The Rubicon theory of war: How the path to conflict reaches the point of no return

International Security

Volumn 36, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 7-40

  Johnson, Dominic D P ^a   Tierney, Dominic ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH   (United Kingdom)

^b SWARTHMORE COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 80052285183     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: 15314804     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/ISEC_a_00043     Document Type: Article

References (191)

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2. Peter M. Gollwitzer, "Mindset Theory of Action Phases," in Paul A.M. Van Lange, Arie W. Kruglanksi, and E. Tory Higgins, eds., Handbook of Theories of Social Psychology, Vol. 1 (London: Sage, 2011), pp. 526-545.
3. "Mind-set" refers to characteristic cognitive orientations, which represent the sum total of activated cognitive procedures
4. Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), pp. 167-214.
5. Geoffrey A. Blainey, The Causes of War (New York: Free Press, 1973).
6. James D. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Summer 1995), pp. 379-414.
7. Jonathan Mercer, "Rationality and Psychology in International Politics," International Organization, Vol. 59, No. 1 (Winter 2005), pp. 77-106.
8. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976).
9. Rose McDermott, Political Psychology in International Relations (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004)
10. David O. Sears, Leonie Huddy, and Robert Jervis, eds., Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
11. Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson, Causes of War (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010).
12. Monica Duffy Toft, The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests, and the Indivisibility of Territory (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003).
13. Jonathan Mercer, Reputation and International Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996).
14. David A. Welch, Justice and the Genesis of War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
15. Blainey, The Causes of War, p. 35.
16. Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999), p. 16.
17. See also Dominic D.P. Johnson, Overcon fidence and War: The Havoc and Glory of Positive Illusions (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004).
18. Daniel Kahneman and Jonathan Renshon, "Why Hawks Win," Foreign Policy, No. 158 (January/February 2007), pp. 34-38.
19. Barbara W. Tuchman, The March of Folly: From Troy to Vietnam (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1984).
20. Dominic D.P. Johnson, Rose McDermott, Emily S. Barrett, Jonathan Cowden, Richard W. Wrangham, Matthew H. McIntyre, and Stephen Peter Rosen, "Overconfidence in Wargames: Experimental Evidence on Expectations, Aggression, Gender, and Testosterone," Proceedings of the Royal Society of London, Series B, October 7, 2006, pp. 2513-2520.
21. In this article, we define "confidence" as the perceived probability that a specified outcome will occur. For example, low confidence may equate with a belief that one has a 25 percent chance of victory, whereas high confidence may equate with a belief that one has a 75 percent chance of victory. "Overconfidence" is defined as a level of confidence that exceeds the true likelihood of an outcome. For example, if a tennis player expects to win 75 percent of his or her matches but loses them all, this would imply overconfidence. The notion of overconfidence is sometimes criticized because it appears to require post hoc judgments. How do we know the true likelihood of an outcome? This is not as large a problem as it may seem, for five reasons. First, although it is problematic to estimate each side's true likelihood of winning at the outbreak of war, these estimates are not entirely subjective or arbitrary. In many cases, overconfidence is so extreme (i.e., "we will win in a few days"), and so far removed from a reasonable assessment of the available evidence, that labeling it as such is straightforward. Second, the true likelihood of an outcome is usually estimated by many observers, both inside and outside the countries concerned, so estimates that are far more confident than the average are likely to be overconfident. Third, there is often strong evidence that accurate information was available to leaders, but was discounted or ignored out of hand, suggesting overconfident beliefs. Fourth, the actual outcome is typically known, providing evidence about whether decisionmakers made a good bet or not. If the tape of history were rerun, they may be right on another occasion, but one data point is nevertheless better than none. On average, expecting a lot and gaining little implies overconfidence. Fifth, when both or all sides think they will resoundingly crush their adversaries, this is a good sign that at least one of the sides is overconfident.
22. Even Fearon's widely cited 1995 article "Rationalist Explanations for War" opens up a potentially important role for overconfidence. Fearon argues that a central cause of war within the rational choice framework is a leader's private information about their own side's resolve or strength, plus "an incentive to exaggerate their true willingness or capability to fight" (p. 395). Poor information may lead to spurious overvaluation-even by a rational actor-of one's own capabilities relative to the opponent, or undervaluation of an adversary's true interests in the outcome of a conflict. Fearon suggests that leaders consciously withhold private information from adversaries, for good reason; but this makes the adversary more likely to choose war, as he cannot accurately assess his opponent's strength. Another possibility, however, suggested by the Rubicon theory of war, is that leaders make inaccurate judgments about relative capabilities and interests because of psychological biases such as overconfidence. This may occur in addition to, or instead of, the phenomena proposed by Fearon.
23. The Munich crisis occurred after Germany demanded the annexation of the Sudetenland area of Czechoslovakia. The crisis was resolved peacefully when Britain and France agreed to the substance of the German wishes as part of the policy of appeasement.
24. Herbert S. Dinerstein, "The Impact of Air Power on the International Scene, 1933-1940," Military Affairs, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Summer 1955), pp. 65-71, at p. 70.
25. Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, p. 138.
26. Quoted in Williamson Murray, The Change in the European Balance of Power, 1938-1939: The Path to Ruin (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 207.
27. Peter Neville, Winston Churchill: Statesman or Opportunist? (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1996)
28. Wesley K. Wark, The Ultimate Enemy: British Intelligence and Nazi Germany, 1933-1939 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985), p. 233.
29. Janice Gross Stein, "Building Politics into Psychology: The Misperception of Threat," Political Psychology, Vol. 9, No. 2 (June 1988), pp. 245-271, at p. 259.
30. Robert E. Knox and James A. Inkster, "Postdecision Dissonance at Post Time," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 8, No. 4 (1968), pp. 319-323.
31. Heinz Heckhausen and Peter M. Gollwitzer, "Thought Contents and Cognitive Functioning in Motivational versus Volitional States of Mind," Motivation and Emotion, Vol. 11, No. 2 (June 1987), pp. 101-120.
32. For a recent overview of the development of the Rubicon model, its empirical support, and how it has influenced the field of psychology, see Gollwitzer, "Mindset Theory of Action Phases."
33. Heckhausen and Gollwitzer, "Thought Contents and Cognitive Functioning in Motivational versus Volitional States of Mind," p. 118.
34. Shelley E. Taylor and Peter M. Gollwitzer, "Effects of Mindset on Positive Illusions," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, Vol. 69, No. 2 (August 1995), pp. 213-226.
35. Heckhausen and Gollwitzer, "Thought Contents and Cognitive Functioning in Motivational versus Volitional States of Mind," p. 103.
36. Psychological phenomena are often categorized as either "motivated" biases (deriving from people's beliefs, preferences, and desires dominating rational thought) or "cognitive" biases (deriving from the machinery of how the brain works). Cognitive biases are generally thought to operate at most times, whereas motivated biases are more likely to occur when people's beliefs and preferences come under challenge. The biases in table 1 would primarily be classified as motivated biases. In implemental mind-sets-when attention turns to carrying out a chosen course of action- personal stakes come to the fore and motivated biases are likely to rise in prominence.
37. For reviews of motivational and cognitive biases, see Irving L. Janis and Leon Mann, Decision Making: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice, and Commitment (New York: Free Press, 1979).
38. Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics
39. For important predictive differences between motivational and cognitive biases, see Chaim D. Kaufmann, "Out of the Lab and into the Archives: A Method for Testing Psychological Explanations of Political Decision Making," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 4 (December 1994), pp. 559-560.
40. Heckhausen and Gollwitzer, "Thought Contents and Cognitive Functioning in Motivational versus Volitional States of Mind."
41. Jurgen Beckmann and Peter M. Gollwitzer, "Deliberative versus Implemental States of Mind: The Issue of Impartiality in Predecisional and Postdecisional Information Processing," Social Cognition, Vol. 5, No. 3 (1987), pp. 259-279.
42. Heckhausen and Gollwitzer, "Thought Contents and Cognitive Functioning in Motivational versus Volitional States of Mind," study 2
43. Kentaro Fujita, Peter M. Gollwitzer, and Gabriele Oettingen, "Mindsets and Pre-Conscious Open-Mindedness to Incidental Information," Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 43, No. 1 (January 2007), pp. 48-61.
44. Beckmann and Gollwitzer, "Deliberative versus Implemental States of Mind"
45. Peter M. Gollwitzer and Ute Bayer, "Deliberative versus Implemental Mindsets in the Control of Action," in Shelly Chaiken and Yaacov Trope, eds., Dual-Process Theories in Social Psychology (New York: Guilford, 1999), pp. 403-422.
46. Peter M. Gollwitzer, Heinz Heckhausen, and Birgit Steller, "Deliberative and Implemental Mind-Sets: Cognitive Tuning toward Congruous Thoughts and Information," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 59, No. 6 (December 1990), pp. 1119-1127.
47. Gollwitzer, "Mindset Theory of Action Phases."
48. Taylor and Gollwitzer, "Effects of Mindset on Positive Illusions," study 3
49. Faby M. Gagné and John E. Lydon, "Mindset and Relationship Illusions: The Moderating Effects of Domain Specificity and Relationship Commitment," Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, Vol. 27, No. 9 (September 2001), pp. 1144-1155.
50. Eddie Harmon-Jones and Cindy Harmon-Jones, "Testing the Action-Based Model of Cognitive Dissonance: The Effect of Action Orientation on Postdecisional Attitudes," Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, Vol. 28, No. 6 (June 2002), pp. 711-723.
51. Joel Cooper, Cognitive Dissonance: Fifty Years of a Classic Theory (New York: Sage, 2007)
52. Leon Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1957).
53. Shelley E. Taylor and Jonathan D. Brown, "Illusion andWell-Being: ASocial Psychological Perspective on Mental Health," Psychological Bulletin, Vol. 103, No. 2 (March 1988), pp. 193-210.
54. Taylor and Gollwitzer, "Effects of Mindset on Positive Illusions," study 2
55. Gollwitzer and Bayer, "Deliberative versus Implemental Mindsets in the Control of Action."
56. Taylor and Brown, "Illusion and Well-Being"
57. Shelley E. Taylor, "Positive Illusions," in Howard S. Friedman, ed., Encyclopedia of Mental Health, Vol. 3 (San Diego, Calif.: Academic Press, 1998), pp. 199-208.
58. Peter M. Gollwitzer and Ronald F. Kinney, "Effects of Deliberative and Implemental Mind-Sets on Illusion of Control," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 56, No. 4 (April 1989), pp. 531-542.
59. Gollwitzer and Bayer, "Deliberative versus Implemental Mindsets in the Control of Action," pp. 412-413.
60. Taylor and Gollwitzer, "Effects of Mindset on Positive Illusions," study 1
61. David A. Armor and Shelley E. Taylor, "The Effects of Mindset on Behavior: Self-Regulation in Deliberative and Implemental Frames of Mind," Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, Vol. 29, No. 1 (January 2003), pp. 86-95.
62. Gollwitzer and Bayer, "Deliberative versus Implemental Mindsets in the Control of Action," pp. 411-414.
63. Taylor and Gollwitzer, "Effects of Mindset on Positive Illusions."
64. Rosa M. Puca, "Preferred Difficulty and Subjective Probability in Different Action Phases," Motivation and Emotion, Vol. 25, No. 4 (December 2001), pp. 307-326.
65. See also Veronika Brandstätter and Elisabeth Frank, "Effects of Deliberative and Implemental Mindsets on Persistence in Goal-Directed Behavior," Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, Vol. 28, No. 10 (October 2002), pp. 1366-1378.
66. Overconfidence also varies according to personality type, gender, and characteristics of the decisionmaking environment
67. Taylor and Brown, "Illusion and Well-Being"
68. Taylor, "Positive Illusions"
69. Shelley E. Taylor, Jennifer S. Lerner, David K. Sherman, Rebecca M. Sage, and Nina K. McDowell, "Portrait of the Self-Enhancer: Well Adjusted and Well Liked or Maladjusted and Friendless?" Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 84, No. 1 (2003), pp. 165-176.
70. Johnson, Overconfidence and War
71. Taylor and Gollwitzer, "Effects of Mindset on Positive Illusions."
72. Gollwitzer, "Mindset Theory of Action Phases," p. 538.
73. Because the Rubicon model of action phases derives in part from laboratory experiments, will these same phenomena be expected to apply to decisionmakers in the real world? The answer is yes because (1) all mentally healthy humans, whether decisionmakers or laypeople, share the same brain architecture, cognitive functioning, and processing mechanisms; (2) empirical evidence shows that even experts fall prey to common psychological biases; and (3) in international crises decisions must be made with little time and limited information, under conditions of stress and high emotions, which tends to exacerbate the effect of psychological biases
74. See Alex Mintz, Steven B. Redd, and Arnold Vedlitz, "Can We Generalize from Student Experiments to the Real World in Political Science, Military Affairs, and International Relations?" Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 50, No. 5 (October 2006), pp. 757-776.
75. Philip E. Tetlock, Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It? How Can We Know? (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005).
76. Stephen Peter Rosen, War and Human Nature (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004).
77. Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," pp. 167-214.
78. Norrin M. Ripsman and Jack S. Levy, "The Preventive War That Never Happened: Britain, France, and the Rise of Germany in the 1930s," Security Studies, Vol. 16, No. 1 (January 2007), p. 40.
79. Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001).
80. For evidence of overconfidence, see Van Evera, Causes of War
81. Mark Hewitson, Germany and the Causes of the First World War (Oxford: Berg, 2004)
82. Barbara W. Tuchman, The Guns of August (New York: Macmillan, 1962).
83. For evidence of pessimism, see Keir A. Lieber, "The New History of World War I and What It Means for International Relations Theory," International Security, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Fall 2007), pp. 155-191.
84. See, for example, Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, p. 138.
85. On selection bias, see Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2004), pp. 22-25.
86. For the classic treatment, see Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics
87. For reviews of problems and solutions, see McDermott, Political Psychology in International Relations
88. Sears, Huddy, and Jervis, Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology
89. Kaufmann, "Out of the Lab and into the Archives," pp. 561-562.
90. William Jannen, "The Austro-Hungarian Decision forWar in July 1914," in Samuel R.Williamson and Peter Pastor, eds., Essays on World War I: Origins and Prisoners of War (New York: Brooklyn College Press, 1983), p. 55.
91. Hew Strachan, The First World War (New York: Viking, 2004), p. 11.
92. Richard F. Hamilton and Holger H. Herwig, Decisions for War, 1914-1917 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 47, 68.
93. Jannen, "The Austro-Hungarian Decision for War in July 1914," p. 66.
94. Samuel R. Williamson, Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War (New York: St. Martin's, 1991), p. 208.
95. Miklós Molnár, A Concise History of Hungary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 241.
96. See also William Mulligan, The Origins of the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 215-216.
97. Giles MacDonogh, The Last Kaiser: The Life of Wilhelm II (New York: St. Martin's, 2000).
98. Quoted in Lamar Cecil, Wilhelm II, Vol. 2: Emperor and Exile, 1900-1941 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), p. 206.
99. Quoted in Tuchman, The Guns of August, p. 119.
100. See also L.L. Farrar Jr., "The Short War Illusion: The Syndrome of German Strategy, August-December, 1914," Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen (MGM), Vol. 12 (1972), pp. 39-52, at p. 40.
101. Wilhelm did become downcast when Britain entered the war, repeating over and over "so many enemies.".
102. Quoted in Cecil, Wilhelm II, p. 209.
103. Strachan, The First World War, p. 21.
104. Quoted in Dale C. Copeland, The Origins of Major War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2000), p. 85.
105. See also Annika Mombauer, Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 211.
106. Hamilton and Herwig, Decisions for War, p. 85.
107. V.R. Berghahn, Germany and the Approach ofWar in 1914 (New York: St. Martin's, 1973), p. 191.
108. Mulligan, The Origins of the First World War, p. 116.
109. Quoted in Copeland, The Origins of Major War, p. 93.
110. Quoted in Konrad H. Jarausch, The Enigmatic Chancellor: Bethmann Hollweg and the Hubris of Imperial Germany (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1973), p. 176.
111. Quoted in Copeland, The Origins of Major War, p. 102.
112. David Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming of War: Europe 1904-1914 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996), p. 407.
113. Quoted in Fritz Fischer, Germany's Aims in the First World War (New York: W.W. Norton, 1967), p. 92.
114. See also Blainey, The Causes of War, pp. 36-37.
115. Van Evera, Causes of War, p. 32.
116. Farrar, "The Short War Illusion," p. 40.
117. Quoted in Fischer, Germany's Aims in the First World War, p. 92.
118. Quoted in Lieber, "The New History ofWorldWar I and What It Means for International Relations Theory," p. 181.
119. Holger H. Herwig, "Germany," in Richard F. Hamilton and Herwig, eds., The Origins of World War I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 175.
120. Quoted in Lebow, Between Peace and War, p. 257.
121. Quoted in Mombauer, Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War, pp. 209-212, at pp. 211-212.
122. Hewitson, Germany and the Causes of the First World War, p. 217.
123. Lieber, "The New History of World War I and What It Means for International Relations Theory"
124. Jack Snyder, "Correspondence: Defensive Realism and the 'New' History of World War I," International Security, Vol. 33, No. 1 (Summer 2008), pp. 174-185.
125. Fischer, Germany's Aims in the First World War
126. Hamilton and Herwig, Decisions for War, p. 47.
127. Copeland, The Origins of Major War
128. Mombauer, Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War
129. Lieber, "The New History of World War I and What It Means for International Relations Theory," p. 188.
130. For discussion of these alternative theories, see Annika Mombauer, The Origins of the First World War: Controversies and Consensus (London: Longman, 2002)
131. Mulligan, The Origins of the First World War
132. Steven E. Miller, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Stephen Van Evera, eds., Military Strategy and the Origins of the First World War, rev. and exp. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991).
133. Farrar, "The Short War Illusion," p. 43.
134. Quoted in John C.G. Röhl, "Germany," in Keith Wilson, ed., Decisions for War, 1914 (New York: St. Martin's, 1995), p. 37.
135. Graydon A. Tunstall, "Austria-Hungary," in Hamilton and Herwig, The Origins of World War I, pp. 145-146.
136. David Stevenson, The First World War and International Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 17.
137. Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming of War, p. 369.
138. William Jannen Jr., The Lions of July: Prelude toWar, 1914 (Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1996), p. 164.
139. Tunstall, "Austria-Hungary," p. 146.
140. Lieber, "The New History of World War I and What It Means for International Relations Theory," p. 182.
141. Martin van Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 110.
142. Tuchman, The Guns of August, p. 119.
143. Van Evera, Causes of War, p. 26.
144. Farrar, "The Short War Illusion," p. 41.
145. Van Creveld, Supplying War, p. 110.
146. Stig Förster, "Dreams and Nightmares: German Military Leadership and the Images of Future Warfare, 1871-1914," in Manfred F. Boemeke, Roger Chickering, and Förster, eds., Anticipating Total War: The German and American Experiences, 1871-1914 (Washington, D.C.: German Historical Institute, 1999), p. 372.
147. Quoted in Snyder, "Correspondence: Defensive Realism and the 'New' History of World War I," pp. 178-179.
148. William C. Fuller, "The Russian Empire," in Ernest R. May, ed., Knowing One's Enemies: Intelligence Assessment before the Two World Wars (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 111.
149. Stevenson, The First World War and International Politics, p. 32.
150. David G. Herrmann, The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 210.
151. Niall Ferguson, Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power (New York: Basic Books, 2004), p. 249.
152. Van Evera, Causes of War, p. 205.
153. Tuchman, The Guns of August, p. 119.
154. Christopher M. Andrew, "France and the German Menace," in May, Knowing One's Enemies, p. 146.
155. Eugenia C. Kiesling, "France," in Hamilton and Herwig, The Origins of World War I, p. 252.
156. Hewitson, Germany and the Causes of the First World War, p. 179.
157. Quoted in Dong Sun Lee, Power Shifts, Strategy, and War: Declining States and International Conflict (New York: Routledge, 2008), p. 70.
158. This statement implies that French actors were not yet 100 percent certain that war would occur, but they evidently believed that war was more likely than before, and moved toward implemental rather than deliberative activities, which would be associated with the formation of implemental mind-sets
159. Farrar, "The Short War Illusion," p. 43.
160. Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming of War, p. 388.
161. Samuel R. Williamson Jr. and Ernest R. May, "An Identity of Opinion: Historians and July 1914," Journal of Modern History, Vol. 79, No. 2 (June 2007), pp. 335-387, at p. 347.
162. Stevenson, The First World War and International Politics, pp. 33-34.
163. Andrew, "France and the German Menace," p. 145.
164. Quoted in Zara S. Steiner and Keith Neilson, Britain and the Origins of the First World War (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p. 256.
165. Quoted in James Joll, The Origins of the FirstWorldWar (New York: Longman, 1984), p. 113.
166. Quoted in Steiner and Neilson, Britain and the Origins of the First World War, pp. 236-237.
167. J. Paul Harris, "Great Britain," in Hamilton and Herwig, Decisions for War, pp. 288-289.
168. Cameron Hazlehurst, Politicians at War, July 1914 to May 1915: A Prologue to the Triumph of Lloyd George (London: Jonathan Cape, 1971), chap. 8.
169. Quoted in Steiner and Neilson, Britain and the Origins of the First World War, pp. 223-234.
170. Blainey, The Causes of War, p. 37.
171. Quoted in Van Evera, Causes of War, p. 20.
172. Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, p. 384.
173. Quoted in Kendrick A. Clements, Woodrow Wilson: World Statesman (Boston: Twayne, 1987), p. 167.
174. Ross A. Kennedy, The Will to Believe: Woodrow Wilson, World War I, and America's Strategy for Peace and Security (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 2009), pp. 128-129.
175. Jan Willem Schulte Nordholt, Woodrow Wilson: A Life for World Peace, trans. Herbert H. Rowen (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), pp. 216-217.
176. Robert W. Tucker, Woodrow Wilson and the Great War: Reconsidering America's Neutrality 1914-1917 (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2007), p. 203.
177. Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, p. 389.
178. Marc Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (Princeton,. N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991), p. 70.
179. Herrmann, The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War, p. 218.
180. Lee, Power Shifts, Strategy, and War, p. 68.
181. Fuller, "The Russian Empire," p. 110.
182. Van Evera, Causes of War, p. 196.
183. Kiesling, "France," pp. 255-256.
184. Jan Karl Tanenbaum, "French Estimates of Germany's Operational War Plans," in May, Knowing One's Enemies, pp. 150-171, at p. 171.
185. Williamson and May, "An Identity of Opinion," p. 347.
186. Farrar, "The Short War Illusion," p. 43.
187. Paul M. Kennedy, "Great Britain before 1914," in May, Knowing One's Enemies, p. 192.
188. Van Evera, Causes of War, p. 197.
189. Kennedy, "Great Britain before 1914," p. 194.
190. Peter M. Gollwitzer and Paschal Sheeran, "Implementation Intentions and Goal Achievement: AMeta-Analysis of Effects and Processes," Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 38 (2006), pp. 69-119.
191. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans., Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976/1832), p. 190.