Dueling realisms

International Organization

Volumn 51, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 445-477

  Brooks, Stephen G ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031524620     PISSN: 00208183     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/002081897550429     Document Type: Review

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