The limits of neoclassical realism: Additive and interactive approaches to explaining foreign policy preferences

Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 251-279

  Fordham, Benjamin O ^a  

^a BINGHAMTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84870481931     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511811869.009     Document Type: Chapter

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