Prospect Theory, Rational Choice, and International Relations

International Studies Quarterly

Volumn 41, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 87-112

  Levy, Jack S ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

GEOPOLITICS; INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS; METHODOLOGY; THEORETICAL STUDY; FOREIGN POLICY; GEOPOLITICAL STUDY; POLICY MAKING; PROSPECT THEORY; RATIONAL CHOICE; THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK;

EID: 0030608619     PISSN: 00208833     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/0020-8833.00034     Document Type: Article

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