Majority rules and incentives

Quarterly Journal of Economics

Volumn 120, Issue 4, 2005, Pages 1535-1568

  Harstad, Bård ^a  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 31444440873     PISSN: 00335533     EISSN: 15314650     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/003355305775097551     Document Type: Review

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