Cooperative behavior and the frequency of social interaction

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 66, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 785-812

  Duffy, John ^a   Ochs, Jack ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH   (United States)

Author keywords

Community enforcement; Cooperation; Experimental design; Folk theorem; Matching; Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma; Social norms

Indexed keywords

EID: 67349154477     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2008.07.003     Document Type: Article

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