What is "theory of mind"? Concepts, cognitive processes and individual differences

Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology

Volumn 65, Issue 5, 2012, Pages 825-839

  Apperly, Ian A ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Cognitive; False belief; Theory of mind

Indexed keywords

ADULT; ARTICLE; CHILD; CHILD DEVELOPMENT; COGNITION; HUMAN; INDIVIDUALITY; INFANT; METHODOLOGY; PRESCHOOL CHILD; THEORY OF MIND;

ADULT; CHILD; CHILD DEVELOPMENT; CHILD, PRESCHOOL; COGNITION; HUMANS; INDIVIDUALITY; INFANT; RESEARCH DESIGN; THEORY OF MIND;

EID: 84861324080     PISSN: 17470218     EISSN: 17470226     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/17470218.2012.676055     Document Type: Article

References (66)

1. Apperly, I. A. 2010. Mindreaders: The cognitive basis of "theory of mind", Hove, UK: Psychology Press.
2. Apperly, I. A. and Butterfill, S. A. 2009. Do humans have two systems to track beliefs and belief-like states?. Psychological Review, 116(4): 953-970.
3. Apperly, I. A., Riggs, K. J., Simpson, A., Chiavarino, C. and Samson, D. 2006. Is belief reasoning automatic?. Psychological Science, 17(10): 841-844.
4. Apperly, I. A., Samson, D., Chiavarino, C., Bickerton, W. and Humphreys, G. W. 2007. Testing the domain-specificity of a theory of mind deficit in brain-injured patients: Evidence for consistent performance on non-verbal, "reality-unknown" false belief and false photograph tasks. Cognition, 103: 300-321.
5. Apperly, I. A., Samson, D., & Humphreys, G. W. (2005). Domain-specificity and theory of mind: Evaluating evidence from neuropsychology. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 9(12), 572-577.
6. Apperly, I. A., Samson, D. and Humphreys, G. W. 2009. Studies of adults can inform accounts of theory of mind development. Developmental Psychology, 45(1): 190-201.
7. Astington, J. W. 2003. "Sometimes necessary, never sufficient: False-belief understanding and social competence". In Individual differences in theory of mind: Implications for typical and atypical development, Edited by: Repacholi, B. and Slaughter, V. 13-38. New York, NY: Psychology Press.
8. Back, E. and Apperly, I. A. 2010. Two sources of evidence on the non-automaticity of true and false belief ascription. Cognition, 115(1): 54-70.
9. Baillargeon, R., Scott, R. M. and He, Z. 2010. False-belief understanding in infants. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 14: 110-118.
10. Baron-Cohen, S., Richler, J., Bisarya, D., Gurunathan, N. and Wheelwright, S. 2003. The Systemising Quotient (SQ): An investigation of adults with Asperger syndrome or high functioning autism and normal sex differences. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, Series B. Special issue on "Autism: Mind and Brain", 358: 361-374.
11. Birch, S. A. J. and Bloom, P. 2007. The curse of knowledge in reasoning about false beliefs. Psychological Science, 18(5): 382-386.
12. Carlson, S. M. and Moses, L. J. 2001. Individual differences in inhibitory control and children's theory of mind. Child Development, 72: 1032-1053.
13. Chandler, M., Boyes, M. and Ball, L. 1990. Relativism and stations of epistemic doubt. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 50: 376-395.
14. Davis, P. E. 2011. Does having an imaginary companion relate to children's understanding of self and others?, Durham, UK: Durham University. (Unpublished doctoral thesis)
15. Dohnel, K., Schuwerk, T., Meinhardt, J., Sodian, B., Hajak, G. and Sommer, M. 2012. Functional activity of the right temporo-parietal junction and of the medial prefrontal cortex associated with true and false belief reasoning. NeuroImage, 60: 1652-1661.
16. Dunbar, R. I.M. 2011. The social brain meets neuroimaging. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 16(2): 101-102.
17. Epley, N., Keysar, B., Van Boven, L. and Gilovich, T. 2004. Perspective taking as egocentric anchoring and adjustment. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87: 327-339.
18. Frith, U. and Frith, C. D. 2003. Development and neurophysiology of mentalising. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological Sciences, 358: 459-473.
19. German, T. P. and Hehman, J. A. 2006. Representational and executive selection resources in "theory of mind": Evidence from compromised belief-desire reasoning in old age. Cognition, 101: 129-152.
20. Goel, V., Buchel, C., Frith, C. and Dolan, R. 2000. Dissociation of mechanisms underlying syllogistic reasoning. NeuroImage, 12(5): 504-514.
21. Gopnik, A. and Meltzoff, A. N. 1997. Words, thoughts, and theories, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
22. Happe, F. G. E. 1994. An advanced test of theory of mind: Understanding of story characters' thoughts and feelings by able autistic, mentally handicapped, and normal children and adults. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 24: 129-154.
23. Hartwright, C., Apperly, I.A., & Hansen, P.C. (2012). Multiple roles for executive control in belief-desire reasoning: Distinct neural networks are recruited for self perspective inhibition and complexity of reasoning. Neuroimage. Advanced online publication. doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2012.03.012
24. Hughes, C. 2011. Social understanding and social lives. From toddlerhood through to the transition to school, Hove, UK: Psychology Press.
25. Hutto, D. D., Herschbach, M. and Southgate, V. 2011. Editorial: Social cognition: Mindreading and alternatives. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2(3): 375-395.
26. Keysar, B., Barr, D. J., Balin, J. A. and Brauner, J. S. 2000. Taking perspective in conversation: The role of mutual knowledge in comprehension. Psychological Sciences, 11: 32-38.
27. Keysar, B., Lin, S. H. and Barr, D. J. 2003. Limits on theory of mind use in adults. Cognition, 89(1): 25-41.
28. Kinderman, P., Dunbar, R. I. M. and Bentall, R. P. 1998. Theory-of-mind deficits and causal attributions. British Journal of Psychology, 89: 191-204.
29. Kovács, Á. M., Téglás, E. and Endress, A. D. 2010. The social sense: Susceptibly to others beliefs in human infants and adults. Science, 330: 1830-1834.
30. Leslie, A. M., German, T. P. and Polizzi, P. 2005. Belief-desire reasoning as a process of selection. Cognitive Psychology, 50: 45-85.
31. Leslie, A. M. and Thaiss, L. 1992. Domain specificity in conceptual development: Neuropsychological evidence from autism. Cognition, 43: 225-251.
32. Lin, S., Keysar, B. and Epley, N. 2010. Reflexively mindblind: Using theory of mind to interpret behavior requires effortful attention. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 46: 551-556.
33. McCleery, J. P., Surtees, A., Graham, K. A., Richards, J. and Apperly, I. A. 2011. The neural and cognitive time-course of theory of mind. Journal of Neuroscience, 31(36): 12849-12854.
34. Meins, E. and Fernyhough, C. 1999. Linguistic acquisitional style and mentalising development: The role of maternal mind-mindedness. Cognitive Development, 14: 363-380.
35. Meins & Fernyhough (2012). Mind-mindedness as a cognitive-behavioral trait: Evidence from mind-minded descriptions of significant others, famous people, and works of art. Manuscript under submission.
36. Meins, E., Fernyhough, C., Fradley, E., & Tuckey, M. (2001). Rethinking maternal sensitivity: Mothers' comments on infants' mental processes predict security of attachment at 12 months. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 42(5), 637-648.
37. Meins, E., Fernyhough, C., Johnson, F., & Lidstone, J. (2006). Mind-mindedness in children: Individual differences in internal-state talk in middle childhood. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 24(1),181-196.
38. Meins, E., Fernyhough, C., Wainwright, R., Das Gupta, M., Fradley, E. and Tuckey, M. 2002. Maternal mind-mindedness and attachment security as predictors of theory of mind understanding. Child Development, 73(6): 1715-1726.
39. Mitchell, P. 1996. Acquiring a conception of mind. A review of psychological research and theory, Hove, UK: Psychology Press.
40. Mitchell, P. and Lacohee, H. 1991. Children's early understanding of false belief. Cognition, 39: 107-127.
41. Mitchell, P., Robinson, E. J., Isaacs, J. E. and Nye, R. M. 1996. Contamination in reasoning about false belief: An instance of realist bias in adults but not children. Cognition, 59: 1-21.
42. Nickerson, R. S. 1999. How we know-and sometimes misjudge-what others know: Imputing one's own knowledge to others. Psychological Bulletin, 125: 737-759.
43. Onishi, K. H. and Baillargeon, R. 2005. Do 15-month-old infants understand false beliefs?. Science, 308(8): 255-258.
44. Perner, J. 1991. Understanding the representational mind, Brighton, UK: Harvester.
45. Perner, J. and Leekam, S. 2008. The curious incident of the photo that was accused of being false: Issues of domain specificity in development, autism and brain imaging. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 61(1): 76-89.
46. Perner, J., Leekam, S. R. and Wimmer, H. 1987. Three-year olds' difficulty with false belief: The case for a conceptual deficit. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 5: 125-137.
47. Perner, J. and Wimmer, H. 1985. "John thinks that Mary thinks that...": Attribution of second-order beliefs by 5- to 10-year-old children. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 39: 437-471.
48. Piaget, J. and Inhelder, B. 1967. The child's conception of space, New York, NY: Norton. (Original work published 1948)
49. Qureshi, A., Apperly, I. A. and Samson, D. 2010. Executive function is necessary for perspective-selection, not Level-1 visual perspective-calculation: Evidence from a dual-task study of adults. Cognition, 117(2): 230-236.
50. Razza, R. and Blair, C. 2009. Associations among false-belief understanding, executive function, and social competence: A longitudinal analysis. Journal of Applied Developmental Psychology, 30: 332-343.
51. Royzman, E. B., Cassidy, K. W. and Baron, J. 2003. "I know, you know": Epistemic egocentrism in children and adults. Review of General Psychology, 7(1): 38-65.
52. Russell, J. 1996. Agency: Its role in mental development, Hove, UK: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
53. Samson, D., Apperly, I. A., Braithwaite, J., Andrews, B. and Bodley, S. E. 2010. Seeing it their way: Evidence for rapid and involuntary computation of what other people see. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 36(5): 1255-1266.
54. Samson, D., Apperly, I. A., Kathirgamanathan, U. and Humphreys, G. W. 2005. Seeing it my way: A case of selective deficit in inhibiting self-perspective. Brain, 128: 1102-1111.
55. Samson, D., Apperly, I. A., Chiavarino, C. and Humphreys, G. W. 2004. The left temporo-parietal junction is necessary for representing someone else's belief. Nature Neuroscience, 7(5): 449-500.
56. Saxe, R. 2006. Uniquely human social cognition. Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 16: 235-239.
57. Saxe, R., Schulz, L. E., & Jiang, Y. V. (2006). Reading minds versus following rules: Dissociating theory of mind and executive control in the brain. Social Neuroscience, 1 (3-4), 284-298.
58. Schneider, D., Bayliss, A. P., Becker, S. I. and Dux, P. E. in press. Eye movements reveal sustained implicit processing of other's mental states. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General,
59. Shamay-Tsoory, S. G. and Aharon-Peretz, J. 2007. Dissociable prefrontal networks for cognitive and affective theory of mind: A lesion study. Neuropsychologia, 45: 3054-3067.
60. Southgate, V., Senju, A. and Csibra, G. 2007. Action anticipation through attribution of false belief by two-year-olds. Psychological Science, 18: 587-592.
61. Surtees, A., Butterfill, S. and Apperly, I. A. 2012. Direct and indirect measures of Level-2 perspective-taking in children and adults. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 30(1): 75-86.
62. Van Overwalle, F. 2009. Social cognition and the brain: A meta-analysis. Human Brain Mapping, 30: 829-858.
63. Wellman, H. M. 1990. The child's theory of mind, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
64. Wellman, H., Cross, D. and Watson, J. 2001. Meta-analysis of theory of mind development: The truth about false-belief. Child Development, 72(3): 655-684.
65. Wellman, H. M. and Liu, D. 2004. Scaling of theory-of-mind tasks. Child Development, 75: 523-541.
66. Wimmer, H. and Perner, J. 1983. Beliefs about beliefs: Representation and constraining function of wrong beliefs in young children's understanding of deception. Cognition, 13: 103-128.