A dynamic theory of holdup

Econometrica

Volumn 72, Issue 4, 2004, Pages 1063-1103

  Che, Yeon Koo ^a   Sákovics, József ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Bargaining; Contribution games; Endogenous pie; Investment

Indexed keywords

CONTRACTS; INVESTMENTS; MANUFACTURE; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; PRODUCTION;

BARGAINING; CONTRIBUTION GAMES; ENDOGENOUS PIE;

ECONOMICS;

EID: 3142764048     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00526.x     Document Type: Article

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