Tit-for-tat or win-stay, lose-shift?

Journal of Theoretical Biology

Volumn 247, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 574-580

  Imhof, Lorens A ^a   Fudenberg, Drew ^b   Nowak, Martin A ^b,c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BONN   (Germany)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Evolutionary game dynamics; Finite population; Mutation selection process; Prisoner's Dilemma

Indexed keywords

COMPETITION (ECOLOGY); EVOLUTION; MUTATION; PRISONER DILEMMA; SELECTION; TIT-FOR-TAT;

ANALYTICAL ERROR; ARTICLE; COMPUTER SIMULATION; EVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENTAL BIOLOGY; GAME; MOLECULAR DYNAMICS; MOLECULAR EVOLUTION; MUTATION RATE; PRIORITY JOURNAL; STOCHASTIC MODEL;

COMPUTER SIMULATION; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; EVOLUTION; GAME THEORY; HUMANS; MODELS, PSYCHOLOGICAL; MUTATION; SELECTION (GENETICS); STOCHASTIC PROCESSES;

EID: 34250624903     PISSN: 00225193     EISSN: 10958541     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2007.03.027     Document Type: Article

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