Editorial: Social Cognition: Mindreading and Alternatives

Review of Philosophy and Psychology

Volumn 2, Issue 3, 2011, Pages 375-395

  Hutto, Daniel D ^a   Herschbach, Mitchell ^b   Southgate, Victoria ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HERTFORDSHIRE   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84861311695     PISSN: 18785158     EISSN: 18785166     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s13164-011-0073-0     Document Type: Editorial

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