The security dilemma revisited

World Politics

Volumn 50, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 171-201

  Glaser, Charles L ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0001226653     PISSN: 00438871     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0043887100014763     Document Type: Article

References (140)

1. Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics 30 (January 1978), 169. For earlier discussions of the security dilemma, see John H. Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma," World Politics 2 (January 1950), which identifies the basic concept, but does not develop it extensively-, and Herbert Butterfield, History and Human Relations (London: Collins, 1951).
2. Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics 30 (January 1978), 169. For earlier discussions of the security dilemma, see John H. Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma," World Politics 2 (January 1950), which identifies the basic concept, but does not develop it extensively-, and Herbert Butterfield, History and Human Relations (London: Collins, 1951).
3. Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics 30 (January 1978), 169. For earlier discussions of the security dilemma, see John H. Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma," World Politics 2 (January 1950), which identifies the basic concept, but does not develop it extensively-, and Herbert Butterfield, History and Human Relations (London: Collins, 1951).
4. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), chap. 3, esp. 62-76; these pages provide a more thorough discussion of the basic workings of the security dilemma than does "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma." For an early discussion of this type of interaction, see J. David Singer, "Threat-Perception and the Armament-Tension Dilemma," Journal of Conflict Resolution 2 (March 1958); for a recent discussion, see Charles L. Glaser, "Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models," World Politics 44 (July 1992).
5. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), chap. 3, esp. 62-76; these pages provide a more thorough discussion of the basic workings of the security dilemma than does "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma." For an early discussion of this type of interaction, see J. David Singer, "Threat-Perception and the Armament-Tension Dilemma," Journal of Conflict Resolution 2 (March 1958); for a recent discussion, see Charles L. Glaser, "Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models," World Politics 44 (July 1992).
6. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), chap. 3, esp. 62-76; these pages provide a more thorough discussion of the basic workings of the security dilemma than does "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma." For an early discussion of this type of interaction, see J. David Singer, "Threat-Perception and the Armament-Tension Dilemma," Journal of Conflict Resolution 2 (March 1958); for a recent discussion, see Charles L. Glaser, "Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models," World Politics 44 (July 1992).
7. Many similar arguments are developed by George Quester, Offense and Defense in the International System (New York: Wiley, 1977). See also Marion William Boggs, Attempts to Define and Limit "Aggressive" Armament and Strategy (Columbia: University of Missouri, 1941); and Marlies Ter Borg, "Reducing Offensive Capabilities: The Attempt of 1932," Journal of Peace Research 29, no. 2 (1992).
8. Many similar arguments are developed by George Quester, Offense and Defense in the International System (New York: Wiley, 1977). See also Marion William Boggs, Attempts to Define and Limit "Aggressive" Armament and Strategy (Columbia: University of Missouri, 1941); and Marlies Ter Borg, "Reducing Offensive Capabilities: The Attempt of 1932," Journal of Peace Research 29, no. 2 (1992).
9. Many similar arguments are developed by George Quester, Offense and Defense in the International System (New York: Wiley, 1977). See also Marion William Boggs, Attempts to Define and Limit "Aggressive" Armament and Strategy (Columbia: University of Missouri, 1941); and Marlies Ter Borg, "Reducing Offensive Capabilities: The Attempt of 1932," Journal of Peace Research 29, no. 2 (1992).
10. The major statement of the standard structural-realist analysis is Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979); also important are idem, Man, the State and War (New York; Columbia University Press, 1959), esp. chaps. 6, 7; and idem, "Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics," in Robert O. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986).
11. The major statement of the standard structural-realist analysis is Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979); also important are idem, Man, the State and War (New York; Columbia University Press, 1959), esp. chaps. 6, 7; and idem, "Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics," in Robert O. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986).
12. The major statement of the standard structural-realist analysis is Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979); also important are idem, Man, the State and War (New York; Columbia University Press, 1959), esp. chaps. 6, 7; and idem, "Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics," in Robert O. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986).
13. See Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," International Security 19 (Winter 1994-95);
14. and Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War, vol. 1, The Structure of Power and the Roots of War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, forthcoming).
15. Although not framed in terms of the security dilemma, see, for example, Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Beyond Deterrence," Journal of Social Issues 43 (Winter 1987). See also Stein, "Deterrence and Reassurance," in Philip E. Tetlock et al., Behavior, Society and Nuclear War, vol. 2 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), esp. 17; this essay gives somewhat greater prominence to the security dilemma. On the more general question of resolving political rivalries, see Sean Lynn-Jones, "Rivalry and Rapprochement: Accommodation between Adversaries in International Politics" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, in process).
16. Although not framed in terms of the security dilemma, see, for example, Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Beyond Deterrence," Journal of Social Issues 43 (Winter 1987). See also Stein, "Deterrence and Reassurance," in Philip E. Tetlock et al., Behavior, Society and Nuclear War, vol. 2 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), esp. 17; this essay gives somewhat greater prominence to the security dilemma. On the more general question of resolving political rivalries, see Sean Lynn-Jones, "Rivalry and Rapprochement: Accommodation between Adversaries in International Politics" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, in process).
17. Although not framed in terms of the security dilemma, see, for example, Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Beyond Deterrence," Journal of Social Issues 43 (Winter 1987). See also Stein, "Deterrence and Reassurance," in Philip E. Tetlock et al., Behavior, Society and Nuclear War, vol. 2 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), esp. 17; this essay gives somewhat greater prominence to the security dilemma. On the more general question of resolving political rivalries, see Sean Lynn-Jones, "Rivalry and Rapprochement: Accommodation between Adversaries in International Politics" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, in process).
18. Matthew Evangelista, "Sources of Moderation in Soviet Security Policy," in Tetlock et al. (fn. 6), esp. 290-96; and idem, "Cooperation Theory and Disarmament Negotiations in the 1950s," World Politics 42 (July 1990). On the Soviet use of concessions, see Deborah Welch Larson, "Crisis Prevention and the Austria State Treaty," International Organization 41 (Winter 1987).
19. Matthew Evangelista, "Sources of Moderation in Soviet Security Policy," in Tetlock et al. (fn. 6), esp. 290-96; and idem, "Cooperation Theory and Disarmament Negotiations in the 1950s," World Politics 42 (July 1990). On the Soviet use of concessions, see Deborah Welch Larson, "Crisis Prevention and the Austria State Treaty," International Organization 41 (Winter 1987).
20. Matthew Evangelista, "Sources of Moderation in Soviet Security Policy," in Tetlock et al. (fn. 6), esp. 290-96; and idem, "Cooperation Theory and Disarmament Negotiations in the 1950s," World Politics 42 (July 1990). On the Soviet use of concessions, see Deborah Welch Larson, "Crisis Prevention and the Austria State Treaty," International Organization 41 (Winter 1987).
21. Robert Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory," American Political Science Review 85 (December 1991); Powell casts the argument in terms of the costs of war, not in terms of the offense-defense balance. And see Glaser (fn. 5), 79.
22. On balancing versus bandwagoning, see Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987), esp. 24-25, 165-67. On the tightness of alliances, see Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," International Organization 44 (Spring 1990); and Thomas J. Christensen, "Perceptions and Allies in Europe, 1865-1940," International Organization 51 (Winter 1997); disagreeing is James D. Morrow, "Arms versus Allies: Trade-offs in the Search for Security," International Organization 47 (Spring 1993). On the alliance choices of small powers, see Karl Mueller, "Patterns of Alliance: Alignment Balancing and Stability in Eastern Europe," Security Studies 5 (Autumn 1995).
23. On balancing versus bandwagoning, see Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987), esp. 24-25, 165-67. On the tightness of alliances, see Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," International Organization 44 (Spring 1990); and Thomas J. Christensen, "Perceptions and Allies in Europe, 1865-1940," International Organization 51 (Winter 1997); disagreeing is James D. Morrow, "Arms versus Allies: Trade-offs in the Search for Security," International Organization 47 (Spring 1993). On the alliance choices of small powers, see Karl Mueller, "Patterns of Alliance: Alignment Balancing and Stability in Eastern Europe," Security Studies 5 (Autumn 1995).
24. On balancing versus bandwagoning, see Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987), esp. 24-25, 165-67. On the tightness of alliances, see Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," International Organization 44 (Spring 1990); and Thomas J. Christensen, "Perceptions and Allies in Europe, 1865-1940," International Organization 51 (Winter 1997); disagreeing is James D. Morrow, "Arms versus Allies: Trade-offs in the Search for Security," International Organization 47 (Spring 1993). On the alliance choices of small powers, see Karl Mueller, "Patterns of Alliance: Alignment Balancing and Stability in Eastern Europe," Security Studies 5 (Autumn 1995).
25. On balancing versus bandwagoning, see Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987), esp. 24-25, 165-67. On the tightness of alliances, see Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," International Organization 44 (Spring 1990); and Thomas J. Christensen, "Perceptions and Allies in Europe, 1865-1940," International Organization 51 (Winter 1997); disagreeing is James D. Morrow, "Arms versus Allies: Trade-offs in the Search for Security," International Organization 47 (Spring 1993). On the alliance choices of small powers, see Karl Mueller, "Patterns of Alliance: Alignment Balancing and Stability in Eastern Europe," Security Studies 5 (Autumn 1995).
26. On balancing versus bandwagoning, see Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987), esp. 24-25, 165-67. On the tightness of alliances, see Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," International Organization 44 (Spring 1990); and Thomas J. Christensen, "Perceptions and Allies in Europe, 1865-1940," International Organization 51 (Winter 1997); disagreeing is James D. Morrow, "Arms versus Allies: Trade-offs in the Search for Security," International Organization 47 (Spring 1993). On the alliance choices of small powers, see Karl Mueller, "Patterns of Alliance: Alignment Balancing and Stability in Eastern Europe," Security Studies 5 (Autumn 1995).
27. Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany between the World Wars (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984), esp. 67, 74, 221-22, 236-39; Jack Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984); for disagreements, see Scott D. Sagan, "1914 Revisited: Allies, Offense and Instability," International Security 11 (Fall 1986); the correspondence between Sagan and Snyder, International Security 11 (Winter 1986-87); and Elizabeth Kier, "Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars," International Security 19 (Spring 1995).
28. Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany between the World Wars (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984), esp. 67, 74, 221-22, 236-39; Jack Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984); for disagreements, see Scott D. Sagan, "1914 Revisited: Allies, Offense and Instability," International Security 11 (Fall 1986); the correspondence between Sagan and Snyder, International Security 11 (Winter 1986-87); and Elizabeth Kier, "Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars," International Security 19 (Spring 1995).
29. Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany between the World Wars (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984), esp. 67, 74, 221-22, 236-39; Jack Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984); for disagreements, see Scott D. Sagan, "1914 Revisited: Allies, Offense and Instability," International Security 11 (Fall 1986); the correspondence between Sagan and Snyder, International Security 11 (Winter 1986-87); and Elizabeth Kier, "Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars," International Security 19 (Spring 1995).
30. Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany between the World Wars (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984), esp. 67, 74, 221-22, 236-39; Jack Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984); for disagreements, see Scott D. Sagan, "1914 Revisited: Allies, Offense and Instability," International Security 11 (Fall 1986); the correspondence between Sagan and Snyder, International Security 11 (Winter 1986-87); and Elizabeth Kier, "Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars," International Security 19 (Spring 1995).
31. Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany between the World Wars (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984), esp. 67, 74, 221-22, 236-39; Jack Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984); for disagreements, see Scott D. Sagan, "1914 Revisited: Allies, Offense and Instability," International Security 11 (Fall 1986); the correspondence between Sagan and Snyder, International Security 11 (Winter 1986-87); and Elizabeth Kier, "Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars," International Security 19 (Spring 1995).
32. Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991), 21-26.
33. Stephen M. Walt, Revolutions and War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), esp. 33-45, 334-38.
34. Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma in Ethnic Conflict," Survival 35 (Spring 1993); and Chaim Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," International Security 20 (Spring 1996).
35. Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma in Ethnic Conflict," Survival 35 (Spring 1993); and Chaim Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," International Security 20 (Spring 1996).
36. Jack Snyder, "Limiting Offensive Conventional Forces: Soviet Proposals and Western Options," International Security 12 (Spring 1988), esp. 67-71; see also Stephen Duane Biddle, "The Determinants of Offensiveness and Defensiveness in Conventional Land Warfare" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1992). Following the basic approach of offense-defense theory, although apparently not directly influenced by it, is the nonprovocative defense literature. See, for example, the special issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 44 (September 1988); and Anders Boserup and Robert Neild, The Foundations of Defensive Defense (New York: St. Martin's, 1990).
37. Jack Snyder, "Limiting Offensive Conventional Forces: Soviet Proposals and Western Options," International Security 12 (Spring 1988), esp. 67-71; see also Stephen Duane Biddle, "The Determinants of Offensiveness and Defensiveness in Conventional Land Warfare" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1992). Following the basic approach of offense-defense theory, although apparently not directly influenced by it, is the nonprovocative defense literature. See, for example, the special issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 44 (September 1988); and Anders Boserup and Robert Neild, The Foundations of Defensive Defense (New York: St. Martin's, 1990).
38. Jack Snyder, "Limiting Offensive Conventional Forces: Soviet Proposals and Western Options," International Security 12 (Spring 1988), esp. 67-71; see also Stephen Duane Biddle, "The Determinants of Offensiveness and Defensiveness in Conventional Land Warfare" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1992). Following the basic approach of offense-defense theory, although apparently not directly influenced by it, is the nonprovocative defense literature. See, for example, the special issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 44 (September 1988); and Anders Boserup and Robert Neild, The Foundations of Defensive Defense (New York: St. Martin's, 1990).
39. Jack Snyder, "Limiting Offensive Conventional Forces: Soviet Proposals and Western Options," International Security 12 (Spring 1988), esp. 67-71; see also Stephen Duane Biddle, "The Determinants of Offensiveness and Defensiveness in Conventional Land Warfare" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1992). Following the basic approach of offense-defense theory, although apparently not directly influenced by it, is the nonprovocative defense literature. See, for example, the special issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 44 (September 1988); and Anders Boserup and Robert Neild, The Foundations of Defensive Defense (New York: St. Martin's, 1990).
40. Charles L. Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).
41. Shai Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence: A Strategy for the 1980s (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982).
42. Barry R. Posen, "Inadvertent Nuclear War? Escalation and NATO's Northern Flank," International Security 7 (Fall 1982); and idem, Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992). Offering a different explanation is Jeffrey W. Legro, "Military Culture and Inadvertent Escalation in World War II," International Security 18 (Spring 1994).
43. Barry R. Posen, "Inadvertent Nuclear War? Escalation and NATO's Northern Flank," International Security 7 (Fall 1982); and idem, Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992). Offering a different explanation is Jeffrey W. Legro, "Military Culture and Inadvertent Escalation in World War II," International Security 18 (Spring 1994).
44. Barry R. Posen, "Inadvertent Nuclear War? Escalation and NATO's Northern Flank," International Security 7 (Fall 1982); and idem, Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992). Offering a different explanation is Jeffrey W. Legro, "Military Culture and Inadvertent Escalation in World War II," International Security 18 (Spring 1994).
45. Stephen M. Walt, "The Case for Finite Containment: Analyzing U.S. Grand Strategy," International Security 14 (Summer 1989), esp. 22-30.
46. Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War," International Security 15 (Winter 1990-91), esp. 11-17; Ted Hopf, "Managing Soviet Disintegration: A Demand for Behavioral Regimes," International Security 17 (Summer 1992); Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe," International Security 16 (Summer 1991), esp. 133-37; and Charles L. Glaser, "Why NATO Is Still Best: Future Security Structures for Europe," International Security 18 (Summer 1993), esp. 26-33, 38-47.
47. Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War," International Security 15 (Winter 1990-91), esp. 11-17; Ted Hopf, "Managing Soviet Disintegration: A Demand for Behavioral Regimes," International Security 17 (Summer 1992); Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe," International Security 16 (Summer 1991), esp. 133-37; and Charles L. Glaser, "Why NATO Is Still Best: Future Security Structures for Europe," International Security 18 (Summer 1993), esp. 26-33, 38-47.
48. Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War," International Security 15 (Winter 1990-91), esp. 11-17; Ted Hopf, "Managing Soviet Disintegration: A Demand for Behavioral Regimes," International Security 17 (Summer 1992); Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe," International Security 16 (Summer 1991), esp. 133-37; and Charles L. Glaser, "Why NATO Is Still Best: Future Security Structures for Europe," International Security 18 (Summer 1993), esp. 26-33, 38-47.
49. Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War," International Security 15 (Winter 1990-91), esp. 11-17; Ted Hopf, "Managing Soviet Disintegration: A Demand for Behavioral Regimes," International Security 17 (Summer 1992); Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe," International Security 16 (Summer 1991), esp. 133-37; and Charles L. Glaser, "Why NATO Is Still Best: Future Security Structures for Europe," International Security 18 (Summer 1993), esp. 26-33, 38-47.
50. Jervis (fn. 2), 76.
51. On the advantages of this usage of "capability," see Glenn H. Snyder, "Process Variables in Neorealist Theory," Security Studies 5 (Spring 1996), 180-83.
52. For the sake of simplicity, I will focus on the decision to buy arms. However, the logic of the security dilemma is more general, including the decision to take territory and to acquire allies to increase security. Regarding territory, an action-reaction process could be expansion into part of a buffer zone that leads one's adversary to expand into the remainder of the zone.
53. Jervis (fn. 2), 64, says that such an action-reaction process results in reduced security because when states seek the ability to defend themselves, they get too much and too little ... too little beceuse others, being menaced, will increase their own arms and so reduce the first state's security." However, this explains only why the state's security is reduced relative to the situation following its initial buildup, but not why it should be reduced relative to the prior military status quo.
54. John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983), chap. 7.
55. This possibility is discussed in Chaim Kaufmann and Charles Glaser, "What Is the Offense-Defense Balance and Can We Measure It?" International Security (forthcoming).
56. See, for example, Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961), esp. 1-2.
57. For earlier use of game theory to explore the different motives that can lead to arms competition and cooperation, see Thomas C. Schelling, "A Framework for the Evaluation of Arms-Control Proposals," Daedulus 104 (Summer 1975). While remaining positive about the potential contribution of game-theoretic formulations, Jervis explores their shortcomings in "Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation," World Politics 40 (April 1988).
58. For earlier use of game theory to explore the different motives that can lead to arms competition and cooperation, see Thomas C. Schelling, "A Framework for the Evaluation of Arms-Control Proposals," Daedulus 104 (Summer 1975). While remaining positive about the potential contribution of game-theoretic formulations, Jervis explores their shortcomings in "Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation," World Politics 40 (April 1988).
59. Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984). For a focus on questions of arming, see George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Randolph M. Siverson, "Arms Races and Cooperation," in Kenneth A. Oye, ed., Cooperation under Anarchy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986).
60. Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984). For a focus on questions of arming, see George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Randolph M. Siverson, "Arms Races and Cooperation," in Kenneth A. Oye, ed., Cooperation under Anarchy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986).
61. Jervis (fn. 1), 168-69. Although Jervis identifies this phenomenon as being separate from the security dilemma, I describe it as an integral part of the security dilemma. On the resource value of territory, see Peter Liberman, "The Spoils of Conquest," International Security 18 (Fall 1993); and idem, Does Conquest Pay? The Exploitation of Occupied Industrial Societies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).
62. Jervis (fn. 1), 168-69. Although Jervis identifies this phenomenon as being separate from the security dilemma, I describe it as an integral part of the security dilemma. On the resource value of territory, see Peter Liberman, "The Spoils of Conquest," International Security 18 (Fall 1993); and idem, Does Conquest Pay? The Exploitation of Occupied Industrial Societies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).
63. Jervis (fn. 1), 168-69. Although Jervis identifies this phenomenon as being separate from the security dilemma, I describe it as an integral part of the security dilemma. On the resource value of territory, see Peter Liberman, "The Spoils of Conquest," International Security 18 (Fall 1993); and idem, Does Conquest Pay? The Exploitation of Occupied Industrial Societies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).
64. See, for example, Michael E. Brown, "The Flawed Logic of NATO Expansion," Survival 37 (Spring 1995). For a security dilemma-based argument against nuclear superiority, see Glaser (fn. 15), chap. 5.
65. The adversary could also become less secure if it concludes that the state places a higher value on security or demands a higher level of security, both of which could make the state harder to deter. For simplicity, I focus on the adversary's assessment of the state's greed.
66. I use the term "greedy" because states can be motivated to expand for two fundamentally different types of reasons - security and greed - which are blurred by the more common terms "expansionist" and "aggressive." Four types of states can be defined in terms of greed and security seeking; see Glaser (fn. 2), 501-3. In referring to states as greedy, I do not mean to imply that they do not also seek security.
67. Jervis (fn. 2), chap. 3, esp. 62-76. See also Glenn Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," World Politics 36 (July 1984), 468-70; Snyder argues that firm alliance policies can generate reactions that are comparable to a spiral generated by an arms buildup.
68. Jervis (fn. 2), chap. 3, esp. 62-76. See also Glenn Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," World Politics 36 (July 1984), 468-70; Snyder argues that firm alliance policies can generate reactions that are comparable to a spiral generated by an arms buildup.
69. 34 In addition to the passage cited in fn. 20, see, for example, Jervis (fn. 2), 62.
70. On signaling, see Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970); and James D. Fearon, "Threats to Use Force: The Role of Costly Signals in International Crises" (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1992).
71. On signaling, see Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970); and James D. Fearon, "Threats to Use Force: The Role of Costly Signals in International Crises" (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1992).
72. This is an oversimplification, however, since a pure security seeker might want the capability to take territory for a variety of reasons. See fn. 57 below for qualifications.
73. Although Jervis identifies the types of buildups, he does not really explain how rational states can spiral; Jervis (fn. 1), 199-201. He notes that states often cannot accurately infer motives from others' military forces and therefore they tend to assume the worst; Jervis (fn. 2), 64-65. This would clearly generate increased hostility, but the judgment is logically flawed, since without additional information states' assessments should remain unchanged. Moreover, states should not assume the worst in the face of uncertainty, since this can support policies that are too competitive/provocative.
74. For discussion of related issues concerning subjective security requirements, see Jervis (fn. 1), 174-76.
75. Andrew Kydd, "Game Theory and the Spiral Model," World Politics 49 (April 1997). Kydd notes (p. 373) that Jervis explores this dynamic for the extreme cases in which bias leads the adversary to assume the state is definitely secure. For pure security seekers, however, all that is necessary to generate a spiral is for the adversary to believe there is some possibility that the state is secure. See also George W. Downs and David M. Rocke, Tacit Bargaining, Arms Races, and Arms Control (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990), chap. 4.
76. Andrew Kydd, "Game Theory and the Spiral Model," World Politics 49 (April 1997). Kydd notes (p. 373) that Jervis explores this dynamic for the extreme cases in which bias leads the adversary to assume the state is definitely secure. For pure security seekers, however, all that is necessary to generate a spiral is for the adversary to believe there is some possibility that the state is secure. See also George W. Downs and David M. Rocke, Tacit Bargaining, Arms Races, and Arms Control (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990), chap. 4.
77. Kydd (fn. 39) provides a formal treatment.
78. Glaser (fn. 5), 67-70; and idem (fn. 2), 526-33; for related points, see Downs, Rocke, and Siverson (fn. 28). On reassurance more generally, see Stein (fn. 6); on the inhibiting effect of appearing weak, see James D. Morrow, "Signaling Difficulties with Linkage in Crisis Bargaining," International Studies Quarterly 36 (June 1996).
79. Glaser (fn. 5), 67-70; and idem (fn. 2), 526-33; for related points, see Downs, Rocke, and Siverson (fn. 28). On reassurance more generally, see Stein (fn. 6); on the inhibiting effect of appearing weak, see James D. Morrow, "Signaling Difficulties with Linkage in Crisis Bargaining," International Studies Quarterly 36 (June 1996).
80. Glaser (fn. 5), 67-70; and idem (fn. 2), 526-33; for related points, see Downs, Rocke, and Siverson (fn. 28). On reassurance more generally, see Stein (fn. 6); on the inhibiting effect of appearing weak, see James D. Morrow, "Signaling Difficulties with Linkage in Crisis Bargaining," International Studies Quarterly 36 (June 1996).
81. Glaser (fn. 5), 67-70; and idem (fn. 2), 526-33; for related points, see Downs, Rocke, and Siverson (fn. 28). On reassurance more generally, see Stein (fn. 6); on the inhibiting effect of appearing weak, see James D. Morrow, "Signaling Difficulties with Linkage in Crisis Bargaining," International Studies Quarterly 36 (June 1996).
82. Glaser (fn. 5), 67-70; and idem (fn. 2), 526-33; for related points, see Downs, Rocke, and Siverson (fn. 28). On reassurance more generally, see Stein (fn. 6); on the inhibiting effect of appearing weak, see James D. Morrow, "Signaling Difficulties with Linkage in Crisis Bargaining," International Studies Quarterly 36 (June 1996).
83. Charles E. Osgood, An Alternative to War or Surrender (Urbana: University of Illinois, 1962).
84. Misperception receives far less discussion in "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma" (but see pp. 181-83) than in Jervis (fn. 2), 67-76.
85. On attribution theory, see Jervis (fn. 2), esp. 35-48;
86. Deborah Welch Larson, Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), esp. 34-42;
87. and Jonathan Mercer, Reputation and International Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996).
88. For an emphasis on organizational perspectives, see Stephen Van Evera, "Causes of War" (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1984), pt. 2; and Snyder (fh. 10). Snyder (fh. 11) emphasizes domestic political dynamics.
89. For an emphasis on organizational perspectives, see Stephen Van Evera, "Causes of War" (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1984), pt. 2; and Snyder (fh. 10). Snyder (fh. 11) emphasizes domestic political dynamics.
90. Van Evera (fn. 45), chap. 8; and idem, "Why States Believe Foolish Ideas: Non-Self-Evaluation by Government and Society" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 1988).
91. Van Evera (fn. 45), chap. 8; and idem, "Why States Believe Foolish Ideas: Non-Self-Evaluation by Government and Society" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 1988).
92. Snyder (fn. 33), 461, emphasizes wasted resources; he argues (p. 462) that alliance formation is similar to arming, in that all states would be better off remaining outside an alliance; action and reaction nevertheless generate alliance blocks that are costly but fail to increase security.
93. On Stag Hunt and related games, see Kenneth A. Oye, "Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies," in Oye (fn. 28).
94. For discussion of their impact on a Stag Hunt, see Downs, Rocke, and Siverson (fn. 28), 134-37.
95. In addition, a type of uncertainty that is not explored in the text is also important - uncertainty about whether an adversary will become greedier. This uncertainty cannot be eliminated because leaders cannot bind themselves and their successors to current goals; see Jervis (fn. 1), 168.
96. Although my discussion focuses on competition over territory, a parallel analysis can be developed for arms competition.
97. If facing a greedy adversary, however, a pure security seeker would now see instrumental value in expansion, if this would increase its security. The state would then have Prisoners' Dilemma preferences instead of Stag Hunt preferences. In addition, the state would see a higher payoff for war, if war held some prospect of successful expansion or of leaving the adversary relatively weaker, which makes competition more attractive. Some of my game-theory colleagues object to this formulation, on the grounds that payoffs should be fixed and not vary with the type of adversary. A more adequate formulation requires a multiperiod game.
98. Consequently, the relative size of payoffs matters. Jervis devotes much of "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma" to exploring factors that influence payoffs. Offense-defense variables are among the most important and are discussed in the following section.
99. For related analysis, see Malcolm W. Hoag, "On Stability in Deterrent Races," World Politics 13 (July 1961).
100. On the relationship between first-strike advantages, preemption, and accidents, see Schelling and Halperin (fn. 26), 14-16.
101. See also Quester (fn. 3), 105-6.
102. As Jervis (fn. 1) notes, this is an overstatement (pp. 201-2). A pure security seeker might buy offense for a number of reasons: (1) if offense has a great advantage over defense; (2) if the state has extended deterrence commitments; (3) because offense may be necessary to regain territory lost at the beginning of a war; and (4) because the threat of counteroffense can enhance deterrence. On extended deterrence, see Stephen W. Van Evera, "Offense, Defense and Strategy: When Is Offense Best?" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 1987). On counteroffense, see Samuel P. Huntington, "Convention Deterrence and Conventional Retaliation in Europe," International Security 8 (Winter 1983-84); and Barry R. Posen, "Crisis Stability and Conventional Arms Control," Daedulus 120 (Winter 1991).
103. As Jervis (fn. 1) notes, this is an overstatement (pp. 201-2). A pure security seeker might buy offense for a number of reasons: (1) if offense has a great advantage over defense; (2) if the state has extended deterrence commitments; (3) because offense may be necessary to regain territory lost at the beginning of a war; and (4) because the threat of counteroffense can enhance deterrence. On extended deterrence, see Stephen W. Van Evera, "Offense, Defense and Strategy: When Is Offense Best?" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 1987). On counteroffense, see Samuel P. Huntington, "Convention Deterrence and Conventional Retaliation in Europe," International Security 8 (Winter 1983-84); and Barry R. Posen, "Crisis Stability and Conventional Arms Control," Daedulus 120 (Winter 1991).
104. As Jervis (fn. 1) notes, this is an overstatement (pp. 201-2). A pure security seeker might buy offense for a number of reasons: (1) if offense has a great advantage over defense; (2) if the state has extended deterrence commitments; (3) because offense may be necessary to regain territory lost at the beginning of a war; and (4) because the threat of counteroffense can enhance deterrence. On extended deterrence, see Stephen W. Van Evera, "Offense, Defense and Strategy: When Is Offense Best?" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 1987). On counteroffense, see Samuel P. Huntington, "Convention Deterrence and Conventional Retaliation in Europe," International Security 8 (Winter 1983-84); and Barry R. Posen, "Crisis Stability and Conventional Arms Control," Daedulus 120 (Winter 1991).
105. As Jervis (fn. 1) notes, this is an overstatement (pp. 201-2). A pure security seeker might buy offense for a number of reasons: (1) if offense has a great advantage over defense; (2) if the state has extended deterrence commitments; (3) because offense may be necessary to regain territory lost at the beginning of a war; and (4) because the threat of counteroffense can enhance deterrence. On extended deterrence, see Stephen W. Van Evera, "Offense, Defense and Strategy: When Is Offense Best?" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 1987). On counteroffense, see Samuel P. Huntington, "Convention Deterrence and Conventional Retaliation in Europe," International Security 8 (Winter 1983-84); and Barry R. Posen, "Crisis Stability and Conventional Arms Control," Daedulus 120 (Winter 1991).
106. The concept of differentiation is implicit in the distinction between qualitative and quantitative arms control, with the former relying on differentiation. This concept lies at the core of modern arms control theory; see, for example, Thomas C. Schelling, "What Went Wrong with Arms Control," Foreign Affairs 64 (Winter 1985-86).
107. Van Evera (fn.5), chap. 5.
108. James D. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," International Organization 49 (Summer 1995), 402-3. And see the following papers prepared for the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Chicago, February 1995: Fearon, "The Offense-Defense Balance and War since 1648"; and Charles Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, "Inspecting the Foundations of Offense-Defense Theory: Can They Bear the Weight?"
109. James D. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," International Organization 49 (Summer 1995), 402-3. And see the following papers prepared for the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Chicago, February 1995: Fearon, "The Offense-Defense Balance and War since 1648"; and Charles Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, "Inspecting the Foundations of Offense-Defense Theory: Can They Bear the Weight?"
110. Van Evera (fn. 5), chaps. 5, 6; and idem, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," International Security 9 (Summer 1984). See also Ted Hopf, "Polarity, the Offense-Defense Balance, and War," American Political Science Review 85 (June 1991); and Fearon (fn. 60, February 1995), who argues that the frequency of war in broad historical periods runs counter to standard offense-defense predictions.
111. Van Evera (fn. 5), chaps. 5, 6; and idem, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," International Security 9 (Summer 1984). See also Ted Hopf, "Polarity, the Offense-Defense Balance, and War," American Political Science Review 85 (June 1991); and Fearon (fn. 60, February 1995), who argues that the frequency of war in broad historical periods runs counter to standard offense-defense predictions.
112. Van Evera (fn. 5), chaps. 5, 6; and idem, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," International Security 9 (Summer 1984). See also Ted Hopf, "Polarity, the Offense-Defense Balance, and War," American Political Science Review 85 (June 1991); and Fearon (fn. 60, February 1995), who argues that the frequency of war in broad historical periods runs counter to standard offense-defense predictions.
113. Van Evera (fn. 5), chaps. 5, 6; and idem, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," International Security 9 (Summer 1984). See also Ted Hopf, "Polarity, the Offense-Defense Balance, and War," American Political Science Review 85 (June 1991); and Fearon (fn. 60, February 1995), who argues that the frequency of war in broad historical periods runs counter to standard offense-defense predictions.
114. See also Jack L. Snyder, "Perceptions of the Security Dilemma in 1914," in Robert Jervis et al., Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985).
115. Marc Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), chap. 2, esp. 64-72. See also David Kaiser, Politics and War: European Conflict from Philip II to Hitler (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), 324; and idem, "Deterrence or National Interest? Reflections on the Origins of War," Orbis 30 (Spring 1986); David Stevenson, "Militarization and Diplomacy in Europe before 1914," International Security 22 (Summer 1997).
116. Marc Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), chap. 2, esp. 64-72. See also David Kaiser, Politics and War: European Conflict from Philip II to Hitler (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), 324; and idem, "Deterrence or National Interest? Reflections on the Origins of War," Orbis 30 (Spring 1986); David Stevenson, "Militarization and Diplomacy in Europe before 1914," International Security 22 (Summer 1997).
117. Marc Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), chap. 2, esp. 64-72. See also David Kaiser, Politics and War: European Conflict from Philip II to Hitler (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), 324; and idem, "Deterrence or National Interest? Reflections on the Origins of War," Orbis 30 (Spring 1986); David Stevenson, "Militarization and Diplomacy in Europe before 1914," International Security 22 (Summer 1997).
118. Marc Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), chap. 2, esp. 64-72. See also David Kaiser, Politics and War: European Conflict from Philip II to Hitler (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), 324; and idem, "Deterrence or National Interest? Reflections on the Origins of War," Orbis 30 (Spring 1986); David Stevenson, "Militarization and Diplomacy in Europe before 1914," International Security 22 (Summer 1997).
119. This slightly overstates the similarity, since Waltz (fn. 4, 1979), for example, assumes that states seek at least security but may have other goals as well (p. 126), while Jervis's formulation assumes that states are pure security seekers. This difference is not problematic, however.
120. Although "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma" precedes Theory of International Politics by a year, much of Waltz's argument is available in "Theory of International Relations," in Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, eds., The Handbook of Political Science (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley, 1975). Waltz (fn. 4, 1979) makes only passing reference to the security dilemma (pp. 186-87).
121. Although "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma" precedes Theory of International Politics by a year, much of Waltz's argument is available in "Theory of International Relations," in Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, eds., The Handbook of Political Science (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley, 1975). Waltz (fn. 4, 1979) makes only passing reference to the security dilemma (pp. 186-87).
122. See Glaser (fn. 5), which presents additional reasons for modification; and Van Evera (fn. 5).
123. Jervis (fn. 1) does not overlook power; he is explicit that both power and offense-defense variables matter (p. 187).
124. See, for example, Snyder (fn. 11), who uses "aggressive" instead of "offensive" (pp. 10-13); and Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, "Preface," in Michael E. Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, eds., The Perils of Anarchy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995), xi.
125. See, for example, Snyder (fn. 11), who uses "aggressive" instead of "offensive" (pp. 10-13); and Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, "Preface," in Michael E. Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, eds., The Perils of Anarchy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995), xi.
126. See Glaser (fn. 5).
127. Another basic puzzle still exists, however: why states - security seekers as well as greedy states - do not compromise instead of incurring the cost of fighting; see Fearon (fn. 60, Summer 1995).
128. For related points, see Robert Jervis, "Arms Control, Stability, and Causes of War," Political Science Quarterly 108 (Summer 1993), 244-45. Randall L. Schweller argues otherwise, holding that when a greedy state exists there is no security dilemma; see Schweller, "Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?" Security Studies 5 (Spring 1996).
129. For related points, see Robert Jervis, "Arms Control, Stability, and Causes of War," Political Science Quarterly 108 (Summer 1993), 244-45. Randall L. Schweller argues otherwise, holding that when a greedy state exists there is no security dilemma; see Schweller, "Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?" Security Studies 5 (Spring 1996).
130. Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), esp. 83-84.
131. Restraint may not be ill-advised, however, since for a greedy insecure adversary the reduction in its insecurity could still offset the reduction in the state's military capabilities. Assessing the net effect requires more specific assumptions and a detailed model of interaction. By contrast, unilateral concessions are always misguided when one is facing a secure greedy state, as described by the deterrence model.
132. On the deterrent value of counteroffensive capabilities, see fn. 57.
133. Although at first glance this might seem to eliminate the security dilemma, this need not be the case. A state motivated entirely by security might choose war to increase its security; consequently, the state's insecurity should lead the adversary to fear it. Thus, eliminating the security dilemma would require that the adversary know not only that the state was a pure security seeker but also that the state did not fear it. Consequently, some points in this paragraph are overstated.
134. In this spirit, see Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman, War and Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), chap. 5. A different argument is that the openness that characterizes mature democracies results in domestic debate that cannot be manipulated simply to deceive an adversary, and therefore provides valuable information about motives. See Andrew Kydd, "Signaling and Structural Realism" (Manuscript 1996); and Kenneth A. Schultz, "Domestic Political Competition and Bargaining in International Crises" (Ph.D. diss., Stanford University, 1996). Schultz develops this type of argument for crisis interactions.
135. In this spirit, see Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman, War and Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), chap. 5. A different argument is that the openness that characterizes mature democracies results in domestic debate that cannot be manipulated simply to deceive an adversary, and therefore provides valuable information about motives. See Andrew Kydd, "Signaling and Structural Realism" (Manuscript 1996); and Kenneth A. Schultz, "Domestic Political Competition and Bargaining in International Crises" (Ph.D. diss., Stanford University, 1996). Schultz develops this type of argument for crisis interactions.
136. In this spirit, see Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman, War and Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), chap. 5. A different argument is that the openness that
137. Arguing along these lines is James D. Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes," American Political Science Review 88 (September 1994), 587. If, however, a democracy believes this to be the case and it is not, then we get the kind of misperception described above: the democracy believes that it doe not face a security dilemma and therefore does not moderate its building; its adversary, not confident that the democracy is a pure security seeker, then responds to the buildup; and the democracy then increases its estimate of the adversary's greediness because it believes that its adversary knew that a response was unnecessary for maintaining its security.
138. See Jervis (fn. 2), chap. 3; and Glaser (fn. 2).
139. Patrick Glynn focuses on Van Evera's arguments; see Glynn, Closing Pandora's Box: Arms Races, Arms Control and the History of the Cold War (New York; Basic Books, 1992), chap. 1, quote at 21. For a more nuanced but at least partially sympathetic discussion, see Trachtenberg (fn. 63), chap. 2, esp. 49-57.
140. Colin S. Gray, Weapons Don't Make War (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1993), 174.