Chief executive pay and remuneration committee independence

Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics

Volumn 74, Issue 4, 2012, Pages 510-531

  Gregory Smith, Ian ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH BUSINESS SCHOOL   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84863538459     PISSN: 03059049     EISSN: 14680084     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0084.2011.00660.x     Document Type: Article

References (75)

1. ABI (2006). Executive Remuneration - ABI Guidelines on Policies and Practices, Technical Report, Association of British Insurers.
2. Anderson, R. and Bizjak, J. (2003). 'An empirical examination of the role of the CEO and the compensation committee in structuring executive pay', Journal of Banking & Finance, Vol. 27, pp. 1323-1348.
3. Arellano, M. and Bond, S. (1991). 'Some tests of specification for panal data: Monte Carlo evidence and an application to employment equations', Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 58, pp. 277-298.
4. Arellano, M. and Bover, O. (1999). 'Another look at the instrumental variable estimation of error-components models', Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 68, pp. 29-51.
5. Bebchuk, L. and Fried, J. (2003). 'Executive compensation as an agency problem', Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 17, pp. 71-92.
6. Bebchuk, L. and Fried, J. (2004). Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
7. Bebchuk, L., Fried, J. and Walker, D. (2002). 'Managerial power and executive compensation', University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 69, pp. 751-785.
8. Bebchuk, L., Grinstein, Y. and Peyer, U. (2006). Lucky CEOs, NBER Working Paper Series.
9. Benito, A. and Conyon, M. (1999). 'The governance of directors' pay: evidence from UK companies', Journal of Management and Governance, Vol. 3, pp. 117-136.
10. Bertrand, M. and Mullainathan, S. (2001). 'Are CEOS rewarded for luck? The ones without principals are', Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 116, pp. 901-932.
11. Black, F. and Scholes, M. (1973). 'The pricing of options and corporate liabilities', Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 81, pp. 637-654.
12. Blundell, R. and Bond, S. (1998). 'Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models', Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 87, pp. 115-143.
13. Bonet, R. and Conyon, M. (2005). 'Compensation committees and executive compensation: evidence from publicly traded UK firms', in Keasey K, Thompson S. and Wright M. (eds), Corporate Governance: Accountability, Enterprise and International Comparisons, John Wiley & Sons, Chicester.
14. Bruce, A. and Buck, T. (2005). Corporate Governance: Accountability, Enterprise and International Comparisons, John Wiley & Sons, Chichester.
15. Bruce, A., Udueni, H., Buck, T. and Main, B. (2003). The Long-Term Incentive Plan: Emergence, Character and Governance Implications, University of Nottingham School of Business Working Paper.
16. Cadbury, A. (1992). The Financial Apects of Corporate Governance, Report on the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, Technical Report, GEE.
17. Cameron, A. and Trivedi, P. (2005). Microeconometrics: Methods and Applications, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MA.
18. Combined Code (1999). The Combined Code on Corporate Governance, Technical Report, Financial Reporting Council.
19. Combined Code (2003). The (Revised) Combined Code on Corporate Governance, Technical Report, Financial Reporting Council.
20. Combined Code (2006). The Combined Code on Corporate Governance, Technical Report, Financial Reporting Council.
21. Combined Code (2009). The Combined Code on Corporate Governance, Technical Report, Financial Reporting Council.
22. Conyon, M. (1997). 'Corporate governance and executive compensation', International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 15, pp. 493-509.
23. Conyon, M. and He, L. (2004). 'Compensation committees and CEO compensation incentives in US entrepreneurial firms', Journal of Management Accounting Research, Vol. 16, pp. 35-56.
24. Conyon, M. and Kuchinskas, D. (2006). Compensation Committees in the United States, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, Cheltenham.
25. Conyon, M. and Leech, D. (1994). 'Top pay, company performance and corporate governance', Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 56, pp. 229-247.
26. Conyon, M. and Murphy, K. (2000). 'The prince and the pauper? CEO pay in the United States and United Kingdom', The Economic Journal, Vol. 110, pp. 640-671.
27. Conyon, M. and Peck, S. (1998). 'Board control, remunerartion committees and top management compensation', Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 41, pp. 146-157.
28. Conyon, M., Peck, S. and Sadler, G. (2000). 'Econometric modelling of UK executive compensation', Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 26, pp. 3-20.
29. Conyon, M., Core, J. and Guay, R. (2011). 'Are US CEOs paid more than UK CEOs? Inferences from risk-adjusted pay', Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 24, pp. 402-438.
30. Core, J., Holtausen, R. and Larcker, D. (1999). 'Corporate Governance, Chief Executive Officer compensation, and firm Performance', Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 51, pp. 371-406.
31. Core, J., Guay, W. and Thomas, R. (2004). 'Is US CEO compensation inefficient pay without performance? Michigan Law Review, Vol. 103, pp. 1142-1185.
32. Cosh, A. (1975). 'The remuneration of chief executives in the United Kingdom', The Economic Journal, Vol. 85, pp. 75-94.
33. Cox, J., Ross, S. and Rubinstein, M. (1998). 'Option pricing: a simplified approach', Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 7, pp. 224-264.
34. Daily, C., Johnson, J., Ellstrand, A. and Dalton, D. (1998). 'Compensation committee composition as a determinant of CEO compensation', Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 41, pp. 209-220.
35. Gabaix, X. and Landier, A. (2008). 'Why has CEO pay increased so much?' Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 123, pp. 49-100.
36. Gomez-Mejia, L. and Wiseman, R. (1997). 'Reframing executive compensation: an assessment and outlook', Journal of Management, Vol. 23, pp. 291-374.
37. Gompers, P., Ishii, J. & Metrick, A. (2003). 'Corporate governance and equity prices', Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 118, pp. 107-155.
38. Greenbury Report (1995). Directors Remuneration: Report of a Study Group Chaired by Sir Richard Greenbury, Technical Report, Confederation of British Industry.
39. Gregg, P., Jewell, S. & Tonks, I. (2005). Executive Pay and Performance in the UK 1994-2002, University of Bristol Working Paper.
40. Gregory-Smith, I., Thompson, S. & Wright, P. (2009). 'Fired or retired? A competing risks analysis of CEO turnover', The Economic Journal, Vol. 119, pp. 463-481.
41. Hall, B. & Liebman, J. (1998). 'Are CEOs really paid like bureaucrats?' The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 63, pp. 653-691.
42. Hall, B. & Murphy, K. (2000). 'Optimal exercise prices for executive stock options', American Economic Review, Vol. 90, pp. 209-214.
43. Hall, B. & Murphy, K. (2002). 'Stock options for undiversified executives', Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 33, pp. 847-869.
44. Hart, O. (1995). 'Corporate governance: some theory and implications', The Economic Journal, Vol. 105, pp. 678-689.
45. Higgs, D. (2003). Review of the Role and Effectiveness of Non-executive Directors, Technical Report, Department of Trade and Industry.
46. Holmstrom, B. (1979). 'Managerial incentive problems: a dynamic perspective', Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 226, pp. 169-182.
47. Holmstrom, B. (2006). Pay Without Performance and the Managerial Power Hypothesis: A Comment, SSRN eLibrary.
48. Hubbard, R. (2005). Pay without Performance: A Market Equilibrium Critique, SSRN eLibrary.
49. Jensen, M. & Meckling, W. (1976). 'Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure', Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 3, pp. 305-360.
50. Jensen, M. & Murphy, K. (1990). 'Performance pay and top-management incentives', Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 98, pp. 225-263.
51. Jensen, M., Murphy, K. & Wruck, E. (2004). Remuneration: Where We've Been, How We Got to Here, What are the Problems, and How to Fix Them, SSRN eLibrary.
52. Kay, J. & Silberston, A. (1995). 'Corporate governance', National Institute Economic Review, Vol. 84, pp. 84-97.
53. Lazear, E. & Rosen, S. (1981). 'Rank-order tournaments as optimum labor contracts', Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts, Vol. 89, pp. 841-865.
54. Main, B., Bruce, A. & Buck, T. (1996). 'Total board remuneration and company performance', The Economic Journal, Vol. 106, pp. 1627-1644.
55. MM & K Ltd (2007). The Executive Director Total Remuneration Survey, Technical Report, MM & K Ltd in assocation with Manifest Information Services Ltd.
56. Murphy, K. (1985). 'Corporate performance and managerial remuneration: an empirical analysis', Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 7, pp. 11-42.
57. Murphy, K. (1999). 'Executive compensation', in Ashenfelter O. and Card D. (eds), Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol. 3, Elsevier Science B.V, Amsterdam.
58. Murphy, K. (2002). 'Explaining executive compensation: managerial power vs. the perceived cost of stock options', University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 69, pp. 847-869.
59. Myners, P. (2004). Myners Principles for Institutional Investment Decision-making: Review of Progress, Technical Report, HM Treasury.
60. Newman, H. & Mozes, H. (1999). 'Does the composition of the compensation committee influence CEO compensation practices?' Financial Management, Vol. 28, pp. 41-53.
61. Nickell, S. (1981). 'Biases in dynamic models with fixed effects', Econometrica, Vol. 49, pp. 1417-1426.
62. Prendergast, C. (1999). 'The provison of incentives in firms', Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 37, pp. 7-63.
63. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (2009). Executive Compensation. Review of the year 2009, Technical Report, PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP.
64. Roberts, J., McNulty, T. and Stiles, P. (2005). 'Beyond agency conceptions of the work of the non-executive director: creating accountability in the boardroom', British Journal of Management, Vol. 16, pp. 5-26.
65. Roodman, D. (2006). How to do xtabond2: An Introduction to 'Difference' and 'System' GMM in Stata, Working Paper, Center for Global Development.
66. Rosen, S. (1981). 'The economics of superstars', American Economic Review, Vol. 71, pp. 845-858.
67. Solomon, J. (2007). Corporate Governance and Accountability, John Wiley & Sons Ltd, Chicester.
68. Thomas, R. (2004). 'Explaining the international CEO pay gap: board capture or market driven', Vanderbilt Law Review, Vol. 57, pp. 1171-1267.
69. Tirole, J. (2001). 'Corporate governance', Econometrica, Vol. 69, pp. 1-35.
70. Tosi, H., Werner, S., Katz, J. and Gomez-Mejia, L. (2000). 'How much does performance matter? A meta-analysis of CEO pay studies', Journal of Management, Vol. 26, pp. 301-339.
71. Treasury Committee (2009). Banking Crisis: Reforming Corporate Governance and Pay in the City, Ninth Report of Session 2008-09, Technical Report, House of Commons.
72. Walker, D. (2009). A Review of Corporate Governance in UK banks and Other Financial Industry Entities, Technical Report, HM Treasury.
73. Weisbach, M. (2007). 'Optimal executive compensation versus managerial power: a review of Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried's Pay without performance: the unfulfilled promise of executive compensations', Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 45, pp. 419-428.
74. Windmeijer, F. (2005). 'A finite sample correction for the variance of linear efficient two-step GMM estimators', Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 126, pp. 25-51.
75. Wooldridge, J. (2002). Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data, MIT Press, Cambridge.