Outline of a new theory of attribution in IR: Dimensions of uncertainty and their cognitive challenges

Chinese Journal of International Politics

Volumn 5, Issue 3, 2012, Pages 299-338

  Shiping, Tang ^a  

^a FUDAN UNIVERSITY   (China)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84865998664     PISSN: 17508916     EISSN: 17508924     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/cjip/pos013     Document Type: Article

References (271)

1. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), chap. 3
2. Stephen G. Brooks, 'Dueling Realisms', International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 3 (1997), pp. 445-477
3. James D. Fearon, 'Rationalist Explanations for War', International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 3 (1995), pp. 379-414
4. Andrew Kydd, 'Sheep in Sheep's Clothing: Why Security Seekers Do Not Fight Each Other', Security Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1 (1997), pp. 114-155
5. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 200
6. David M. Edelstein, 'Managing Uncertainty: Beliefs about Intentions and the Rise of Great Powers', Security Studies, Vol. 12, No. 1 (2002), pp. 1-40
7. Robert Powell, 'War as a Commitment Problem', International Organization, Vol. 60, No. 2 (2006), pp. 169-203
8. Brian C. Rathbun, 'Uncertain About Uncertainty: Understanding the Multiple Meanings of a Crucial Concept in International Relations Theory', International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 51, No. 4 (2007), pp. 533-557
9. Shiping Tang, 'Fear in International Politics: Two Positions', International Studies Review, Vol. 10, No. 3 (2008), pp. 451-470.
10. By explicitly limiting the domain of the theory proposed here to IR, I am implying that our attribution operates differently in different domains (esp. survival versus mating). Of course, the most critical force that shapes this kind of domain-specificity has been social evolution. The differences in attribution (and other psychological traits) between the two sexes when it comes to mating have been extensively documented by adherents of Evolutionary Psychology (EP).
11. Robert Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997
12. A. K. Shah and D. M. Oppenheimer, 'Heuristics Made Easy: An Effort-Reduction Framework', Psychological Bulletin, Vol. 134, No. 2 (2008), pp. 207-222
13. Gerd Gigerenzer and Daniel G. Goldstein, 'Reasoning the Fast and Frugal Way: Models of Bounded Rationality', Psychological Review, Vol. 103, No. 4 (1996), pp. 650-669.
14. Robert A. LeVine and Donald T. Campbell, Ethnocentrism: Theories of Conflict, Ethnic Attitudes, and Group Behaviors (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1972
15. Henri Tajfel, Social Identity and Intergroup Relations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982
16. Marilyn B. Brewer, 'The Role of Ethnocentrism in Intergroup Conflict', in S. Worchel and W. G. Austin, eds., Psychology of Intergroup Relations (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1986
17. J. C. Turner, M. A. Hogg, P. J. Oakes, S. D. Reicher and M. S. Wetherell, Rediscovering the Social Group: A Self-Categorization Theory (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987).
18. Tim Wildschut and Chester A. Insko, 'Explanations of Interindividual-Intergroup Discontinuity: A Review of the Evidence', European Review of Social Psychology, Vol. 18, No.1 (2007), pp. 175-211.
19. David L. Hamilton and Steven J. Sherman, 'Perceiving Persons and Groups', Psychological Review, Vol. 10, No. 2 (1996), pp. 336-355
20. Robert P. Abelson, Nilanjana Dasgupta, Jaihyun Park and Mahzarin R. Banaji, 'Perceptions of the Collective Other', Personality and Social Psychology Review, Vol. 2, No. 4 (1998), pp. 243-250.
21. Ivan D. Steiner, 'Paradigms and Groups', in Leonard Berkkowitz., ed., Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 10 (San Diego: Academic Press, 1986), pp. 173-220.
22. In addition to the five principal dimensions underscored here, in IR there have been other notions that are related to uncertainty (e.g., reputation, credibility, trustworthiness). I refrain from discussing them here.
23. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, pp. 48-49
24. Robert Powell, 'Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate', International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2 (1994), pp. 313-344.
25. Shiping Tang, A Theory of Security Strategy for Our Time: Defensive Realism (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2010
26. Robert Powell, 'Anarchy in International Relations Theory', pp. 313-344.
27. American Heritage Dictionary (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1983), p. 447
28. Online Farlex Dictionary, http://www.thefreedictionary.com/motive.
29. Charles L. Glaser, 'Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models', World Politics, Vol. 44, No. 2 (1992), pp. 497-538
30. Evan Braden Montgomery, 'Breaking out of the Security Dilemma: Realism, Reassurance, and the Problem of Uncertainty', International Security, Vol. 31, No. 2 (2006), pp. 151-185.
31. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading: Addision-Wesley, 1979
32. Charles L. Glaser, 'Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-help', International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (199450-90
33. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.
34. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics; see also Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War; Janice Gross Stein, 'Building Politics into Psychology: The Misperception of Threat', Political Psychology, Vol. 9, No. 2 (1988), pp. 245-271
35. Jonathan Mercer, Reputation in International Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996).
36. Edward E. Jones and Richard E. Nisbett, 'The Actor and the Observer: Divergent Perceptions of the Causes of Behavior', in Edward Jones, et al., eds., Attribution: Perceiving the Causes of Behavior (Morristown: General Learning Press, 1972), pp. 79-94
37. Harold H. Kelley and John Michela, 'Attribution Theory and Research', Annual Review of Psychology, Vol. 31 (1980), pp. 457-501
38. Daniel T. Gilbert and Patrick S. Malone, 'The Correspondence Bias', Psychological Bulletin, Vol. 117, No. 1 (1995), pp. 21-38.
39. See Daniel T. Gilbert and Patrick S. Malone, 'The Correspondence Bias', pp. 21-38
40. John Sabini, Michael Siepmmann, and Julia Stein, 'Target Article: The Really Fundamental Attribution Error in Social Psychological Research', Psychological Inquiry, Vol. 12 (2001), pp. 1-15.
41. Bertram F. Malle, How the Mind Explains Behavior: Folk Explanations, Meaning, and Social Interaction (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004), pp. 5-27.
42. Hereafter, Attribution denotes 'explaining behavior'.
43. Bertram F. Malle, 'How People Explain Behavior: A New Theoretical Framework', Personality and Social Psychology Review, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1999), pp. 23-48
44. Bertram F. Malle, How the Mind Explains Behavior: Folk Explanations, Meaning, and Social Interaction
45. Bertram F. Malle, 'Attributions as Behavior Explanations: Toward a New Theory', in D. Chadee and J. Hunter, eds., Current Themes and Perspectives in Social Psychology (St. Augustine: The University of the West Indies, 2007), pp. 3-26.
46. Bertram F. Malle, How the Mind Explains Behavior, chap. 4. Malle's theory actually identifies a third mode of explaining intentional behavior called 'enabling factor explanations' (pp. 109-111
47. From the perspectives of the theory advanced here, this 'enabling factor' mode is not an independent mode of attribution because all attributions of behavior assume some enabling factors behind an intentional behavior implicitly, if not explicitly. Moreover, Malle's theory, though very elaborate, is too much into linguistics and thus far removed from real-world IR situations. This again testifies that students of IR need to move beyond attribution theory from social psychology.
48. See Bertram F. Malle, How the Mind Explains Behavior.
49. There are other fundamental problems associated with the attribution literature than what students of IR have been most familiar with, but I can only address them elsewhere.
50. In addition to these two dichotomies, there is also the dichotomy of stable vs. unstable introduced by Bernard Weiner. I ignore this dichotomy because it may not be very relevant for intergroup relations.
51. Glenn D. Reeder and Marilynn B. Brewer, 'A Schematic Model of Dispositional Attribution in Interpersonal Perception', Psychological Review, Vol. 86, No. 1 (1979), p. 61
52. Jonathan Mercer, Reputation in International Politics.
53. Edward E. Jones and Keith E. Davis, 'From Acts to Dispositions: The Attribution Process in Person Perception', in L. Berkowitz, ed., Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 2 1965), pp. 219-266
54. Bertram F. Malle, 'How People Explain Behavior', pp. 23-48
55. John Sabini, Michael Siepmmann, and Julia Stein, 'Target Article', pp. 1-15
56. In IR literature, Jervis (Perception and Misperception in International Politics, chap. 2) uses the dichotomy of internal versus external whereas Mercer uses the dichotomy of dispositional and situational.
57. Edward E. Jones and Keith E Davis, 'From Acts to Dispositions', pp. 219-266.
58. Bertram F. Malle, How the Mind Explains Behavior; Bertram F. Malle, 'Attributions as Behavior Explanations', pp. 3-26.
59. Ivan D. Steiner, 'Paradigms and Groups', pp. 173-220.
60. Henri Tajfel, Social Identity and Intergroup Relations; Henri Tajfel and John C. Turner, 'The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior', in W. Worchel and W. G. Austin, William, eds., Psychology of Intergroup Relations, (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1986), pp. 7-24.
61. Bertram F. Malle, 'How People Explain Behavior', pp. 23-48
62. Bertram F. Malle, How the Mind Explains Behavior; Bertram F. Malle, 'Attributions as Behavior Explanations', pp. 3-26
63. John Sabini, Michael Siepmmann, and Julia Stein, 'Target Article', pp. 1-15.
64. Thomas F. Pettigrew, 'The Ultimate Attribution Error: Extending Allport's Cognitive Analysis of Prejudice', Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, Vol. 5, No. 4 (1979), pp. 461-476
65. Miles Hewstone, 'The 'Ultimate Attribution Error'? A Review of the Literature on Intergroup Causal Attribution', European Journal of Social Psychology, Vol. 20, No. 4 (1990), pp. 311-336.
66. Because ethnocentrism is essentially egocentrism at the group level, everybody is ethnocentric (or nation state-centric): only the degree of our ethnocentrism varies.36 Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985)
67. Jonathan Mercer, Reputation in International Politics, chap. 2.
68. Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1960). Indeed, the very first experiment that demonstrates FAE by Jones and Harris (Edward E. Jones and Victor A. Harris, 'The Attribution of Attitudes', Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1967 1-24
69. Contained a fairly evident group dynamics: subjects were to attribute the motives behind others' essays about Fidel Castro, shortly after the Cuban Missile Crisis!
70. Richard Ned Lebow, A Cultural Theory of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
71. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, chap. 3; Charles L. Glaser, 'Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-help'; Andrew Kydd, Trust and Mistrust in International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press,), chaps. 2 and 3; Shiping Tang, A Theory of Security Strategy for Our Time, chap. 4.2005
72. Andrew Kydd, Trust and Mistrust in International Relations, chaps. 7 and 8; Shiping Tang, A Theory of Security Strategy for Our Time, chap. 5.
73. Shiping Tang, 'Fear in International Politics: Two Positions', see also the discussion below.
74. S. Oskamp, 'Attitudes toward U.S. and Russian Actions: a Double Standard', Psychological Reports, Vol. 16 (1965), pp. 43-46
75. Richard D. Ashmore, David Bird, Frances K. del Boca, and Robert C. Vanderet, 'An Experimental Investigation of the Double Standard in the Perception of International Affairs', Political Behaviors, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1979), pp. 123-135
76. Ifat Maoz, Andrew Ward, Michael Katz, and Lee Ross, 'Reactive Devaluation of an 'Israeli' vs. 'Palestinian' Peace Proposal', Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 46, No. 4 (2002), pp. 515-546.
77. This dynamics is connected to the 'loss aversion' as captured by prospect/framing theory. See Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, 'Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk', Econometrica, Vol. 47, No. 2 (1979), pp. 263-292
78. For a review of prospect/ framing theory in IR, see Jack S. Levy, 'Prospect Theory, Rational Choice, and International Relations,' International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 41, No. 1 (1997), pp. 87-112.
79. Janice Gross Stein, 'Building Politics into Psychology', pp. 249-251
80. Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, We All Lost the Cold War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 309-314.
81. Indeed, this double-standard mentality is so powerful it also applies even to our allies ('they are still others!'), although to a less extent than to our (potential) opponents.
82. A. K. Shah and D. M. Oppenheimer, 'Heuristics Made Easy', pp. 207-222.
83. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, pp. 372-378.
84. Douglas Porch, 'Military 'Culture' and the Fall of France in 1940: A Review Essay', International Security, Vol. 24, No. 4 (2000), pp. 157-180.
85. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, pp. 48-49.
86. It must be emphasized that opportunistic expansion cannot be 'automatic'. Moreover, an opportunistic expansionist state is still a malignant state, and to label these states as security-seeking states (which means benign state for many) as Glaser and Taliaferro have done is misleading. See Charles L. Glaser, 'Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models', pp. 497-538
87. Charles L. Glaser, 'Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-help', International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (1994 50-90
88. Jeffery W. Taliaferro, 'Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited', International Security, Vol. 25, No. 3 152-158
89. Stephen Walt, The Origin of Alliance (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987); Randall L. Schweller, 'Bandwagoning for Profit: Bring the Revisionist State Back in', International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (1994), pp. 72-107.
90. Robert Jervis, System Effects.
91. Richard E. Nisbett and Lee Ross, Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings in Social Judgement (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1980).
92. Edward E. Jones and Keith E Davis, 'From Acts to Dispositions', pp. 219-266
93. Edward E. Jones and Richard E. Nisbett, 'The Actor and the Observer: Divergent Perceptions of the Causes of Behavior', pp. 79-94
94. Lee Ross, 'The Intuitive Psychologist and His Shortcomings: Distortions in the Attribution Process', in L. Berkowitz, ed., Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 10, pp. 173-220
95. Daniel T. Gilbert and Patrick S. Malone, 'The Correspondence Bias', pp. 21-38.
96. Fritz Heider, 'Social Perception and Phenomenal Causality', Psychological Review, Vol. 51 (1944), pp. 358-374
97. Fritz Heider, The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations (New York: Wiley, 1958).
98. Edward E. Jones and Keith E. Davis, 'From Acts to Dispositions', pp. 219-266.
99. Indeed, in an important reformulation of the FAE, Ross (Lee Ross, 'The Intuitive Psychologist and His Shortcomings') noted that social psychologists too tend to underestimate the weight of situations in driving our behavior.
100. Fritz Heider, 'Social Perception and Phenomenal Causality', Psychological Review, Vol. 51 (1944), pp. 358-374
101. Fritz Heider, The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations (New York: Wiley, 1958)
102. Edward E. Jones and Keith E. Davis, 'From Acts to Dispositions', pp. 219-266
103. Indeed, Fritz Heider explicitly noted that our needs drive our attribution and differentiated good behaviors vs. bad behaviors and good actors vs. bad actors. He also referred to Fauconnet's discussion on (assigning) responsibilities. This argument immediately points to an evolutionary explanation for our mental operational modes, although not in the more familiar Evolutionary Psychology type. See Fritz Heider, 'Social Perception and Phenomenal Causality', pp. 358-361.
104. One of the reviewers suggests that the relationship problem is an identity problem (enemy vs. friend). I think this is only a matter of labeling. I leave the readers to decide which label to prefer.
105. The fact that our cognition operates asymmetrically has been firmly established in social psychology, often known as the asymmetry between 'false positive' and 'false negative'. A related phenomenon has been the well-established 'negativity bias' that negative experiences tend to stay with our memory longer and stronger than positive ones. For reviews, see Roy Baumeister, Ellen Bratslavsky, Catrin Finkenauer, and Kathleen D. Vohs, 'Bad Is Stronger than Good', Review of General Psychology, Vol. 5, No. 4 (2001), pp. 323-370
106. Paul Rozin and Edward, B. Royzman, 'Negativity Bias, Negativity Dominance, and Contagion', Personality and Social Psychology Review, Vol. 5, No. 4 (2001), pp. 296-320.
107. Kenneth A. Dodge, Gregory S. Pettit, Cynthia L. McClaskey and Melissa M. Brown, Social Competence in Children, Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, Vol. 51 (1986), pp. 1-85
108. R. M. Kramer, 'Paranoid Cognition in Social Systems: Thinking and Acting in the Shadow of Doubt', Personality and Social Psychology Review, Vol. 2, No. 4 (1998), pp. 251-275
109. R. M. Kramer and D. M. Messick, 'Getting by With a Little Help from Our Enemies: Collective Paranoia and its Rule in Intergroup Relations', in C. Sedikides, J. Schopler and C. A. Insko, eds., Intergroup Cognition and Intergroup Behavior (Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1998), pp. 233-255
110. Lee Ross and Robert Ward, 'Psychological Barriers to Dispute Resolutions', in Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 27 (San Diego: Academic Press, 1995), pp. 255-304
111. Ifat Maoz, Andrew Ward, Michael Katz, and Lee Ross, 'Reactive Devaluation of an 'Israeli' vs. 'Palestinian' Peace Proposal', pp. 515-546.
112. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, pp. 343-355.
113. Deborah W. Larson, Anatomy of Mistrust: US-Soviet Relations during the Cold War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997).
114. Christopher Layne, 'Security Studies and the Use of History: Neville Chamberlain's Grand Strategy Revisited', Security Studies, Vol. 17, No. 3 (2008), pp. 397-437
115. Norrin M. Ripsman and Jack S. Levy, 'The Preventive War that Never Happened: Britain, France, and the Rise of Germany in the 1930s', Security Studies, Vol. 16, No. 1 (2007), pp. 32-67
116. W. Murray and A. R. Millett, A War To Be Won: Fighting the Second World War (Cambridge: Harvard University Pres, 2000).
117. A. J. P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918 (Claredon: Oxford University Press, 1954), pp. xx-xxxiii.
118. Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1981)
119. Richard Ned Lebow, A Cultural Theory of International Relations, pp. 97-100
120. Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, We All Lost the Cold War.
121. Geoffrey Blaine, Causes of War (New York: Free Press, 1988).
122. The 'Rubicon theory of war' operates on a different phase of crisis. After a leader made a decision toward war, he/she became more confident that his chosen path would lead to a positive outcome. See Dominic D.P. Johnson and Timothy A. Tierney, 'The Rubicon Theory of War: How the Path to Conflict Reaches the Point of No Return', International Security, Vol. 36, No. 1 (2011), pp. 7-40
123. As such, he/she refuses to reconsider and lets his/her decisions take him/her into war. Quite evidently, I focus mostly on attribution (and deliberation) before a decision for war.
124. Jonathan Mercer, Reputation in International Politics
125. Daryl Press, Calculating Credibility (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005)
126. Shiping Tang, 'Reputation, Cult of Reputation, and International Conflict', Security Studies, Vol. 14, No. 1 (2005), pp. 34-62.
127. Ted Hopf, Peripheral Visions: Deterrence Theory and American Foreign Policy in the Third World, 1965-1990 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994). 74 Janice Gross Stein, 'Calculation, Miscalculation, and Conventional Deterrence: the View from Cairo', in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore: John Hopkins Univeristy Press, 1985), pp. 34-35
128. Janice Gross Stein, 'Calculation, Miscalculation, and Conventional Deterrence: the View from Jerusalem', in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, Psychology and Deterrence, pp. 60-88.
129. Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, We All Lost the Cold War, esp. pp. 325-328.
130. James D. Fearon, 'Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation', International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 2 (1998), pp. 269-305.
131. Glenn H. Snyder, 'The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics', World Politics, Vol. 36, No. 4 (1984), pp. 461-495
132. Yoichi Funabashi, Alliance Adrift (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999
133. Timothy Crawford, 'Preventing Enemy Coalitions: How Wedge Strategies Shape Power Politics', International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4 (2011), pp. 155-189.
134. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics
135. Charles L. Glaser, 'Political Consequences of Military Strategy', pp. 497-538
136. Shiping Tang, A Theory of Security Strategy for Our Time
137. Deborah W. Larson, Anatomy of Mistrust; Andrew Kydd, Trust and Mistrust in International Relations, chap. 8.
138. Melvin P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration and the Cold War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992
139. Deborah W. Larson, Anatomy of Mistrust; Andrew Kydd, Trust and Mistrust in International Relations, chap. 3.
140. Richard Bitzinger, 'Gorbachev and GRIT: Did Arms Control Succeed Because of Unilateral Actions or in Spite of Them?', Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 15, No. 1 (1994), pp. 68-79.
141. William Wohlforth, 'Realism and the End of the Cold War', International Security, Vol. 19, 1 91-129.
142. For a critique of these readings, see Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, We All Lost the Cold War, pp. 369-376. On this front, I shall note that there are some striking similarities between explaining behaviors and explaining outcomes: we attribute great weight to our own actions and little weight to others' actions when outcomes are positive (or desirable) from our own point of view, and we do the exact opposite when outcomes are negative (or undesirable). Thus, because the Cold War ended in U.S. favor, pundits in the United States explained the outcome mostly with U.S. behaviors (e.g., William Wohlforth, 'Realism and the End of the Cold War'). In contrast, in light of the supposedly losing of relative influence by the United States to China in Southeast Asia, many pundits attribute it mostly to China's 'charm offensive' and the possible evil design behind it (e.g., Josh Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power Is Transforming the World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007); Robert Sutter, 'China's Rise: Implications for U.S. Leadership in Asia', Policy Studies, Vol. 21 (Washington: East-West Center Washington, 2006
143. In a conflictual situation, the other side has already been assumed to be malignant. In other words, our estimation of the probability that the other side intends to do us harm becomes 1.
144. Kenneth A. Dodge, Gregory S. Pettit, Cynthia L. McClaskey, and Melissa M. Brown, Social Competence in Children, pp. 1-85
145. Kenneth A. Dodge and Daniel R. Somberg, 'Hostile Attributional Biases among Aggressive Boys Are Exacerbated under Conditions of Threats to the Self', Child 58, 1 (1987), 213-224
146. R. M. Kramer, 'Paranoid Cognition in Social Systems', pp. 251-275
147. R. M. Kramer and D. M. Messick, 'Getting by With a Little Help from Our Enemies', pp. 233-255.
148. For a more detailed discussion, see Shiping Tang, 'The Social Evolutionary Psychology of Fear (and Trust): Or why is international cooperation difficult?' paper presented in the 49th Annual Convention of International Studies Association in San Francisco, March 26-29, 2008.
149. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, pp. 64-65
150. Shiping Tang, 'Reputation, Cult of Reputation, and International Conflict', pp. 50-54.
151. Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, We All Lost the Cold War, chap. 12
152. Sergei Zubov and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997).
153. I address the problems of game models of war and peace in detail in section V below.
154. Randall L. Schweller, Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 38.
155. Randall L. Schweller, 'Neorealism's Status Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?', Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3 (1996), pp. 103-104
156. Andrew Kydd, 'Sheep in Sheep's Clothing', pp. 126-152.
157. Andrew Barros and Talbot C. Imlay, 'Correspondence: Debating British Decision Making toward Nazi Germany in the 1930s', International Security, Vol. 34, No. 1 (2009), p. 276.
158. Brian C. Rathbun, 'Uncertain About Uncertainty', pp. 537
159. Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960
160. Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966
161. James D. Fearon, 'Rationalist Explanations for War', pp. 379-414.
162. Paul K. MacDonald, 'The Virtue of Ambiguity: A Critique of the Information Turn in IR theory', Unpublished manuscript, Columbia University, 2002, pp. 5-7
163. James D. Fearon, 'Rationalist Explanations for War', p. 381.
164. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics.
165. Charles L. Glaser, 'Political Consequences of Military Strategy', pp. 499-508
166. Charles L. Glaser, 'Realists as Optimists', pp. 60
167. Robert Powell, 'Anarchy in International Relations Theory', pp. 313-344
168. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics.
169. Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society, p. 42.
170. For a more detailed discussion, see Shiping Tang, A Theory of Security Strategy for Our Time: Defensive Realism, chaps. 1 2.
171. Robert Jervis, System Effects.
172. Anne Sartori, 'The Might of the Pen: A Reputational Theory of Communication in International Disputes', International Organization, Vol. 56, No. 1 (2002), pp. 137-140.
173. As MacArthur put it, 'If they [the Chinese] tried to get down to Pyongyang, it would be the greatest slaughter.' Also, Sartori found no direct evidence that linked U.S. decision makers' reading into Taiwan with their reading into Korea.
174. Daryl Press, Calculating Credibility, p. 143.
175. Charles L. Glaser, 'Political Consequences of Military Strategy', pp. 497-538
176. Charles L. Glaser, 'The Security Dilemma Revisited', World Politics, Vol. 50, No. 1 (1997), pp. 171-201.
177. Shiping Tang, A Theory of Security Strategy for Our Time, chaps. 2 and 3.
178. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, pp. 45-84.
179. Robert Jervis With Thierry Balzacq, 'The Logic of Mind: Interview with Robert Jervis', Review of International Studies, Vol. 30, No. 3 (2004), pp. 559-563.
180. This is an immediate prediction from the psychology of fear: our cognition is heavily skewed toward insecurity/fear but away from security/complacency/trust. For a more detailed discussion, see Shiping Tang, ''The Social Evolutionary Psychology of Fear (and Trust): Or why is international cooperation difficult?'' 118 Deborah W. Larson, Anatomy of Mistrust
181. Melvin P. Leffler, For the Soul of the Mankind: U.S., Soviet Union, and the Cold War (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007
182. Shiping Tang, A Theory of Security Strategy for Our Time, appendix I.
183. Douglas M. Gibler, 'The Costs of Reneging: Reputation and Alliance Formation', Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 52, No. 3 (2008), p. 437.
184. Gregory, D. Miller, 'Hypotheses on Reputation: Alliance Choices and the Shadow of the Past', Security Studies, Vol. 12, No. 3 (2003), pp. 40-78.
185. Jonathan Mercer, Reputation in International Politics.
186. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics
187. Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War; Jack S. Levy, 'Misperceptions and the Causes of War: Theoretical Linkages and Analytical Problems', World Politics, Vol. 36, No. 1 (198376-99
188. Janice Gross Stein, 'Building Politics into Psychology', pp. 245-271.
189. Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, We All Lost the Cold War; Jonathan Mercer, Reputation in International Politics; Daryl Press, Calculating Credibility.1992
190. Jack S. Levy, 'Misperceptions and the Causes of War', p. 88.
191. John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (New York: The Penguin Press,chap. 4; Melvin P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power. 2005
192. Sergei Zubov and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War.
193. Deborah W. Larson, Anatomy of Mistrust; Melvin P. Leffler, For the Soul of the Mankind.
194. Janice Gross Stein, 'Building Politics into Psychology', p. 249.
195. Both countries, however, under-estimated Hitler's ambition. This might be a motivated bias, due to the memories of the First World War. To their credit, by 1936, both British and French decision makers were sure of Hitler's malignant intentions. For a detailed discussion, see Christopher Layne, 'Security Studies and the Use of History'.
196. Norrin M. Ripsman and Jack S. Levy, 'The Preventive War that Never Happened', pp. 48-58
197. Jonathan Renshon, 'Assessing Capabilities in International Politics: Biased Overestimation and the Case of the Imaginary ''Missile Gap'' ', Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 32, No. 1 (2009), p. 116.
198. Jonathan Mercer, Reputation in International Politics; Daryl Press, Calculating Credibility; Shiping Tang, 'Reputation, Cult of Reputation, and International Conflict', pp. 34-62.
199. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, pp. 67-74.
200. Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, We All Lost the Cold War, pp. 309-314.
201. Yoichi Funabashi, Alliance Adrift.
202. Glenn H. Snyder, 'The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics'.
203. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, pp. 343-349.
204. Jing-dong Yuan and Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, China and India: Cooperation or Conflict (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003).
205. Deborah W. Larson, Anatomy of Mistrust; Andrew Kydd, Trust and Mistrust in International Relations, chap. 8.
206. John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War, esp. chaps. 2-4.
207. S. Nelson Drew, ed., NSC-68: Forging the Strategy of Containment, with analyses by Paul H. Nitze (Washington, D. C.: National Defense University, 1993), p. 44.
208. Sergei Zubov and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War.
209. Stephen G. Brooks, 'Dueling Realisms', pp. 445-477.
210. Shiping Tang, 'Fear in International Politics'.
211. Because most realism theories assumes states to be strategic or 'rational' actor, and many understand 'rational' to be acting according to probability, with possibility being an extreme expression of probability, Brooks' formulation seems extreme for many. I thank Andy Kydd for discussion on this issue.
212. Jeffery W. Taliaferro, 'Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited'.
213. Dale Copeland, The Origins of Major War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000).
214. Shiping Tang, 'Fear in International Politics'.
215. Stephen Walt, The Origin of Alliance; Charles L. Glaser, 'Political Consequences of Military Strategy', pp. 497-538
216. Charles L. Glaser, 'Realists as Optimists'; Andrew Kydd, Trust and Mistrust in International Relations; Brian C. Rathbun, 'Uncertain About Uncertainty', pp. 533-557
217. Shiping Tang, 'Fear in International Politics', see also Bertram F. Malle, How the Mind Explains Behavior.
218. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.
219. Dale Copeland, The Origins of Major War.
220. Shiping Tang, 'Fear in International Politics'.
221. Christopher Layne, 'Security Studies and the Use of History'; Norrin M. Ripsman and Jack S. Levy, 'The Preventive War that Never Happened'.
222. Indeed, although by no means easy, other states may take measures to influence the domestic politics of the target state so that a Hitler could not gain or hold power in that state.
223. James D. Fearon, 'Rationalist Explanations for War', pp. 379-414
224. Robert Powell, In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).
225. Paul K. MacDonald, 'The Virtue of Ambiguity: A Critique of the Information Turn in IR theory'; Robert Powell, 'War as a Commitment Problem'; Jennifer Mitzen and Randall Schweller, 'Knowing the Unknown Unknowns: Misplaced Certainty and the Onset of War', Security Studies, Vol. 20, No. 2 (2011), pp. 2-35.
226. Robert Powell, 'War as a Commitment Problem', p. 170
227. James D. Fearon, 'Rationalist Explanations for War', pp. 379-414
228. Robert Powell, 'War as a Commitment Problem'.
229. Monica Duffy Toft, 'Issue Indivisibility and Time Horizons as Rationalist Explanations for War', Security Studies, Vol. 15, No. 1 (2006), pp. 34-69.
230. James D. Fearon, 'Rationalist Explanations for War', p. 401.
231. Of course, in the real world, an actor's intentions can change even when motivations remain constant.
232. Randall L. Schweller, 'Neorealism's Status Quo Bias' pp. 91-121
233. Andrew Kydd, 'Sheep in Sheep's Clothing'; Shiping Tang, A Theory of Security Strategy for Our Time, chap. 2.
234. Erik Gartzke, 'War Is in the Error Term', International Organization, Vol. 53, No. 3 (1999), pp. 567-587.
235. Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).
236. James D. Fearon, 'Rationalist Explanations for War', p. 388.
237. Richard Ned Lebow, A Cultural Theory of International Relations
238. Robert Powell, 'War as a Commitment Problem'.
239. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, pp. 58-67.
240. Paul K. MacDonald, 'The Virtue of Ambiguity', pp. 19-23
241. Made argument that are somewhat related to what I advance here, noting that when pushed to its logic conclusion, models of war and peace based on incomplete information are really driven by the 'old' problems of 'interests' and 'power'.
242. Dale Copeland, The Origins of Major War; John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics; see also Shiping Tang, 'Fear in International Politics'.
243. Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War; Christopher Layne, 'Security Studies and the Use of History'.
244. David M. Edelstein, 'Managing Uncertainty'.
245. With hindsight, Britain and France would have been better off by fighting in Munich rather than a year later when they did half-heartedly (W. Murray and A. R. Millett, A War to Be Won: Fighting the Second World War). Obviously, a more sound explanation is a combination of the second and third interpretations.
246. Christopher Layne, 'Security Studies and the Use of History', pp. 404-405.
247. Norrin M. Ripsman and Jack S. Levy, 'The Preventive War that Never Happened', p. 150.
248. Andrew Barros, and Talbot C. Imlay, 'Correspondence', pp. 173-182.
249. David M. Edelstein, 'Managing Uncertainty', p. 29.
250. Henry A. Kissinger, A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problem of Peace, 1812-1822 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957), pp. 2-3.
251. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 163-164
252. David M. Edelstein, 'Managing Uncertainty', Randall L. Schweller, 'Managing the Rise of Great Powers: History and Theory', in Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, eds., Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 14
253. Randall L. Schweller and William Wohlforth, 'Power Test: Evaluating Realism in Response to the End of the Cold War', Security Studies, Vol. 9, No. 3 (2000), p. 81.
254. Charles L. Glaser, 'Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-help'; Andrew Kydd, Trust and Mistrust in International Relations; Shiping Tang, A Theory of Security Strategy for Our Time, chap. 5. Indeed, the enduring myth that Munich means that one has to stand firm earlier on because others' intentions are inherently to gauge reflects the power of the social evolutionary psychology of fear: we inherently pay more attention to negative events because we want to prevent a repeat of such events. For a more detailed discussion, see Shiping Tang, 'The Social Evolutionary Psychology of Fear (and Trust): Or
255. Richard Ned Lebow, A Cultural Theory of International Relations.
256. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics.
257. Dale Copeland, The Origins of Major War; Jeffery W. Taliaferro, 'Security Seeking under Anarchy', pp. 128-161
258. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.
259. Robert Powell, 'Anarchy in International Relations Theory', pp. 313-344
260. Jeffery W. Taliaferro, 'Security Seeking under Anarchy', pp. 128-161
261. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 91-92
262. Charles L. Glaser, 'Political Consequences of Military Strategy', pp. 497-538
263. Benjamin O. Fordham, 'The Limits of Neoclassical Realism: Additive and Interactive Approaches to Explaining Foreign Policy Preferences', in Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, eds., Neoclassical Realism, State, and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 251-279.
264. Indeed, Waltz (Theory of International Politics, pp. 91-2) himself could not have been more explicit with the instrumental necessity of his assumptions, calling it 'a radical simplification made for the sake of constructing a theory.'
265. Paul K. MacDonald, 'Useful Fiction or Miracle Maker: The Competing Epistemological Foundations of Rational Choice Theory', American Political Science Review, Vol. 97, No. 4 (2003), pp. 551-565.
266. For a recent collection of neoclassical realism works, see Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, eds., Neoclassical Realism, State, and Foreign Policy.
267. Charles L. Glaser, 'Political Consequences of Military Strategy', p. 507.
268. Randall L. Schweller, 'Bandwagoning for Profit', pp. 72-107.
269. Arnold Wolfers, ''National Security' as an Ambiguous Symbol', Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 67, No. 4 (1952), pp. 481-502.
270. Ole Weaver, 'Securitization and De-Securitization', in Ronnie D. Lipschutz, eds., On Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), pp. 46-86.
271. Richard E. Nisbett, Kaiping Peng, Incheol Choi, and Ara Norenzayan, 'Culture and Systems of Thought: Holistic Versus Analytic Cognition', Psychological Review, Vol. 108, No.2 (2001), pp. 291-310