Perspective in intentional action attribution

Philosophical Psychology

Volumn 25, Issue 5, 2012, Pages 673-687

  Feltz, Adam ^a   Harris, Maegan ^a   Perez, Ashley ^b  

^a Schreiner University   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN   (United States)

Author keywords

Behavioral Economics; Experimental Philosophy; Individual Differences; Intentional Action; Intuitions; Knobe Effect

Indexed keywords

EID: 84864686493     PISSN: 09515089     EISSN: 1465394X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2011.627540     Document Type: Article

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