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Volumn 55, Issue 4 SPEC.ISS., 2004, Pages 553-573

The evolution of strategies in a repeated trust game

Author keywords

Experiments; Repeated games; Repeated game strategies; Trust

Indexed keywords


EID: 5744242983     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2003.11.008     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (122)

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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.