Fair offers in a repeated principal-agent relationship with hidden actions

Economica

Volumn 72, Issue 286, 2005, Pages 225-240

  Cochard, François ^a   Willinger, Marc ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DE STRASBOURG   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ECONOMICS;

EID: 18644376312     PISSN: 00130427     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.0013-0427.2005.00412.x     Document Type: Article

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