-
1
-
-
45249096829
-
-
See infra Part IV.C.
-
See infra Part IV.C.
-
-
-
-
2
-
-
45249084027
-
-
See Andrew M. Carter, Age Matters: The Case for a Constitutionalized Infancy Defense, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 687, 687-92 (2006) (discussing recent cases involving children convicted of serious crimes).
-
See Andrew M. Carter, Age Matters: The Case for a Constitutionalized Infancy Defense, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 687, 687-92 (2006) (discussing recent cases involving children convicted of serious crimes).
-
-
-
-
3
-
-
45249084476
-
-
See California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ([P]unishment should be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal defendant.); WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *20-21. This principle is sometimes referred to as the principle of penal proportionality.
-
See California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[P]unishment should be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal defendant."); WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *20-21. This principle is sometimes referred to as the principle of penal proportionality.
-
-
-
-
4
-
-
45249088939
-
-
See Mary Berkheiser, Capitalizing Adolescence: Juvenile Offenders on Death Row, 59 U. MIAMI L. REV. 135, 181-82 (2005).
-
See Mary Berkheiser, Capitalizing Adolescence: Juvenile Offenders on Death Row, 59 U. MIAMI L. REV. 135, 181-82 (2005).
-
-
-
-
5
-
-
45249093167
-
-
See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 9.6(a) (4th ed. 2003) [hereinafter LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW].
-
See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 9.6(a) (4th ed. 2003) [hereinafter LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW].
-
-
-
-
6
-
-
45249124651
-
-
Id
-
Id.
-
-
-
-
7
-
-
45249122375
-
-
See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 9.6(a) (2d ed. 2003) [hereinafter LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW]; Allen v. United States, 150 U.S. 551, 557-58 (1893).
-
See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 9.6(a) (2d ed. 2003) [hereinafter LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW]; Allen v. United States, 150 U.S. 551, 557-58 (1893).
-
-
-
-
8
-
-
33846622310
-
The Infancy Defense in the New Juvenile Court, 31
-
See
-
See Andrew Walkover, The Infancy Defense in the New Juvenile Court, 31 UCLA L. REV. 503, 511 (1984).
-
(1984)
UCLA L. REV
, vol.503
, pp. 511
-
-
Walkover, A.1
-
9
-
-
45249095757
-
-
See infra Part IV.D.
-
See infra Part IV.D.
-
-
-
-
10
-
-
0037332309
-
-
See infra Part III.D. See also Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEX. L. REV. 799, 829 (2003) (contending that the cognitive decision making of preadolescents differs from adults in so fundamental a manner as to justify only rehabilitative interventions, rather than punitive measures, in the lives of young children charged with criminal or delinquent acts).
-
See infra Part III.D. See also Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEX. L. REV. 799, 829 (2003) (contending that the cognitive decision making of preadolescents differs from adults in so fundamental a manner as to justify only rehabilitative interventions, rather than punitive measures, in the lives of young children charged with criminal or delinquent acts).
-
-
-
-
11
-
-
45249103040
-
-
For example, contracts entered into by children are void ab initio. Vent v. Osgood, 36 Mass. 572 (19 Pick. 572) (1837). See also Scott & Steinberg, supra note 9, at 803 (arguing that typical binary age classifications (minor versus adult), which ignore developmental differences between young children and adolescents, suffice in many areas, but juvenile justice policy requires a more nuanced approach).
-
For example, contracts entered into by children are void ab initio. Vent v. Osgood, 36 Mass. 572 (19 Pick. 572) (1837). See also Scott & Steinberg, supra note 9, at 803 (arguing that typical binary age classifications (minor versus adult), which ignore developmental differences between young children and adolescents, suffice in many areas, but juvenile justice policy requires a more nuanced approach).
-
-
-
-
12
-
-
45249119674
-
-
U.S. 1
-
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30 (1967).
-
(1967)
In re Gault
, vol.387
, pp. 30
-
-
-
13
-
-
45249115022
-
-
Id. at 18-22
-
Id. at 18-22.
-
-
-
-
14
-
-
45249124429
-
-
See LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 4, § 9.6(a).
-
See LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 4, § 9.6(a).
-
-
-
-
15
-
-
45249103666
-
-
See Walkover, supra note 7, at 551
-
See Walkover, supra note 7, at 551.
-
-
-
-
16
-
-
45249091827
-
-
See id. at 511-12; In re Tyvonne, 558 A.2d 661, 664 (Conn. 1989).
-
See id. at 511-12; In re Tyvonne, 558 A.2d 661, 664 (Conn. 1989).
-
-
-
-
17
-
-
70449779022
-
The Origins of the "Right and Wrong" Test of Criminal Responsibility and Its Subsequent Development in the United States: An Historical Survey, 54
-
See
-
See Anthony Platt & Bernard L. Diamond, The Origins of the "Right and Wrong" Test of Criminal Responsibility and Its Subsequent Development in the United States: An Historical Survey, 54 CAL. L. REV. 1227, 1230 (1966).
-
(1966)
CAL. L. REV
, vol.1227
, pp. 1230
-
-
Platt, A.1
Diamond, B.L.2
-
18
-
-
45249102391
-
Physical and Mental Infancy in the Criminal Law, 87
-
Frederick Woodbridge, Physical and Mental Infancy in the Criminal Law, 87 U. PA. L. REV. 426, 435 (1939).
-
(1939)
U. PA. L. REV
, vol.426
, pp. 435
-
-
Woodbridge, F.1
-
19
-
-
45249089593
-
-
Id. at 429
-
Id. at 429.
-
-
-
-
20
-
-
45249103449
-
-
Carter, supra note 2, at 708
-
Carter, supra note 2, at 708.
-
-
-
-
21
-
-
45249121466
-
-
Id
-
Id.
-
-
-
-
24
-
-
45249124217
-
-
Lara A. Bazelon, Note, Exploding the Superpredator Myth: Why Infancy Is the Preadolescent's Best Defense in Juvenile Court, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 159, 168-69 (2000).
-
Lara A. Bazelon, Note, Exploding the Superpredator Myth: Why Infancy Is the Preadolescent's Best Defense in Juvenile Court, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 159, 168-69 (2000).
-
-
-
-
25
-
-
45249111305
-
-
See Woodbridge, supra note 17, at 434
-
See Woodbridge, supra note 17, at 434.
-
-
-
-
26
-
-
45249097060
-
-
See LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 6, § 9.6(a) (citing cases in which the prosecution overcame the presumption of criminal incapacity for children under fourteen).
-
See LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 6, § 9.6(a) (citing cases in which the prosecution overcame the presumption of criminal incapacity for children under fourteen).
-
-
-
-
27
-
-
45249092059
-
-
Id
-
Id.
-
-
-
-
28
-
-
45249106997
-
-
Carter, supra note 2, at 711-14 (discussing early American cases involving the infancy defense). In the nineteenth century, William Blackstone's treatment of children in the criminal law, which included the tiered common law infancy defense, was, in effect, incorporated into American law. Platt & Diamond, supra note 16, at 1238.
-
Carter, supra note 2, at 711-14 (discussing early American cases involving the infancy defense). In the nineteenth century, William Blackstone's treatment of children in the criminal law, which included the tiered common law infancy defense, "was, in effect, incorporated into American law." Platt & Diamond, supra note 16, at 1238.
-
-
-
-
29
-
-
45249094890
-
-
Walkover, supra note 7, at 511 n.22.
-
Walkover, supra note 7, at 511 n.22.
-
-
-
-
30
-
-
45249092058
-
-
See id. at 507; Sanford J. Fox, Responsibility in the Juvenile Court, 11 WM. & MARY L. REV. 659, 660 (1970). See Godfrey v. State, 31 Ala. 323 (1858), for an application of this rule.
-
See id. at 507; Sanford J. Fox, Responsibility in the Juvenile Court, 11 WM. & MARY L. REV. 659, 660 (1970). See Godfrey v. State, 31 Ala. 323 (1858), for an application of this rule.
-
-
-
-
31
-
-
45249110364
-
supra note 2, at 714-19. While most states that codified the defense adopted the same age limits as the common law, a few others modified the age limits, lowering the age of presumed criminal capacity
-
See
-
See Carter, supra note 2, at 714-19. While most states that codified the defense adopted the same age limits as the common law, a few others modified the age limits, lowering the age of presumed criminal capacity. See id.
-
See id
-
-
Carter1
-
32
-
-
45249113203
-
-
See Walkover, supra note 7, at 513 n.32.
-
See Walkover, supra note 7, at 513 n.32.
-
-
-
-
33
-
-
0000346103
-
The Juvenile Court, 23
-
See
-
See Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 106-07 (1909).
-
(1909)
HARV. L. REV
, vol.104
, pp. 106-107
-
-
Mack, J.W.1
-
34
-
-
45249107716
-
-
See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE 33 (2005).
-
See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE 33 (2005).
-
-
-
-
35
-
-
45249117821
-
-
See Fox, supra note 29, at 665-72 (summarizing twentieth-century cases involving the applicability of the infancy defense in juvenile courts); Walkover, supra note 7, at 512-13.
-
See Fox, supra note 29, at 665-72 (summarizing twentieth-century cases involving the applicability of the infancy defense in juvenile courts); Walkover, supra note 7, at 512-13.
-
-
-
-
36
-
-
45249103890
-
-
See Walkover, supra note 7, at 513
-
See Walkover, supra note 7, at 513.
-
-
-
-
37
-
-
45249087632
-
-
See infra Part IV.B.
-
See infra Part IV.B.
-
-
-
-
38
-
-
45249089834
-
-
Another similar concept is criminal responsibility, usually discussed in the context of the insanity defense and the M'Naghten rule. See LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 6, § 7.2. The rule states that those who, due to mental disease or defect, do not know the nature and quality of an act or did not know that act to be wrong, cannot be subjected to criminal responsibility. Id.
-
Another similar concept is criminal responsibility, usually discussed in the context of the insanity defense and the "M'Naghten rule." See LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 6, § 7.2. The rule states that those who, due to mental disease or defect, do not know the nature and quality of an act or did not know that act to be wrong, cannot be subjected to criminal responsibility. Id.
-
-
-
-
39
-
-
45249095967
-
-
Id. § 9.1(b).
-
Id. § 9.1(b).
-
-
-
-
40
-
-
45249111095
-
-
See Walkover, supra note 7, at 509-10
-
See Walkover, supra note 7, at 509-10.
-
-
-
-
42
-
-
45249084245
-
-
In re G.T., 597 A.2d 638, 640 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
-
In re G.T., 597 A.2d 638, 640 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
-
-
-
-
44
-
-
45249105231
-
-
See, e.g., State v. Q.D., 685 P.2d 557, 561 (Wash. 1984).
-
See, e.g., State v. Q.D., 685 P.2d 557, 561 (Wash. 1984).
-
-
-
-
45
-
-
45249098424
-
-
See, e.g, id
-
See, e.g., id.
-
-
-
-
46
-
-
45249117407
-
-
However, considerations of the child's intent - or lack thereof - to commit the act may be relevant to the need of the state to provide psychological evaluation, counseling, or other social services. See infra Part V.
-
However, considerations of the child's "intent" - or lack thereof - to commit the act may be relevant to the need of the state to provide psychological evaluation, counseling, or other social services. See infra Part V.
-
-
-
-
47
-
-
45249101509
-
-
See Bazelon, supra note 23, at 160-61
-
See Bazelon, supra note 23, at 160-61.
-
-
-
-
48
-
-
45249105030
-
-
Id
-
Id.
-
-
-
-
49
-
-
45249091155
-
-
Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960). See also Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171-72 (1975); Richard J. Bonnie & Thomas Grisso, Adjudicative Competence and Youthful Offenders, in YOUTH ON TRIAL 73, 76-77 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000) (analyzing elements necessary to establish adjudicative competence). The Dusky standard also applies to the competency of a defendant to tender a plea. See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 389 (1993).
-
Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960). See also Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171-72 (1975); Richard J. Bonnie & Thomas Grisso, Adjudicative Competence and Youthful Offenders, in YOUTH ON TRIAL 73, 76-77 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000) (analyzing elements necessary to establish adjudicative competence). The Dusky standard also applies to the competency of a defendant to tender a plea. See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 389 (1993).
-
-
-
-
50
-
-
0023065213
-
-
See Thomas Grisso et al., Competency to Stand Trial in Juvenile Court, 10 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 1, 16 (1987).
-
See Thomas Grisso et al., Competency to Stand Trial in Juvenile Court, 10 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 1, 16 (1987).
-
-
-
-
51
-
-
45249100150
-
-
See Bonnie & Grisso, supra note 48, at 93; Vance L. Cowden & Geoffrey R. McKee, Competency to Stand Trial in Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings - Cognitive Maturity and the Attorney-Client Relationship, 33 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 629, 634 (1995).
-
See Bonnie & Grisso, supra note 48, at 93; Vance L. Cowden & Geoffrey R. McKee, Competency to Stand Trial in Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings - Cognitive Maturity and the Attorney-Client Relationship, 33 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 629, 634 (1995).
-
-
-
-
52
-
-
45249114800
-
-
See Bonnie & Grisso, supra note 48, at 93
-
See Bonnie & Grisso, supra note 48, at 93.
-
-
-
-
53
-
-
45249115633
-
-
See Cowden & McKee, supra note 50, at 635-36. Other possible factors accounting for the scant attention paid to competency issues in juvenile court proceedings include: (1) the uncertain status of defense attorneys in delinquency cases, with some attorneys operating more as a guardian of the child's best interests than a zealous advocate; (2) few opportunities for appellate consideration, given the informal nature of many juvenile court hearings and other procedural aspects of the juvenile court process; and (3) the failure of counsel to recognize potential competency issues regarding their clients. Id. at 636-40.
-
See Cowden & McKee, supra note 50, at 635-36. Other possible factors accounting for the scant attention paid to competency issues in juvenile court proceedings include: (1) the uncertain status of defense attorneys in delinquency cases, with some attorneys operating more as a guardian of the child's best interests than a zealous advocate; (2) few opportunities for appellate consideration, given the informal nature of many juvenile court hearings and other procedural aspects of the juvenile court process; and (3) the failure of counsel to recognize potential competency issues regarding their clients. Id. at 636-40.
-
-
-
-
54
-
-
45249092463
-
-
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-291 (West 2007); MINN. STAT. ANN. JUV. DEL. PROC. RULE § 20.01(1) (West 2007).
-
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-291 (West 2007); MINN. STAT. ANN. JUV. DEL. PROC. RULE § 20.01(1) (West 2007).
-
-
-
-
55
-
-
45249093166
-
-
See Bonnie & Grisso, supra note 48, at 85
-
See Bonnie & Grisso, supra note 48, at 85.
-
-
-
-
56
-
-
45249084026
-
-
Cf. id. at 97 (arguing that adjudicative competency determinations in juvenile court should have the same effect as in criminal court, but only with respect to juvenile court adjudications bearing the same consequences as sanctions in a criminal court for comparable offenses).
-
Cf. id. at 97 (arguing that adjudicative competency determinations in juvenile court should have the same effect as in criminal court, but only with respect to juvenile court adjudications bearing the same consequences as sanctions in a criminal court for comparable offenses).
-
-
-
-
57
-
-
45249101282
-
-
HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., OFF. OF JUV. JUST. AND DELINQ. PREVENTION, NAT'L CTR. FOR JUV. JUST., JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 2006 NATIONAL REPORT 93-99 (2006), available at http://ojjdp.ncjrs.gov/ojstatbb/nr2006/ downloads/NR2006.pdf (summarizing history of juvenile courts in the United States). See Mack, supra note 32, at 107.
-
HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., OFF. OF JUV. JUST. AND DELINQ. PREVENTION, NAT'L CTR. FOR JUV. JUST., JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 2006 NATIONAL REPORT 93-99 (2006), available at http://ojjdp.ncjrs.gov/ojstatbb/nr2006/ downloads/NR2006.pdf (summarizing history of juvenile courts in the United States). See Mack, supra note 32, at 107.
-
-
-
-
58
-
-
45249099687
-
-
See H. Warren Dunham, The Juvenile Court: Contradictory Orientations in Processing Offenders, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 508, 509 (1958). Connecticut and Wyoming were the final two states to establish juvenile courts; all other states had followed Illinois's lead by 1923. Id.
-
See H. Warren Dunham, The Juvenile Court: Contradictory Orientations in Processing Offenders, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 508, 509 (1958). Connecticut and Wyoming were the final two states to establish juvenile courts; all other states had followed Illinois's lead by 1923. Id.
-
-
-
-
59
-
-
45249111094
-
-
See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 53 (LexisNexis 2002) (original version at ch. 413, § 2 (1906)) (as far as practicable, [children brought before the juvenile court] shall be treated, not as criminals, but as children in need of aid, encouragement and guidance); see also ZIMRING, supra note 33, at 5-6; Mack, supra note 32, at 104 ([T]he state is the higher or the ultimate parent of all of the dependents within its borders.); id. at 109 (stating that the purpose of juvenile courts is [t]o save [the child] from the brand of criminality, the brand that sticks to it for life; to take it in hand and instead of first stigmatizing and then reforming it, to protect it from the stigma).
-
See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 53 (LexisNexis 2002) (original version at ch. 413, § 2 (1906)) ("as far as practicable, [children brought before the juvenile court] shall be treated, not as criminals, but as children in need of aid, encouragement and guidance"); see also ZIMRING, supra note 33, at 5-6; Mack, supra note 32, at 104 ("[T]he state is the higher or the ultimate parent of all of the dependents within its borders."); id. at 109 (stating that the purpose of juvenile courts is "[t]o save [the child] from the brand of criminality, the brand that sticks to it for life; to take it in hand and instead of first stigmatizing and then reforming it, to protect it from the stigma").
-
-
-
-
60
-
-
45249099062
-
-
See Mack, supra note 32, at 107, 109
-
See Mack, supra note 32, at 107, 109.
-
-
-
-
61
-
-
0000214541
-
The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75
-
See
-
See Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 MINN. L. REV. 691, 695 (1991).
-
(1991)
MINN. L. REV
, vol.691
, pp. 695
-
-
Feld, B.C.1
-
62
-
-
45249084475
-
-
See id
-
See id.
-
-
-
-
63
-
-
45249117177
-
-
See Solomon J. Greene, Note, Vicious Streets: The Crisis of the Industrial City and the Invention of Juvenile Justice, 15 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 135, 136-37 (2003).
-
See Solomon J. Greene, Note, Vicious Streets: The Crisis of the Industrial City and the Invention of Juvenile Justice, 15 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 135, 136-37 (2003).
-
-
-
-
64
-
-
45249120104
-
-
See Feld, supra note 60, at 693-95 (discussing the child-savers movement and the origins of the juvenile court); Mack, supra note 32, at 116-17 (noting that parents of children brought before the juvenile courts in the early twentieth century were often foreigners without an understanding of American methods and views and in need of kindly assistance).
-
See Feld, supra note 60, at 693-95 (discussing the "child-savers" movement and the origins of the juvenile court); Mack, supra note 32, at 116-17 (noting that parents of children brought before the juvenile courts in the early twentieth century were often foreigners "without an understanding of American methods and views" and in need of "kindly assistance").
-
-
-
-
65
-
-
0345846112
-
The Transformation of the Juvenile Court - Part II: Race and the "Crack Down" on Youth Crime, 84
-
See
-
See Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court - Part II: Race and the "Crack Down" on Youth Crime, 84 MINN. L. REV. 327, 339 (1999).
-
(1999)
MINN. L. REV
, vol.327
, pp. 339
-
-
Feld, B.C.1
-
66
-
-
45249124868
-
-
The Supreme Court echoed this sentiment in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966, and In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 1967, One reason the juvenile courts failed to fulfill their rehabilitative purpose was a lack of adequate funding. See Fox, supra note 29, at 673, I]f it is recalled that juvenile delinquent has traditionally referred to antisocial children, trespassers on middle-class norms, and junior enemies of the community, then it is more understandable that the public has been reluctant to open its purse for the benefit of those who stand poised against it, So long as the legal system thus isolates and highlights that aspect of the child which rationally calls for the least sympathy, and ignores the conditions of his life that would evoke a desire to help, the law simply serves to reinforce the severity of public attitudes. Id
-
The Supreme Court echoed this sentiment in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966), and In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). One reason the juvenile courts failed to fulfill their rehabilitative purpose was a lack of adequate funding. See Fox, supra note 29, at 673. [I]f it is recalled that "juvenile delinquent" has traditionally referred to antisocial children, trespassers on middle-class norms, and junior enemies of the community, then it is more understandable that the public has been reluctant to open its purse for the benefit of those who stand poised against it. . . . So long as the legal system thus isolates and highlights that aspect of the child which rationally calls for the least sympathy, and ignores the conditions of his life that would evoke a desire to help, the law simply serves to reinforce the severity of public attitudes. Id.
-
-
-
-
67
-
-
45249106533
-
-
See Gault, 387 U.S. at 25-26; Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 382 N.E.2d 725, 728 (Mass. 1978) (A half century's bitter experience has taught that where the safeguards attaching to criminal trials are foregone in juvenile proceedings, while the realities, after delinquency is found, fall short of the rehabilitative aspirations of the early sponsors of juvenile courts, children subjected to the process may be twice deprived.).
-
See Gault, 387 U.S. at 25-26; Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 382 N.E.2d 725, 728 (Mass. 1978) ("A half century's bitter experience has taught that where the safeguards attaching to criminal trials are foregone in juvenile proceedings, while the realities, after delinquency is found, fall short of the rehabilitative aspirations of the early sponsors of juvenile courts, children subjected to the process may be twice deprived.").
-
-
-
-
68
-
-
45249096828
-
-
Gault, 387 U.S. at 23-24.
-
Gault, 387 U.S. at 23-24.
-
-
-
-
69
-
-
45249092933
-
-
383 U.S. 541 1966
-
383 U.S. 541 (1966).
-
-
-
-
70
-
-
45249084244
-
-
Id. at 555-56
-
Id. at 555-56.
-
-
-
-
71
-
-
45249098423
-
-
Id. at 556
-
Id. at 556.
-
-
-
-
72
-
-
45249097280
-
-
Gault, 387 U.S. at 17-18. It is of no constitutional consequence - and of limited practical meaning - that the institution to which he is committed is called an Industrial School. The fact of the matter is that, however euphemistic the title, a 'receiving home' or an 'industrial school' for juveniles is an institution of confinement in which the child is incarcerated for a greater or lesser time. Id. at 27.
-
Gault, 387 U.S. at 17-18. It is of no constitutional consequence - and of limited practical meaning - that the institution to which he is committed is called an Industrial School. The fact of the matter is that, however euphemistic the title, a 'receiving home' or an 'industrial school' for juveniles is an institution of confinement in which the child is incarcerated for a greater or lesser time. Id. at 27.
-
-
-
-
73
-
-
45249111697
-
-
Id. at 30
-
Id. at 30.
-
-
-
-
74
-
-
45249085873
-
-
See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365 (1970) (The same considerations that demand extreme caution in factfinding to protect the innocent adult apply as well to the innocent child.); see also Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 530 (1975) ([I]n terms of potential consequences, there is little to distinguish an adjudicatory hearing . . . from a traditional criminal prosecution.).
-
See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365 (1970) ("The same considerations that demand extreme caution in factfinding to protect the innocent adult apply as well to the innocent child."); see also Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 530 (1975) ("[I]n terms of potential consequences, there is little to distinguish an adjudicatory hearing . . . from a traditional criminal prosecution.").
-
-
-
-
75
-
-
45249116942
-
-
Gault, 387 U.S. at 22-27.
-
Gault, 387 U.S. at 22-27.
-
-
-
-
76
-
-
45249088706
-
-
See Walkover, supra note 7, at 521
-
See Walkover, supra note 7, at 521.
-
-
-
-
77
-
-
45249114801
-
-
See Feld, supra note 64, at 361-66. But see FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AMERICAN YOUTH VIOLENCE 31-47 (1998) (expressing skepticism as to whether arrest statistics from 1980-1996 clearly establish rising rates of juvenile crime).
-
See Feld, supra note 64, at 361-66. But see FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AMERICAN YOUTH VIOLENCE 31-47 (1998) (expressing skepticism as to whether arrest statistics from 1980-1996 clearly establish rising rates of juvenile crime).
-
-
-
-
78
-
-
45249103039
-
-
See Jarod K. Hofacket, Note, Justice or Vengeance: How Young is Too Young for a Child to be Tried and Punished as an Adult?, 34 TEX. TECH L. REV. 159, 164 (2002-03); Bazelon, supra note 23, at 176-77.
-
See Jarod K. Hofacket, Note, Justice or Vengeance: How Young is Too Young for a Child to be Tried and Punished as an Adult?, 34 TEX. TECH L. REV. 159, 164 (2002-03); Bazelon, supra note 23, at 176-77.
-
-
-
-
79
-
-
45249105474
-
-
Bazelon, supra note 23, at 176-77; SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 56, at 96. See also Hofacket, supra note 77, at 164-68; Scott & Steinberg, supra note 9, at 807-11 (describing moral panic and exaggerated fears of increased youth violence, including racial and ethnic bias, leading to calls for overhaul of juvenile justice system).
-
Bazelon, supra note 23, at 176-77; SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 56, at 96. See also Hofacket, supra note 77, at 164-68; Scott & Steinberg, supra note 9, at 807-11 (describing "moral panic" and exaggerated fears of increased youth violence, including racial and ethnic bias, leading to calls for overhaul of juvenile justice system).
-
-
-
-
80
-
-
45249101721
-
-
See SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 56, at 96-97; Scott & Steinberg, supra note 9, at 805-06 (describing circumstances leading up to legislative reform of juvenile justice system in 1990s); Randi-Lynn Smallheer, Note, Sentence Blending and the Promise of Rehabilitation: Bringing the Juvenile Justice System Full Circle, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 259, 272-75 (1999); ZIMRING, supra note 76, at 11-15 (describing scope of legislative responses in 1990s to youth violence).
-
See SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 56, at 96-97; Scott & Steinberg, supra note 9, at 805-06 (describing circumstances leading up to legislative reform of juvenile justice system in 1990s); Randi-Lynn Smallheer, Note, Sentence Blending and the Promise of Rehabilitation: Bringing the Juvenile Justice System Full Circle, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 259, 272-75 (1999); ZIMRING, supra note 76, at 11-15 (describing scope of legislative responses in 1990s to youth violence).
-
-
-
-
81
-
-
37949020565
-
The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Punishment, Treatment, and the Difference It Makes, 68
-
discussing amendments to purpose clauses in several states, See
-
See Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Punishment, Treatment, and the Difference It Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821, 841-45 (1988) (discussing amendments to purpose clauses in several states).
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(1988)
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-
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Feld, B.C.1
-
82
-
-
45249110591
-
-
See SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 56, at 99. Massachusetts remains one of the few states with a purpose clause still focusing on the needs of the juvenile offender. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 53 (LexisNexis 2002) ([The juvenile court provisions of the statute] shall be liberally construed so that the care, custody and discipline of the children brought before the court shall approximate as nearly as possible that which they should receive from their parents, and that, as far as practicable, they shall be treated, not as criminals, but as children in need of aid, encouragement and guidance.).
-
See SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 56, at 99. Massachusetts remains one of the few states with a purpose clause still focusing on the needs of the juvenile offender. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 53 (LexisNexis 2002) ("[The juvenile court provisions of the statute] shall be liberally construed so that the care, custody and discipline of the children brought before the court shall approximate as nearly as possible that which they should receive from their parents, and that, as far as practicable, they shall be treated, not as criminals, but as children in need of aid, encouragement and guidance.").
-
-
-
-
83
-
-
45249105909
-
-
See SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 56, at 96-97
-
See SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 56, at 96-97.
-
-
-
-
84
-
-
45249108809
-
-
See id. at 97. For example, Massachusetts amended its statute in 1996 such that the records of proceedings involving youthful offenders conducted pursuant to an indictment, but not other cases involving delinquency, shall be open to public inspection in the same manner and to the same extent as adult criminal court records. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 60A. See generally Emily Bazelon, Public Access to Juvenile and Family Court: Should the Courtroom Doors Be Open or Closed?, 18 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 155 (1999-2000).
-
See id. at 97. For example, Massachusetts amended its statute in 1996 such that the records of proceedings involving youthful offenders conducted pursuant to an indictment, but not other cases involving delinquency, "shall be open to public inspection in the same manner and to the same extent as adult criminal court records." MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 60A. See generally Emily Bazelon, Public Access to Juvenile and Family Court: Should the Courtroom Doors Be Open or Closed?, 18 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 155 (1999-2000).
-
-
-
-
85
-
-
45249095310
-
-
SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 56, at 108-09.
-
SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 56, at 108-09.
-
-
-
-
86
-
-
45249098422
-
-
See ZIMRING, supra note 76, at 15
-
See ZIMRING, supra note 76, at 15.
-
-
-
-
87
-
-
45249111696
-
-
See SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 56, at 96
-
See SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 56, at 96.
-
-
-
-
88
-
-
45249124867
-
-
Judicial waiver or transfer involves a hearing before a judge who must determine whether the juvenile should be tried in juvenile court or transferred to criminal court. See Thomas F. Geraghty & Will Rhee, Learning from Tragedy: Representing Children in Discretionary Transfer Hearings, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 595, 602 (1998, At a judicial transfer hearing, the parties may produce evidence (including expert testimony) as to the likelihood of the child's successful rehabilitation. See id. at 603
-
Judicial waiver or transfer involves a hearing before a judge who must determine whether the juvenile should be tried in juvenile court or transferred to criminal court. See Thomas F. Geraghty & Will Rhee, Learning from Tragedy: Representing Children in Discretionary Transfer Hearings, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 595, 602 (1998). At a judicial transfer hearing, the parties may produce evidence (including expert testimony) as to the likelihood of the child's successful rehabilitation. See id. at 603.
-
-
-
-
89
-
-
45249113230
-
at 606-07. In states allowing prosecutorial discretion to transfer cases to criminal court, the juvenile's attorney is denied the opportunity to present evidence before a judge concerning the appropriate forum in which to adjudicate the case
-
See
-
See id. at 606-07. In states allowing prosecutorial discretion to transfer cases to criminal court, the juvenile's attorney is denied the opportunity to present evidence before a judge concerning the appropriate forum in which to adjudicate the case. See id.
-
See id
-
-
-
90
-
-
45249084703
-
-
See id. at 605-06. The proliferation of automatic transfer statutes - statutes that value only punishment and not rehabilitation - by state legislatures in recent years has sent a clear message to state judges that punishment is to be valued more than rehabilitation. Id. at 609 n.36.
-
See id. at 605-06. "The proliferation of automatic transfer statutes - statutes that value only punishment and not rehabilitation - by state legislatures in recent years has sent a clear message to state judges that punishment is to be valued more than rehabilitation." Id. at 609 n.36.
-
-
-
-
91
-
-
45249086970
-
-
Kim Taylor-Thompson, States of Mind/States of Development, 14 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 143, 143-44 (2003).
-
Kim Taylor-Thompson, States of Mind/States of Development, 14 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 143, 143-44 (2003).
-
-
-
-
92
-
-
45249088707
-
-
SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 56, at 103
-
SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 56, at 103.
-
-
-
-
93
-
-
45249083157
-
-
Id. at 96
-
Id. at 96.
-
-
-
-
94
-
-
0346613471
-
-
See Barry C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court: Youthfulness, Criminal Responsibility, and Sentencing Policy, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 68, 82-86 (1997).
-
See Barry C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court: Youthfulness, Criminal Responsibility, and Sentencing Policy, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 68, 82-86 (1997).
-
-
-
-
95
-
-
45249117193
-
-
See id
-
See id.
-
-
-
-
96
-
-
45249107959
-
-
SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 56, at 115. See generally Smallheer, supra note 79.
-
SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 56, at 115. See generally Smallheer, supra note 79.
-
-
-
-
97
-
-
45249119474
-
-
SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 56, at 115
-
SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 56, at 115.
-
-
-
-
98
-
-
45249120314
-
-
Id. For example, Ohio allows for discretionary serious youthful offender status - a form of blended sentencing - for children as young as ten who are adjudicated delinquent for committing an act that would be aggravated murder or murder if committed by an adult. OHIO. REV. CODE ANN. § 2152.11 (West 2002).
-
Id. For example, Ohio allows for "discretionary serious youthful offender status" - a form of blended sentencing - for children as young as ten who are adjudicated delinquent "for committing an act that would be aggravated murder or murder if committed by an adult." OHIO. REV. CODE ANN. § 2152.11 (West 2002).
-
-
-
-
99
-
-
45249094889
-
-
One commentator has argued that juvenile courts now so closely resemble adult criminal courts, except for the persisting procedural deficiencies of juvenile courts, that states should abolish the juvenile court. See Feld, supra note 93, at 68-70. Juveniles would thus be subject to prosecution in adult criminal court, but courts would recognize youthfulness as a mitigating factor in sentencing . . . . Id.
-
One commentator has argued that juvenile courts now so closely resemble adult criminal courts, except for the "persisting procedural deficiencies" of juvenile courts, that states should abolish the juvenile court. See Feld, supra note 93, at 68-70. Juveniles would thus be subject to prosecution in adult criminal court, but courts would "recognize youthfulness as a mitigating factor in sentencing . . . ." Id.
-
-
-
-
100
-
-
75449150611
-
-
See, e.g., Lawrence Kohlberg, The Development of Children's Orientations Toward a Moral Order: I. Sequence in the Development of Moral Thought, 6 VITA HUMANA 11, 30 (1963) ([L]arge groups of moral concepts and ways of thought only attain meaning at successively advanced ages and require the extensive background of social experience and cognitive growth represented by the age factor.); Walkover, supra note 7, at 541-42 (While research since Piaget has tended to view moral development more in terms of a continuum than stages . . . the conclusion that younger children generally lack the internalized set of social controls found in late adolescents has been confirmed.);
-
See, e.g., Lawrence Kohlberg, The Development of Children's Orientations Toward a Moral Order: I. Sequence in the Development of Moral Thought, 6 VITA HUMANA 11, 30 (1963) ("[L]arge groups of moral concepts and ways of thought only attain meaning at successively advanced ages and require the extensive background of social experience and cognitive growth represented by the age factor."); Walkover, supra note 7, at 541-42 ("While research since Piaget has tended to view moral development more in terms of a continuum than stages . . . the conclusion that younger children generally lack the internalized set of social controls found in late adolescents has been confirmed.");
-
-
-
-
101
-
-
0034485063
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-
Elizabeth Caufman & Laurence Steinberg, (Im)Maturity of Judgment in Adolescence: Why Adolescents May Be Less Culpable Than Adults, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 741, 756-59 (2000) (explaining that children discount future consequences more than adults, are less able to take the perspective of another, and are more susceptible to peer pressure).
-
Elizabeth Caufman & Laurence Steinberg, (Im)Maturity of Judgment in Adolescence: Why Adolescents May Be Less Culpable Than Adults, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 741, 756-59 (2000) (explaining that children discount future consequences more than adults, are less able to take the perspective of another, and are more susceptible to peer pressure).
-
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102
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-
35648997334
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See, note 9, at, summarizing research on immature judgment, failure to adequately assess risks, and impulsivity in adolescent decision making
-
See Scott & Steinberg, supra note 9, at 813-16 (summarizing research on immature judgment, failure to adequately assess risks, and impulsivity in adolescent decision making).
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supra
, pp. 813-816
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Scott1
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Brief for the American Medical Association et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 10, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1633549 [hereinafter AMA Brief] (citing Nitin Gogtay et al., Dynamic Mapping of Human Cortical Development During Childhood Through Early Adulthood, 101 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. Sci. 8174 (2004).
-
Brief for the American Medical Association et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 10, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1633549 [hereinafter AMA Brief] (citing Nitin Gogtay et al., Dynamic Mapping of Human Cortical Development During Childhood Through Early Adulthood, 101 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. Sci. 8174 (2004).
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See AMA Brief, supra note 101, at 5; Sarah Durston et al., Anatomical MRI of the Developing Human Brain: What Have We Learned?, 40 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 1012 (2001) (assessing MRI studies of brain development in childhood and adolescence); Gogtay et al., supra note 101;
-
See AMA Brief, supra note 101, at 5; Sarah Durston et al., Anatomical MRI of the Developing Human Brain: What Have We Learned?, 40 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 1012 (2001) (assessing MRI studies of brain development in childhood and adolescence); Gogtay et al., supra note 101;
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Jay N. Giedd et al., Quantitative Magnetic Resonance Imaging of Human Brain Development: Ages 4-18, 6 CEREBRAL CORTEX 551 (1996) [hereinafter Giedd et al., Quantitative MRI];
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Jay N. Giedd et al., Brain Development During Childhood and Adolescence: A Longitudinal MRI Study, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 861 (1999) [hereinafter Giedd et al., Brain Development].
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Jay N. Giedd et al., Brain Development During Childhood and Adolescence: A Longitudinal MRI Study, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 861 (1999) [hereinafter Giedd et al., Brain Development].
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See Giedd et al., Quantitative MRI, supra note 102; Giedd et al., Brain Development, supra note 102; Elizabeth R. Sowell et al., Mapping Cortical Change Across the Human Life Span, 6 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 309 (2003).
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AMA Brief, supra note 101, at 11. See also Abigail A. Baird et al., Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging of Facial Affect Recognition in Children and Adolescents, 38 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 195, 195 (1999).
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AMA Brief, supra note 101, at 11. See also Abigail A. Baird et al., Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging of Facial Affect Recognition in Children and Adolescents, 38 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 195, 195 (1999).
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113
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Id. at 13-14. See also Antoine Bechara et al., Dissociation of Working Memory from Decision Making Within the Human Prefrontal Cortex, 18 J. NEUROSCIENCE 428 (1998);
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Id. at 13-14. See also Antoine Bechara et al., Dissociation of Working Memory from Decision Making Within the Human Prefrontal Cortex, 18 J. NEUROSCIENCE 428 (1998);
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See Gogtay, supra note 101, at 8174 (subjects of study aged four to twenty-one years); Sowell, supra note 103, at 309 (study of subjects ages seven to eighty-seven).
-
See Gogtay, supra note 101, at 8174 (subjects of study aged four to twenty-one years); Sowell, supra note 103, at 309 (study of subjects ages seven to eighty-seven).
-
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117
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45249121486
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See AMA Brief, supra note 101, at 20; Gogtay, supra note 101, at 8177.
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notes 100-102 and accompanying text
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543 U.S. 551 (2005). See also Laval S. Miller-Wilson, Law and Adolescence: Examining the Legal and Policy Implications of Adolescent Development Research for Youth Involved in the Child Welfare, Juvenile Justice, or Criminal Justice Systems, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 317, 320-22 (2006) (summarizing research on adolescent development, including studies cited in Roper).
-
543 U.S. 551 (2005). See also Laval S. Miller-Wilson, Law and Adolescence: Examining the Legal and Policy Implications of Adolescent Development Research for Youth Involved in the Child Welfare, Juvenile Justice, or Criminal Justice Systems, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 317, 320-22 (2006) (summarizing research on adolescent development, including studies cited in Roper).
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Id. (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)).
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Id. (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)).
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123
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Id. at 569
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Id. at 569.
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-
See generally Deborah W. Denno, The Scientific Shortcomings of Roper v. Simmons, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 379 (2006) (arguing that the Roper Court reached the proper result, but that the Court's reliance upon outdated research and lack of scientific sources cited in the opinion potentially limits the case's value as a precedent for the role of social-science research in the law).
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127
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For a summary of the recent influence of cognitive neuroscience in the legal system, see
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For a summary of the recent influence of cognitive neuroscience in the legal system, see Brent Garland & Paul W. Glimcher, Cognitive Neuroscience and the Law, 16 CURRENT OPINION IN NEUROBIOLOGY 130, 130-34 (2006).
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45249090760
-
-
Id. at 570
-
Id. at 570.
-
-
-
-
131
-
-
45249087209
-
-
The Progressive reformers behind the founding of the juvenile court movement also believed that juveniles were more susceptible to treatment than adults. See Christopher Slobogin et al, A Prevention Model of Juvenile Justice: The Promise of Kansas v. Hendricks for Children, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 185, 190
-
The Progressive reformers behind the founding of the juvenile court movement also believed that juveniles were more susceptible to treatment than adults. See Christopher Slobogin et al., A Prevention Model of Juvenile Justice: The Promise of Kansas v. Hendricks for Children, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 185, 190.
-
-
-
-
132
-
-
84963456897
-
-
notes 27-30 and accompanying text
-
See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
-
See supra
-
-
-
133
-
-
84963456897
-
-
notes 99-102 and accompanying text
-
See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
-
See supra
-
-
-
135
-
-
45249086107
-
-
Sally T. Green, Prosecutorial Waiver into Adult Criminal Court: A Conflict of Interests Violation Amounting to the States' Legislative Abrogation of Juveniles' Due Process Rights, 110 PENN. ST. L. REV. 233 (2005);
-
Sally T. Green, Prosecutorial Waiver into Adult Criminal Court: A Conflict of Interests Violation Amounting to the States' Legislative Abrogation of Juveniles' Due Process Rights, 110 PENN. ST. L. REV. 233 (2005);
-
-
-
-
136
-
-
45249092715
-
-
Joshua T. Rose, Note, Innocence Lost: The Detrimental Effect of Automatic Waiver Statutes on Juvenile Justice, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 977 (2003).
-
Joshua T. Rose, Note, Innocence Lost: The Detrimental Effect of Automatic Waiver Statutes on Juvenile Justice, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 977 (2003).
-
-
-
-
137
-
-
45249094445
-
-
See SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 56, at 186-87
-
See SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 56, at 186-87.
-
-
-
-
138
-
-
45249102390
-
-
Id. at 2
-
Id. at 2.
-
-
-
-
139
-
-
45249124453
-
-
Id. at 125. Of those arrested, seventy-one percent were white, twenty-seven percent black, two percent Asian, and one percent American Indian. Id. Of the total under-eighteen population in 2002, 77.9% were classified as white, 16.4% black, 1.4% American Indian, and 4.4% Asian. Id. at 2. Also, 18% of juveniles in the U.S. were of Hispanic ethnicity. Id.
-
Id. at 125. Of those arrested, seventy-one percent were white, twenty-seven percent black, two percent Asian, and one percent American Indian. Id. Of the total under-eighteen population in 2002, 77.9% were "classified as white, 16.4% black, 1.4% American Indian, and 4.4% Asian." Id. at 2. Also, "18% of juveniles in the U.S. were of Hispanic ethnicity." Id.
-
-
-
-
140
-
-
45249084720
-
-
SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 56, at 125. For a thorough discussion of the role of gender in juvenile court proceedings, see generally Jennifer Thibodeau, Note, Sugar and Spice and Everything Nice: Female Juvenile Delinquency and Gender Bias in Punishment and Behavior in Juvenile Courts, 8 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 489 (2002).
-
SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 56, at 125. For a thorough discussion of the role of gender in juvenile court proceedings, see generally Jennifer Thibodeau, Note, Sugar and Spice and Everything Nice: Female Juvenile Delinquency and Gender Bias in Punishment and Behavior in Juvenile Courts, 8 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 489 (2002).
-
-
-
-
141
-
-
45249099266
-
-
SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 56, at 152
-
SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 56, at 152.
-
-
-
-
142
-
-
45249100174
-
-
See id
-
See id.
-
-
-
-
143
-
-
45249105485
-
-
Id. at 157
-
Id. at 157.
-
-
-
-
144
-
-
45249102615
-
-
Id. at 172
-
Id. at 172.
-
-
-
-
145
-
-
45249086969
-
-
Id
-
Id.
-
-
-
-
146
-
-
45249105908
-
-
Id. at 175
-
Id. at 175.
-
-
-
-
147
-
-
45249102825
-
-
Id. at 177
-
Id. at 177.
-
-
-
-
148
-
-
45249092932
-
-
Id. at 201
-
Id. at 201.
-
-
-
-
149
-
-
45249119895
-
-
Id
-
Id.
-
-
-
-
150
-
-
45249090058
-
-
See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.055 (West 2003).
-
See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.055 (West 2003).
-
-
-
-
151
-
-
45249096225
-
-
See, e.g., In re Michael, 423 A.2d 1180, 1183 (R.I. 1981) (Once one accepts the principle that a finding of delinquency . . . is not the equivalent of a finding that the juvenile has committed a crime, there is no necessity of a finding that the juvenile had such maturity that he or she knew what he or she was doing was wrong.).
-
See, e.g., In re Michael, 423 A.2d 1180, 1183 (R.I. 1981) ("Once one accepts the principle that a finding of delinquency . . . is not the equivalent of a finding that the juvenile has committed a crime, there is no necessity of a finding that the juvenile had such maturity that he or she knew what he or she was doing was wrong.").
-
-
-
-
152
-
-
45249099686
-
-
384 So. 2d 104 (Ala. 1980).
-
384 So. 2d 104 (Ala. 1980).
-
-
-
-
153
-
-
45249094678
-
-
Id. at 105
-
Id. at 105.
-
-
-
-
154
-
-
45249089832
-
-
Id. at 105-06
-
Id. at 105-06.
-
-
-
-
155
-
-
45249095326
-
-
558 A.2d 661 (Conn. 1989). For a more thorough analysis of In re Tyvonne and the status of the infancy defense in Connecticut, see generally D. Keith Foren, Casenote, In Re Tyvonne M. Revisited: The Criminal Infancy Defense in Connecticut, 18 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 733 (1999).
-
558 A.2d 661 (Conn. 1989). For a more thorough analysis of In re Tyvonne and the status of the infancy defense in Connecticut, see generally D. Keith Foren, Casenote, In Re Tyvonne M. Revisited: The Criminal Infancy Defense in Connecticut, 18 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 733 (1999).
-
-
-
-
156
-
-
45249117406
-
-
Tyvonne, 558 A.2d at 665-66.
-
Tyvonne, 558 A.2d at 665-66.
-
-
-
-
157
-
-
45249106762
-
-
Id. at 666
-
Id. at 666.
-
-
-
-
158
-
-
45249109684
-
-
See id. at 667-68.
-
See id. at 667-68.
-
-
-
-
159
-
-
45249093378
-
-
See supra Part III.C.
-
See supra Part III.C.
-
-
-
-
160
-
-
45249097079
-
-
For example, six years after In re Tyvonne, the Connecticut legislature amended its juvenile justice statute, moving away from its rehabilitative purpose toward a greater emphasis on crime prevention. See 1995 Conn. Legis. Serv. 95-225 (West, see also Foren, supra note 145, at 753-55. Following the 1995 amendments, the first goal listed in the Connecticut juvenile justice statute's purpose clause is to hold juveniles accountable for their unlawful behavior. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-121h, 2007, This renders the holding in In re Tyvonne potentially subject to challenge, to the extent the holding depended upon the rehabilitative, nonpunitive nature of Connecticut's juvenile courts. See Foren, supra note 145, at 755-64
-
For example, six years after In re Tyvonne, the Connecticut legislature amended its juvenile justice statute, moving away from its rehabilitative purpose toward a greater emphasis on crime prevention. See 1995 Conn. Legis. Serv. 95-225 (West); see also Foren, supra note 145, at 753-55. Following the 1995 amendments, the first goal listed in the Connecticut juvenile justice statute's purpose clause is to "hold juveniles accountable for their unlawful behavior." CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-121(h) (2007). This renders the holding in In re Tyvonne potentially subject to challenge, to the extent the holding depended upon the rehabilitative, nonpunitive nature of Connecticut's juvenile courts. See Foren, supra note 145, at 755-64.
-
-
-
-
161
-
-
45249086987
-
-
See, e.g., State v. Q.D., 685 P.2d 557, 560 (Wash. 1984) (holding that the infancy defense should be available in juvenile proceedings that are essentially criminal in nature).
-
See, e.g., State v. Q.D., 685 P.2d 557, 560 (Wash. 1984) (holding that the infancy defense should be available in juvenile proceedings that are essentially criminal in nature).
-
-
-
-
162
-
-
45249103665
-
-
584 A.2d 1287, 1293 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991).
-
584 A.2d 1287, 1293 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991).
-
-
-
-
163
-
-
45249106317
-
-
See id. at 1291; see also supra note 71 and accompanying text.
-
See id. at 1291; see also supra note 71 and accompanying text.
-
-
-
-
164
-
-
45249086514
-
-
Devon, 584 A.2d at 1291.
-
Devon, 584 A.2d at 1291.
-
-
-
-
165
-
-
45249098164
-
-
Id. at 1292
-
Id. at 1292.
-
-
-
-
166
-
-
45249092462
-
-
Id. at 1297
-
Id. at 1297.
-
-
-
-
167
-
-
45249115441
-
-
Id. at 1296-97 (The evidence before [the judge] that Devon, at the time of the allegedly delinquent act, was 13 years, 10 months, and 2 weeks of age was substantial, although not quite sufficient, proof of his cognitive capacity.).
-
Id. at 1296-97 ("The evidence before [the judge] that Devon, at the time of the allegedly delinquent act, was 13 years, 10 months, and 2 weeks of age was substantial, although not quite sufficient, proof of his cognitive capacity.").
-
-
-
-
168
-
-
45249112308
-
-
Case law suggests a number of factors that a court may consider when determining whether a child has the requisite capacity to understand the wrongfulness of his conduct. These factors include age, experience and knowledge, see In re Gladys R, 464 P.2d 127, 134 (Cal. 1970, observation of [the child] in the courtroom, and evidence of, conduct during the crimes charged, see In re Cindy E, 147 Cal. Rptr. 812, 815 (Ct. App. 1978, the mental and psychological makeup of the child, his IQ, his social maturity, his societal adjustment, and his basic personality, see Devon, 584 A.2d 1296. Massachusetts's juvenile courts routinely assess such factors when determining, under the totality of the circumstances, whether a child made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights when an interested adult is not present. Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 449 N.E.2d 654, 657 Mass. 1983, See also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 4
-
Case law suggests a number of factors that a court may consider when determining whether a child has the requisite capacity to understand the wrongfulness of his conduct. These factors include age, experience and knowledge, see In re Gladys R., 464 P.2d 127, 134 (Cal. 1970), "observation of [the child] in the courtroom, and evidence of . . . conduct during the crimes charged . . . ," see In re Cindy E., 147 Cal. Rptr. 812, 815 (Ct. App. 1978), the mental and psychological makeup of the child, his IQ, his social maturity, his societal adjustment, and his basic personality, see Devon, 584 A.2d 1296. Massachusetts's juvenile courts routinely assess such factors when determining, under the totality of the circumstances, whether a child made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights when an interested adult is not present. Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 449 N.E.2d 654, 657 (Mass. 1983). See also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (validity of a waiver depends on particular circumstances of each case "including the background, experience and conduct of the accused").
-
-
-
-
169
-
-
45249086986
-
-
In Massachusetts, a delinquent is any child between [the ages of] seven and seventeen who violates any city ordinance or town by-law or who commits any offence against a law of the commonwealth. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 52 (LexisNexis 2002). If a child is adjudicated delinquent for a violation of the criminal law, he is subject to commitment to the juvenile correctional agency until age eighteen. Id. § 58.
-
In Massachusetts, a delinquent is any child "between [the ages of] seven and seventeen who violates any city ordinance or town by-law or who commits any offence against a law of the commonwealth." MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 52 (LexisNexis 2002). If a child is adjudicated delinquent for a violation of the criminal law, he is subject to commitment to the juvenile correctional agency until age eighteen. Id. § 58.
-
-
-
-
170
-
-
45249100173
-
-
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 413 (LexisNexis 1906) (current version at MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 19 (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2006). See 44 Roderick L. Ireland, Juvenile Law, in MASSACHUSETTS PRACTICE SERIES § 2 (2d. ed. 2006).
-
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 413 (LexisNexis 1906) (current version at MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 19 (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2006). See 44 Roderick L. Ireland, Juvenile Law, in MASSACHUSETTS PRACTICE SERIES § 2 (2d. ed. 2006).
-
-
-
-
171
-
-
45249087654
-
-
See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 52 (LexisNexis 2002).
-
See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 52 (LexisNexis 2002).
-
-
-
-
172
-
-
45249093395
-
-
See, e.g., id. § 54 (prosecutorial discretion to indict children fourteen to seventeen as youthful offenders); id. § 58 (youthful offender may be sentenced to such punishment as is provided by law for the offense).
-
See, e.g., id. § 54 (prosecutorial discretion to indict children fourteen to seventeen as youthful offenders); id. § 58 (youthful offender may be sentenced to such punishment as is provided by law for the offense).
-
-
-
-
173
-
-
45249114596
-
-
Id. §§ 55A, 67; MASS. R. CRIM. P. ANN. 14 (Lexis 2005).
-
Id. §§ 55A, 67; MASS. R. CRIM. P. ANN. 14 (Lexis 2005).
-
-
-
-
174
-
-
45249090973
-
-
See Commonwealth v. Vailes, 275 N.E.2d 893 (Mass. 1971); Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
-
See Commonwealth v. Vailes, 275 N.E.2d 893 (Mass. 1971); Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
-
-
-
-
175
-
-
45249093616
-
-
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 123, § 15 (LexisNexis 2002) (a court of competent jurisdiction may order an examination of a juvenile when the court doubts whether the juvenile is criminally responsible).
-
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 123, § 15 (LexisNexis 2002) ("a court of competent jurisdiction" may order an examination of a juvenile when the court doubts whether the juvenile is criminally responsible).
-
-
-
-
177
-
-
45249113229
-
-
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Connor C., 738 N.E.2d 731, 738 (Mass. 2000) (finding a delinquency adjudication may be used as a predicate conviction for adult sentencing enhancement pursuant to MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 269, § 10(d) (LexisNexis 1992 & Supp. 2006); Commonwealth v. Foreman, 830 N.E.2d 219 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005) (finding juvenile's adjudication for armed robbery satisfied predicate conviction requirement for adult sentencing enhancement as armed career criminal pursuant to MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 269, § 10G (LexisNexis Supp. 2006)).
-
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Connor C., 738 N.E.2d 731, 738 (Mass. 2000) (finding a delinquency adjudication may be used as a predicate conviction for adult sentencing enhancement pursuant to MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 269, § 10(d) (LexisNexis 1992 & Supp. 2006); Commonwealth v. Foreman, 830 N.E.2d 219 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005) (finding juvenile's adjudication for armed robbery satisfied predicate conviction requirement for adult sentencing enhancement as armed career criminal pursuant to MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 269, § 10G (LexisNexis Supp. 2006)).
-
-
-
-
178
-
-
45249087653
-
-
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6, § 178C (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2006).
-
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6, § 178C (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2006).
-
-
-
-
179
-
-
45249108170
-
-
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 71, § 37H1/2 (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2006).
-
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 71, § 37H1/2 (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2006).
-
-
-
-
180
-
-
45249085422
-
-
See id
-
See id.
-
-
-
-
181
-
-
45249087854
-
-
Commonwealth v. Ogden O., 864 N.E.2d 13, 18 (Mass. 2007).
-
Commonwealth v. Ogden O., 864 N.E.2d 13, 18 (Mass. 2007).
-
-
-
-
182
-
-
45249097524
-
-
Ogden, 864 N.E.2d at 15.
-
Ogden, 864 N.E.2d at 15.
-
-
-
-
183
-
-
45249086305
-
-
Id
-
Id.
-
-
-
-
184
-
-
45249095537
-
-
Id
-
Id.
-
-
-
-
185
-
-
45249102171
-
-
Id. at 19
-
Id. at 19.
-
-
-
-
186
-
-
45249099714
-
-
Id. at 21
-
Id. at 21.
-
-
-
-
187
-
-
45249084949
-
-
Id. at 16
-
Id. at 16.
-
-
-
-
188
-
-
45249097754
-
-
Id. at 17
-
Id. at 17.
-
-
-
-
189
-
-
45249102170
-
-
Id. at 16 (quoting Commonwealth v. Davis, 406 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980) (emphasis added)).
-
Id. at 16 (quoting Commonwealth v. Davis, 406 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980) (emphasis added)).
-
-
-
-
190
-
-
45249118347
-
-
Id. at 17
-
Id. at 17.
-
-
-
-
191
-
-
45249116531
-
-
See id. at 17-18.
-
See id. at 17-18.
-
-
-
-
192
-
-
45249109705
-
-
Id. at 18 n.5
-
Id. at 18 n.5.
-
-
-
-
193
-
-
45249124887
-
-
Id. at 18
-
Id. at 18.
-
-
-
-
194
-
-
84963456897
-
-
note 3 and accompanying text
-
See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
-
See supra
-
-
-
195
-
-
45249114364
-
-
Massachusetts Department of Youth Services, Mission Statement, http://www.mass.gov/dys (follow Mission Statement hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 29, 2007). The Mission Statement states: Our mission is to protect the public and prevent crime by promoting positive change in the lives of youth committed to our custody, and by partnering with communities, families, government and provider agencies toward this end. We accomplish this mission through interventions that build knowledge, develop skills and change the behavior of the youth in our care. Id.
-
Massachusetts Department of Youth Services, Mission Statement, http://www.mass.gov/dys (follow "Mission Statement" hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 29, 2007). The Mission Statement states: Our mission is to protect the public and prevent crime by promoting positive change in the lives of youth committed to our custody, and by partnering with communities, families, government and provider agencies toward this end. We accomplish this mission through interventions that build knowledge, develop skills and change the behavior of the youth in our care. Id.
-
-
-
-
196
-
-
45249083368
-
-
See Barbara Kaban & Francine Sherman, An Overview of Disposition Process in Delinquency Cases, in JUVENILE LAW BASICS 205, 209 (1998).
-
See Barbara Kaban & Francine Sherman, An Overview of Disposition Process in Delinquency Cases, in JUVENILE LAW BASICS 205, 209 (1998).
-
-
-
-
197
-
-
45249111319
-
-
See id
-
See id.
-
-
-
-
198
-
-
45149147252
-
-
See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 58 (LexisNexis 2002).
-
See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 58 (LexisNexis 2002).
-
-
-
-
199
-
-
45249104620
-
-
See R. MARC KANTROWITZ, AMY M. KARP & STEPHEN M. LIMON, 2007 MASSACHUSETTS JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND CHILD WELFARE LAW SOURCEBOOK & CITATOR, 661-90 (2007).
-
See R. MARC KANTROWITZ, AMY M. KARP & STEPHEN M. LIMON, 2007 MASSACHUSETTS JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND CHILD WELFARE LAW SOURCEBOOK & CITATOR, 661-90 (2007).
-
-
-
-
200
-
-
45249112514
-
-
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 14 (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2006).
-
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 14 (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2006).
-
-
-
-
201
-
-
45249122395
-
-
KANTROWITZ ET AL, supra note 189, at 672
-
KANTROWITZ ET AL., supra note 189, at 672.
-
-
-
-
202
-
-
45249123387
-
-
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 272, § 53 (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2006).
-
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 272, § 53 (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2006).
-
-
-
-
203
-
-
45249102849
-
-
KANTROWITZ ET AL, supra note 189, at 666
-
KANTROWITZ ET AL., supra note 189, at 666.
-
-
-
-
204
-
-
45249103052
-
-
See id. at 676.
-
See id. at 676.
-
-
-
-
205
-
-
45249112997
-
-
See tbl. supra Part IV.B.
-
See tbl. supra Part IV.B.
-
-
-
-
206
-
-
45249107452
-
-
For a discussion of the most important Supreme Court cases regarding the juvenile justice system, see supra Part III.B.
-
For a discussion of the most important Supreme Court cases regarding the juvenile justice system, see supra Part III.B.
-
-
-
-
207
-
-
45249107734
-
-
See, e.g., Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 82 (1984).
-
See, e.g., Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 82 (1984).
-
-
-
-
208
-
-
45249084496
-
-
See supra Part III.C.
-
See supra Part III.C.
-
-
-
-
209
-
-
45249085637
-
-
For a discussion of the sentencing grid used in Massachusetts, see supra notes 189-194 and accompanying text.
-
For a discussion of the sentencing grid used in Massachusetts, see supra notes 189-194 and accompanying text.
-
-
-
-
210
-
-
45249104847
-
-
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 984.15 (2007); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 39E (LexisNexis 2002).
-
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 984.15 (2007); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 39E (LexisNexis 2002).
-
-
-
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