Can a Focus on Breakthrough Technologies Improve the Performance of International Environmental Agreements?

Environmental and Resource Economics

Volumn 47, Issue 3, 2010, Pages 395-406

  Hoel, Michael ^a   de Zeeuw, Aart ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OSLO   (Norway)

^b TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Breakthrough technology; International environmental agreements

Indexed keywords

ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS; POLLUTION CONTROL;

BREAKTHROUGH TECHNOLOGY; INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS; NETWORK EXTERNALITY; TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION;

ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGY;

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION; PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT; RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT; TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION;

EID: 77958450805     PISSN: 09246460     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10640-010-9384-3     Document Type: Article

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