the accumulation of wealth and reduce the risk of crime and "illegitimate" opportunity structures that create both physical and social opportunities for crime);
201. Michelle Little & Laurence Steinberg, Psychosocial Correlates of Adolescent Drug Dealing in the Inner City: Potential Roles of Opportunity, Conventional Commitments, and Maturity, 43 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 357, 359-60 (2006) (studying neighborhood effects on urban adolescent drug dealing and noting a rising number of opportunities for juveniles to sell drugs in urban areas);
202. Ramiro Martínez, Jr. et al., Social Disorganization, Drug Market Activity, and Neighborhood Violent Crime, 43 URB. AFF. REV. 846, 863-64 (2008) (stating that residential instability has "significant and positive direct effects on rates of aggravated assault").
203. See Michael Tonry, The Social, Psychological, and Political Causes of Racial Disparities in the American Criminal Justice System, in 39 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 273, 274-75 (Michael Tonry ed., 2010) (contending that "[n]o credible case can be made that gross racial disparities were unforeseeable").
204. For a history of social policies and practices including contemporary criminal justice policies and practices that maintain current social stratification of whites over poor blacks, see DOUGLAS S. MASSEY, CATEGORICALLY UNEQUAL: THE AMERICAN STRATIFICATION SYSTEM 54, 94, 251 (2007) (examining the history of social stratification and arguing that crime policy supports white interests);
205. Lawrence D. Bobo & Devon Johnson, A Taste for Punishment: Black and White Americans' Views on the Death Penalty and the War on Drugs, 1 DU BOIS REV. 151, 151-56 (2004) (examining scholars who view changes in U.S. criminal justice policy as an effort to reassert control and domination over African Americans);
206. Glenn C. Loury, Race, Incarceration, and American Values, in RACE, INCARCERATION, & AMERICAN VALUES 3, 36-37 (2008) (examining mass incarceration as a "principal vehicle for the reproduction of racial hierarchy in our society");
207. Löic Wacquant, From Slavery to Mass Incarceration: Rethinking the 'Race Question' in the US, 13 NEW LEFT REV. 41, 41-60 (2002) [hereinafter
208. See Jeffrey Fagan & Tracey L. Meares, Punishment, Deterrence and Social Control: The Paradox of Punishment in Minority Communities, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 173, 176-77, 180 (2008) (discussing the failure of punitive legal sanctions like incarceration to reduce crime, especially in poor communities of color).
209. Tamar R. Birckhead, Toward a Theory of Procedural Justice for Juveniles, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 1447, 1479-80 (2009) (summarizing studies on the link between perceived fairness in the judicial system and recidivism among juveniles and concludng that despite individual shortcomings in various studies, a link exists between a lack of faith in the judicial system and higher recidivism rates);
210. Sandra Graham & Colleen Halliday, The Social Cognitive (Attributional) Perspective on Culpability in Adolescent Offenders, in YOUTH ON TRIAL, supra note 65, at 345, 354, 358-59 (observing that youth who perceive the legal process as unfair are more likely to project a negative attitude, which juvenile justice decision makers may read as "unremorseful" and therefore more culpable);
211. Kristina Murphy & Tom Tyler, Procedural Justice and Compliance Behaviour: The Mediating Role of Emotions, 38 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 652, 662-65 (2008) (confirming earlier studies that connect people's perception of fairness with their willingness to cooperate with authority).
212. George S. Bridges & Sara Steen, Racial Disparities in Official Assessments of Juvenile Offenders: Attributional Stereotypes as Mediating Mechanisms, 63 AM. SOC. REV. 554, 561 (1998) (discussing an empirical study in which probation officers' narratives about the youth they supervised were analyzed for attributions of character, likeliness to reoffend, and sentencing, resulting in a finding that officers view black youth as more likely to reoffend than white youth);
213. Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 876, 876-93 (2004) (discussing studies that show that black targets are spontaneously viewed as more criminal);
214. Nicholas Espiritu, (E)racing Youth: The Racialized Construction of California's Proposition 21 and the Development of Alternate Contestations, 52 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 189, 199-201 (2005) (discussing California polls showing an attribution of a perceived spike in crime rates to youth of color, an overrepresentation of youth in the media's representation of violence, and a de facto assumption of gang membership for youth of color under California's gang monitoring system);
215. Aliya Saperstein & Andrew M. Penner, The Race of a Criminal Record: How Incarceration Colors Racial Perceptions, 57 SOC. PROBS. 92, 96 (2010) (summarizing studies showing an association of blackness with criminality);
216. Scott & Steinberg, Blaming Youth, supra note 21, at 809-10 (pointing out that African American youths are perceived as "being more mature, more dangerous, and more deserving of punishment than are comparable white youths").
217. See James Bell, Throwaway Children: Conditions of Confinement and Incarceration, in THE PUBLIC ASSAULT ON AMERICA'S CHILDREN: POVERTY, VIOLENCE AND JUVENILE INJUSTICE 188, 189 (Valerie Polakow ed., 2000);
218. see, e.g., Nicholas K. Peart, Op-Ed., Why Is the N.Y.P.D. After Me?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2011, at SR6 (discussing the firsthand experience of a young black man stopped and frisked by the New York Police Department numerous times, sometimes violently, for no apparent reason).
219. Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1550-53 (2005) (discussing ways in which local news provides data we use to develop opinions about criminal justice policy, including associating criminality with African Americans).
220. Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 465, 476 (2010).
221. See Sandra Graham & Brian S. Lowery, Priming Unconscious Racial Stereotypes About Adolescent Offenders, 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 483, 494, 499 (2004).
222. Aneeta Rattan et al., Race and the Fragility of the Legal Distinction Between Juveniles and Adults, PLOS ONE, May 2012, at 1-5.
223. citing Transcript of Oral Argument, Sullivan v. Florida, 129 S. Ct. 2157 (2010) (No. 08-7621).
224. Brooke Donald, Stanford Psychologists Examine How Race Affects Juvenile Sentencing, STAN. NEWS (May 24, 2012), http://news.stanford.edu/news/2012/may/ race-juvenile-offenders- 052412.html (quoting Aneeta Rattan, lead author of the Stanford study).
225. Tara L. Mitchell et al., Racial Bias in Mock Juror Decision-Making: A Meta-Analytic Review of Defendant Treatment, 29 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 621, 629 (2005);
226. Margaret C. Stevenson & Bette L. Bottoms, Race Shapes Perceptions of Juvenile Offenders in Criminal Court, 39 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1660, 1680 (2009).
227. discussing research on "colorism" and citing Ni- lanjana Dasgupta, Group Entitativity and Group Perception: Associations Between Features and Psychological Judgment, 77 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 991 (1999)
228. Travis L. Dixon & Keith B. Maddox, Skin Tone, Crime News, and Social Reality Judgments: Priming the Stereotype of the Dark and Dangerous Black Criminal, 35 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1555 (2005).
229. Kareem L. Jordan & Tina L. Freiburger, Examining the Impact of Race and Ethnicity on the Sentencing of Juveniles in the Adult Court, 21 CRIM. JUST. POL'Y REV. 185, 194-97 (2010);
230. BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE COURT 265 (1999);
231. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1196-97, 1221-26 (2009) (discussing an empirical study showing that trial judges hold implicit biases along racial lines that can affect their judicial decision making).
232. See Scott & Steinberg, Blaming Youth, supra note 21, at 809-10.
233. Robert J. Smith & Justin D. Levinson, The Impact of Implicit Racial Bias on the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 795, 796, 804, 822 (2012) (suggesting that despite compelling proof of implicit bias in a range of domains, there is no direct empirical proof of implicit bias in prosecutorial decision making).
234. But see WAYNE MCKENZIE ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTION AND RACIAL JUSTICE: USING DATA TO ADVANCE FAIRNESS IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTION 2, 6-9 (2009), available at http://www.vera.org/download? file=3482/Using-data-to- advance-fairness-in-criminal-prosecution.pdf (describing the Prosecution and Racial Justice (PRJ) program's data collection efforts at prosecutor offices, which include multivariable data collection at four different decision-making stages (initial case screening, charging, plea offers, and disposition) and interpretation of the data);
235. Geoff Ward et al., Racial Politics of Juvenile Justice Policy Support: Juvenile Court Worker Orientations Toward Disproportionate Minority Confinement, 1 RACE & JUST. 154, 179 n.16 (2011) (finding "[b]y a very wide margin, defense attorneys are most inclined to strongly agree or agree that minority overrepresentation is a problem, followed by probation officers and judges," and noting that "[f]ew prosecutors express any agreement with this statement").
236. Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 35 (1998) (noting that prosecutors may unconsciously view a case involving a white victim as more serious than a case involving a black victim in making charging and other related decisions);
237. Feld, Race, Politics, and Juvenile Justice, supra note 21, at 1461-83 (tracing the racial and political history from the first juvenile courts to the due process revolution).
238. Feld, Race, Politics, and Juvenile Justice, supra note 21, at 1491-93 (pointing out that the Supreme Court's decision not to extend the jury right to juveniles rested partly on the need for juvenile judges to have "flexibility");
239. Andrew M. Carter, Age Matters: The Case for a Constitutionalized Infancy Defense, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 687, 734-49 (2006) (arguing that the infancy defense is deeply rooted in tradition and constitutionally mandated because juveniles under fourteen lack the moral culpability for criminal conduct);
240. Merril Sobie, The Delinquent "Toddler": The Minimum Age of Responsibility, CRIM. JUST., Winter 2012, at 36, 36, 41-42 (arguing for the establishment of a minimum age of criminal responsibility);
241. Lara A. Bazelon, Note, Exploding the Superpredator Myth: Why Infancy Is the Preadolescent's Best Defense in Juvenile Court, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 159, 190-98 (2000) (suggesting revitalization of the infancy defense by adopting a presumption against the necessary mens rea for preadolescents).
242. See, e.g., Nina W. Chernoff & Marsha L. Levick, Beyond the Death Penalty: Implications of Adolescent Development Research for the Prosecution, Defense, and Sanctioning of Youthful Offenders, 39 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 209, 213-15 (2005);
243. See, e.g., ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 33-39 (2007);
244. Victor L. Streib, Prosecutorial Discretion in Juvenile Homicide Cases, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1071, 1083-84 (2005) (arguing that "jurisdictions that permit prosecutors to file juvenile homicide cases either in juvenile court or in criminal court raise the most serious concerns about unchecked prosecutorial discretion").
245. See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, You've Come a Long Way, Baby: Two Waves of Juvenile Justice Reforms as Seen from Jena, Louisiana, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 511, 515 (2009) (suggesting that the absence of judicial review of prosecutors' discretionary decisions is troubling because racial prejudice can affect discretionary judgments made in the juvenile justice system, as seen in Louisiana);
246. Andrew E. Taslitz, Judging Jena's D.A.: The Prosecutor and Racial Esteem, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 393, 416-21 (2009) (stating that "[t]ruly unconscious racial prejudice, even by whites thoroughly and consciously committed to racial equality, is likely even more widespread").
247. See Ellen Marrus, Best Interests Equals Zealous Advocacy: A Not So Radical View of Holistic Representation for Children Accused of Crime, 62 MD. L. REV. 288, 304-05 (2003).
248. See RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 19 (1997);
249. Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1716-18 (2006);
250. see also Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, The Wages of Antiquated Procedural Thinking: A Critique of Chicago v Morales, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 197, 199-200 (discussing the passage and enforcement of gang loitering legislation in response to "voluminous citizen complaints about" violence and "open-air drug dealing").
251. Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851, 873-89 (1995) (proposing that financial incentives be applied to various duties of the public prosecutor);
252. Prosecutorial Discretion, VERA INST. JUST., http://www.vera.org/project/ prosecution-and-racial-justice (last visited Nov. 6, 2012).
253. See, e.g., John F. Irwin & Daniel L. Real, Unconscious Influences on Judicial Decision- Making: The Illusion of Objectivity, 42 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1, 8-9 (2010) (summarizing research on strategies to reduce implicit judicial bias);
254. citing Patricia G. Devine & Margo J. Monteith, Automaticity and Control in Stereotyping, in DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 339, 346-47 (Shelly Chaiken & Yaacov Trope eds., 1999);
255. Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945, 962-65 (2006).
256. See Margo J. Monteith et al., Suppression as a Stereotype Control Strategy, 2 PERSONALITY & SOC. PYSCHOL. REV. 63, 64 (1998);
257. B. Keith Payne et al., Best Laid Plans: Effects of Goals on Accessibility Bias and Cognitive Control in Race-Based Misperceptions of Weapons, 38 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 384, 390-95 (2002).
258. Nilanjana Dasgupta & Anthony G. Greenwald, On the Malleability of Automatic Attitudes: Combating Automatic Prejudice with Images of Admired and Disliked Individuals, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 800, 802, 806-07 (2001).
259. See generally Anna Roberts, (Re)forming the Jury: Detection and Disinfection of Implicit Juror Bias, 44 CONN. L. REV. 827, 852-60 (2012) (discussing the controversial proposal that jurors, judges, and attorneys take the IAT).
260. See Peggy M. Tobolowsky, Victim Participation in the Criminal Justice Process: Fifteen Years After the President's Task Force on Victims of Crime, 25 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 21, 48-58 (1999) (discussing the right of victims to be present at the criminal justice proceedings).
261. See Catherine M. Coles, Community Prosecution, Problem Solving, and Public Accountability: The Evolving Strategy of the American Prosecutor 11 (Program in Criminal Justice Policy & Mgmt. of the Malcolm Wiener Ctr. for Soc. Policy, Working Paper No. 00-02-04, 2000), available at http://130.203.133.150/viewdoc/download;jsessionid= D35E277C93209F69FA3353DA3EC5F238?doi=10.1.1.91.2361&rep=rep1&type=pbf (discussing the "considerable discretion" of the district attorney to retain prosecutors based on the number of trials, percentage of convictions and pleas, and the length of sentences attained).
262. See Barton Poulson, A Third Voice: A Review of Empirical Research on the Psychological Outcomes of Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 167, 180 (collecting and analyzing studies);
263. see also Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse and Apology into Criminal Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85, 132 (2004) (discussing studies that confirm that offenders are more likely to apologize after meaningful face-to-face interaction with their victim).
264. Stanford, 537 U.S. 968 (2002), which endorsed scientific arguments regarding adolescent development, drew "a groundswell of attention to the teen brain from advocates, commentators, and the media," leading to the later involvement of developmental research in juvenile criminal cases).
265. See Thomas Grisso, Adolescents' Decision Making: A Developmental Perspective on Constitutional Provisions in Delinquency Cases, 32 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 3, 13-14 (2006) (discussing the difficulties of evaluating the capacities of youths on a case-bycase basis).
266. David O. Brink, Immaturity, Normative Competence, and Juvenile Transfer: How (Not) to Punish Minors for Major Crimes, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1555, 1584 (2004) (noting that, despite a strong correlation between age and maturity, there will always be individual variance).
267. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.12.010 (2010) (including diversion from the formal adjudication process as a goal of the system);
268. D.C. CODE § 16-2301.02(2) (LexisNexis 2001) (including "promot[ing] youth development . . . through early intervention, diversion, and community-based alternatives" as a goal);
269. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 388.24(2)(1) (West Supp. 2012) (outlining goals of Minnesota's pretrial diversion "to provide eligible offenders with an alternative to adjudication that emphasizes restorative justice");
270. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-260.04 (LexisNexis 2011) (outlining factors to consider before diversion including the juvenile's age and nature of offense, but no overt reference to developmental considerations);
271. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-71 (West Supp. 2012) (outlining factors to consider before diversion including, broadly, a juvenile's "age and maturity");
272. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 938.01(2)(e) (West Supp. 2011) (including in the legislative intent the goal of diverting juveniles "as warranted").
273. See James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1543 (1981) (discussing prosecutors' reluctance to limit their discretion and impose internal guidelines).
274. But see INST. FOR JUDICIAL ADMIN.-ABA JOINT COMM'N ON JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, STANDARDS RELATING TO PROSECUTION §§ 4.1-4.4, at 17-18 (1979) (discussing standards for the "[p]readjudication [p]hase" that impose certain duties on juvenile prosecutors);
275. NAT'L DIST. ATT'YS ASS'N, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 4-11, at 64-67 (3d ed. 2010) (outlining various factors a prosecutor should consider when making decisions regarding juveniles, such as whether to transfer them to adult court).
276. Rory K. Little, The ABA's Project to Revise the Criminal Justice Standards for the Prosecution and Defense Functions, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1111, 1112-20 (2011) (discussing the development of standards to guide prosecutorial decision making).
277. See Jeffrey Fagan, Contexts of Choice by Adolescents in Criminal Events, in YOUTH ON TRIAL, supra note 65, at 371, 390-91 (arguing that the claim of self-defense should be used more liberally as a claim of "contextual influence" in juvenile cases, considering juveniles' social environment in determining culpability for violent encounters);
278. See Martha Grace Duncan, "So Young and So Untender": Remorseless Children and the Expectations of the Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1469, 1491 (2002) (arguing that the practice of looking for sorrow in the first few hours after the crime inaccurately assumes that remorse is an "automatic reaction, not something that may be achieved over time");
279. Henning, Victims' Rights, supra note 56, at 1149. 316
280. See Bryan H. Ward, Sentencing Without Remorse, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 131, 142-44 (2006);
281. see also People v. Superior Court ex rel. Soon Ja Du, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 177, 181 (Ct. App. 1992) (discussing the trial court's grant of a probationary sentence after defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter because the defendant's failure to show remorse likely resulted from cultural and language barriers);
282. cf. Joseph A. Nese, Jr., Comment, The Fate of Mentally Retarded Criminals: An Examination of the Propriety of Their Execution Under the Eighth Amendment, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 373, 383 (2002) (discussing how "mentally retarded" criminal defendants' courtroom demeanor may give a false impression of lack of remorse).
283. See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2401 (2011) (recognizing the tenuous nature of juvenile confessions in overwhelming situations such as in the presence of a police officer);
284. Brandon L. Garrett, The Substance of False Confessions, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1051, 1112 (2010) (proposing that courts appoint experts to evaluate individuals who are suggestible to false confessions);
285. Allison D. Redlich, The Susceptibility of Juveniles to False Confessions and False Guilty Pleas, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 943, 953 (2010) (examining whether the tendency of adolescents to give false confessions translates into a higher rate of guilty pleas for juveniles than adults).
286. Id. at 952-53; see also Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891, 907-18 (2004) (describing modern police interrogation tactics that at times "lead the innocent to confess falsely");
287. Saul M. Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and Recommendations, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 3, 6-7, 19 (2010) (discussing how police interrogation presupposes guilt and employs tactics to extract confessions).
288. See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2401 (2011) (recognizing the tenuous nature of juvenile confessions in overwhelming situations such as in the presence of a police officer);
289. Brandon L. Garrett, The Substance of False Confessions, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1051, 1112 (2010) (proposing that courts appoint experts to evaluate individuals who are suggestible to false confessions);
290. Allison D. Redlich, The Susceptibility of Juveniles to False Confessions and False Guilty Pleas, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 943, 953 (2010) (examining whether the tendency of adolescents to give false confessions translates into a higher rate of guilty pleas for juveniles than adults).
291. Id. at 952-53; see also Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891, 907-18 (2004) (describing modern police interrogation tactics that at times "lead the innocent to confess falsely");
292. Saul M. Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and Recommendations, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 3, 6-7, 19 (2010) (discussing how police interrogation presupposes guilt and employs tactics to extract confessions).
293. see also Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Disparity Rules, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 374, 412 (2007) (discussing how facially neutral, yet racially loaded, factors such as "family structure" were replaced by "whether there is an adult willing to be responsible for assuring the youth's appearance in court" after the disproportionate minority contact (DMC) standard required states to consider how an agency's decisions may contribute to racial disparity)
294. quoting ELEANOR H. HOYTT ET AL., REDUCING RACIAL DISPARITIES IN JUVENILE DETENTION 57 (2004), available at http://www.aecf.org/upload/publicationfiles/ reducing%20racial%20disparities.pdf);
295. Dorothy E. Roberts, Criminal Justice and Black Families: The Collateral Damage of Over-Enforcement, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1005, 1020-27 (2001) (discussing the disparate treatment of black juvenile delinquents in a number of jurisdictions).
296. COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE JUVENILE COURT OF CLAYTON COUNTY, THE CLAYTON COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM, THE CLAYTON COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT, THE RIVERDALE POLICE DEPARTMENT, THE JONESBORO POLICE DEPARTMENT, THE FOREST PARK POLICE DEPARTMENT, THE CLAYTON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND CHILDREN SERVICES, THE CLAYTON CENTER FOR BEHAVIORAL HEALTH SERVICES, ROBERT E. KELLER, DISTRICT ATTORNEY AND THE GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 2-4 (2004) [hereinafter COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT], available at publichealth.lsuhsc.edu/iphj/ pdf/SOLibrary1.pdf (agreeing that minor acts of misbehavior by juvenile delinquents do not justify court intervention or supervision);
297. Cf. Josie Foehrenbach Brown, Developmental Due Process: Waging a Constitutional Campaign to Align School Discipline with Developmental Knowledge, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 929, 946, 965-70 (2009) (observing that school discipline policies including zero tolerance run counter to what we know about adolescent development and can be altogether harmful, and outlining recommended alternative disciplinary approaches).
298. Results from the Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative, ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., http://www.aecf.org/MajorInitiatives/ JuvenileDetentionAlternativesInitiative/JDAIResults.aspx (last visited Nov. 6, 2012).
299. Angela J. Davis, Racial Fairness in the Criminal Justice System: The Role of the Prosecutor, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 202, 206-10 (2007) (recognizing that even with standards in place, unconscious racism may still play into decision making and discussing the lack of legal remedies to counteract disparities in the system caused by implicit bias).
300. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-2301.02 (LexisNexis 2001) (asserting the purpose of the juvenile justice system includes "plac[ing] a premium on the rehabilitation of children");
301. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT. § 301.1 (McKinney 2008) (stating that in every juvenile proceeding, the court should consider the "needs and best interests of the respondent");
302. See 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(22) (2006) (requiring state plans to "reduce . . . the disproportionate number of juvenile members of minority groups, who come into contact with the juvenile justice system").
303. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2010 (2011);
304. see also § 15A-2011(a)-(b) (describing how a defendant may establish that "race was a significant factor in decisions to seek or impose the sentence of death").
305. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 2.56(1) (West Supp. 2012) (requiring "correctional impact statement[s]" to asses the impact of sentencing, parole, or probation reforms on minorities).
306. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 2-24b (West Supp. 2012) ("[A] racial and ethnic impact statement shall be prepared with respect to certain bills and amendments that could, if passed, increase or decrease the pretrial or sentenced population of the correctional facilities in this state.").
307. See Michael Pinard, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Confronting Issues of Race and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 457, 530-33 (2010) (surveying how Canada and numerous U.S. jurisdictions have taken measures to address racial inequities in criminal justice systems).
308. Some states have started training for prosecutors. See, e.g., ACT 4 JUVENILE JUSTICE, VERMONT: STATE PROFILE OF FEDERAL JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION FUNDING 1-3 (2012), available at http://act4jj.org/media/ factsheets/factsheet-66.pdf (noting that Vermont uses Title II funds to train prosecutors in adolescent brain development);
309. Jonathan Lippman, Rethinking Juvenile Justice, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 23, 2012, http://www.newyork lawjournal.com/PubArticleNY.jsp?id=1202539352935 (referring to effort by New York to hold trainings for prosecutors on adolescent development);
310. Juvenile Forensic Evaluations: Competency to Stand Trial and Treatment Amenability, CHILD. L. CENTER U.N.M., http://child law.unm.edu/programs-past.php (last visited Nov. 6, 2012) (discussing "training for Children's Court judges, prosecutors and public defenders with Dr. Thomas Grisso, a nationally recognized expert in adolescent development and the juvenile justice system");
311. PCCD Awards Recovery Grants to Assist Counties, Prosecutors Within Juvenile Justice System, ALIPESNEWS (Sept. 9, 2009, 11:45 AM), https://www.alipesnews.com/App.aspx#id=3058263000000000&languageId=4000 (discussing an award of $75,000 in federal funds to the Pennsylvania District Attorneys Institute to provide training for juvenile prosecutors, including child and adolescent development training).
312. James C. Backstrom & Gary L. Walker, The Role of the Prosecutor in Juvenile Justice: Advocacy in the Courtroom and Leadership in the Community, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 963, 982-87 (2006) (discussing strategies for preventing juvenile crime and advocating for a broader role for prosecutors in such efforts);
313. THOMAS GRISSO, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: ADOLESCENT OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL DISORDERS 6-13 (2004) (discussing study results);
314. Regina M. Foley, Academic Characteristics of Incarcerated Youth and Correctional Education Programs: A Literature Review, 9 J. EMOTIONAL & BEHAV. DISORDERS 248, 249, 257 (2001);
315. Linda A. Teplin et al., Psychiatric Disorders in Youth in Juvenile Detention, 59 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1133, 1133-38 (2002).
316. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2465 (2012) ("But none of what [Graham] said about children-about their distinctive (and transitory) mental traits and environmental vulnerabilities-is crime-specific.");
317. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010) ("No recent data provide reason to reconsider the Court's observations in Roper about the nature of juveniles.");
318. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005) ("The personality traits of juveniles are more transitory, less fixed.").
319. Laurence Steinberg et al., Reentry of Young Offenders from the Justice System: A Developmental Perspective, 2 YOUTH VIOLENCE & JUV. JUST. 21, 29-30 (2004) [hereinafter Steinberg et al., Reentry] (summarizing relevant literature on the obstacles to the rehabilitation of already incarcerated youths).
320. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966).
321. Kristin Henning, It Takes a Lawyer to Raise a Child?: Allocating Responsibilities Among Parents, Children, and Lawyers in Delinquency Cases, 6 NEV. L.J. 836, 862 (2006).
322. See, e.g., MAGELLAN HEALTH SERVS., PERSPECTIVES ON RESIDENTIAL AND COMMUNITYBASED TREATMENT FOR YOUTH AND FAMILIES 4 (2010), available at http://www.magellanhealth.com/media/2718/CommunityResidentailTreatment-White- Paper.pdf (noting the lack of research to prove effectiveness of residential treatments);
323. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., YOUTH VIOLENCE: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 118 (2001) (discussing evaluations of residential programs that show little promise of reducing subsequent crime and violence in delinquent youths);
324. UNIV. LEGAL SERVS., INC., OUT OF STATE, OUT OF MIND: THE HIDDEN LIVES OF D.C. YOUTH IN RESIDENTIAL TREATMENT CENTERS 10 (2009), available at http://www.uls-dc.org/out-2520of-2520state-2520out-2520of-2520mind-2520 revision-2520final.pdf (stating residential treatment centers are not evidence-based practices because there is "weak evidence" for the effectiveness of residential treatments).
325. BAZELON CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW, THE DETRIMENTAL EFFECTS OF GROUP PLACEMENTS/SERVICES FOR YOUTH WITH BEHAVIORAL HEALTH PROBLEMS 2 (2006), available at http://www.bazelon.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=NCd6- AmZxdg%3d&tabid=166 (positing that segregating youth with behavioral issues is more harmful than helpful).
326. UNIV. LEGAL SERVS., INC., supra note 402, at 7-10;
327. see U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-146T, RESIDENTIAL TREATMENT PROGRAMS: CONCERNS REGARDING ABUSE AND DEATH IN CERTAIN PROGRAMS FOR TROUBLED YOUTH 12-34 (2007) (detailing case studies of death and abuse of youth in residential treatment centers).
328. See Michael Bullis et al., Life on the "Outs"-Examination of the Facility-to-Community Transition of Incarcerated Youth, 69 EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 7, 7 (2002).
329. ASHLEY NELLIS & RICHARD HOOKS WAYMAN, YOUTH REENTRY TASK FORCE OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION COALITION, BACK ON TRACK: SUPPORTING YOUTH REENTRY FROM OUT-OF-HOME PLACEMENT TO THE COMMUNITY 17-18 (2009) (outlining the negative effects of out-of-home placement).
330. ASHLEY NELLIS & RICHARD HOOKS WAYMAN, YOUTH REENTRY TASK FORCE OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION COALITION, BACK ON TRACK: SUPPORTING YOUTH REENTRY FROM OUT-OF-HOME PLACEMENT TO THE COMMUNITY 17-18 (2009) (outlining the negative effects of out-of-home placement).
331. Richard Leiby, Cosby, Saying the Darndest Things, WASH. POST, May 19, 2004, at C3 (discussing Bill Cosby's public condemnation of African American families).
332. See, e.g., About Omega Boys Club, STREET SOLDIERS: OMEGA BOYS CLUB, http://www.street-soldiers.org/programs.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2012) (community-based program helping young men with conflict resolution);
333. About Us, LATIN AM. YOUTH CLUB, http:// www.layc-dc.org/index.php/about- us-intro.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2012) (communitybased holistic case management to aid at-risk youth);
334. Who We Are, CROWN HEIGHTS COMMUNITY MEDIATION CENTER, http://www.crownheightsmediationcenter.org/p/who-we-are.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2012) (community-based center helping youth navigate their environment in Brooklyn, New York).
335. The Racial Justice Improvement Project, A.B.A. CRIM. JUST. SEC., http://racialjustice project.weebly.com (last visited Nov. 6, 2012). In select jurisdictions, the ABA Racial Justice Improvement Project creates task forces, including district attorneys, in cooperation with courts, public defenders, police departments, and nonprofit organizations, to address discrete racial justice goals at different points in the criminal justice process.
336. Edgar Cahn & Cynthia Robbins, An Offer They Can't Refuse: Racial Disparity in Juvenile Justice and Deliberate Indifference Meet Alternatives that Work, 13 UDC L. REV. 71, 97-98 (2010) (discussing the success of the Time Dollar Youth Court program, which allows police to divert youth to teen courts rather than to the traditional adjudication format in juvenile cases);
337. See Joseph J. Cocozza et al., Diversion from the Juvenile Justice System: The Miami-Dade Juvenile Assessment Center Post-Arrest Diversion Program, 40 SUBSTANCE USE & MISUSE 935, 937-39 (2005) (discussing the success and characteristics of nonlegal interventions such as Functional Family Therapy and Multisystemic Therapy).
338. See Ctr. on Juvenile & Criminal Justice, Widening the Net in Juvenile Justice and the Dangers of Prevention and Early Intervention 1-6 (2001);
339. Mary Ellen Reimund, Is Restorative Justice on a Collision Course with the Constitu- tion?, 3 APPALACHIAN J.L. 1, 17-18 (2004);
340. Debra Oldenettel & Madeline Wordes, The Community Assessment Center Concept, JUV. JUST. BULL., Mar. 2000, at 10.
341. TRACY M. GODWIN ET AL., AM. PROB. & PAROLE ASS'N, PEER JUSTICE AND YOUTH EMPOWERMENT: AN IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE FOR TEEN COURT PROGRAMS 30 (1996) (pointing out due process concerns when youth are compelled to admit guilt before admission into diversion programs such as teen court).
342. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Goodbye to Hammurabi: Analyzing the Atavistic Appeal of Restorative Justice, 52 STAN. L. REV. 751, 761-63 (2000) (discussing the risk that prosecutors will use youth's incriminating statements against them at trial if victim-offender mediation is unsuccessful).
343. See Zachary K. Hamilton et al., Diverting Multi-Problem Youth from Juvenile Justice: Investigating the Importance of Community Influence on Placement and Recidivism, 25 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 137, 140-41 (2007) (discussing the theory that mere identification of diverted youth enhances probability of detention and stigma because of continued contact with the system).
344. Frank A. Orlando, Mediation Involving Children in the U.S.: Legal and Ethical Conflicts, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE ON TRIAL: PITFALLS AND POTENTIALS OF VICTIM-OFFENDER MEDIATION 333, 338 (Heinz Messmer & Hans-Uwe Otto eds., 1992) (discussing a study claiming that up to three-quarters of youth would not have been brought to the court's attention if a diversion program had not existed).