Rationalist explanations for war

International Organization

Volumn 49, Issue 3, 1995, Pages 379-414

  Fearon, James D ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84972159336     PISSN: 00208183     EISSN: 15315088     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0020818300033324     Document Type: Article

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