Inferring repeated-game strategies from actions: Evidence from trust game experiments

Economic Theory

Volumn 28, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 603-632

  Engle Warnick, Jim ^a   Slonim, Robert L ^b  

^a MCGILL UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

^b CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Experimental economics; Finite automata; Repeated games; Strategies; Trust

Indexed keywords

EID: 23244437978     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-005-0633-6     Document Type: Article

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