Stochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers: The regular case

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 144, Issue 4, 2009, Pages 1373-1395

  Kováč, Eugen ^a,b   Mylovanov, Tymofiy ^a,c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BONN   (Germany)

^b CHARLES UNIVERSITY   (Czech Republic)

^c PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Cheap talk; No monetary transfers; Optimal delegation; Principal agent relationship; Stochastic mechanisms

Indexed keywords

EID: 67649371177     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2008.06.008     Document Type: Article

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