Collusion as public monitoring becomes noisy: Experimental evidence

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 144, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 1135-1165

  Aoyagi, Masaki ^a   Fréchette, Guillaume ^b  

^a ISER   (Japan)

^b NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Collusion; Cooperation; Imperfect public monitoring; Repeated games

Indexed keywords

EID: 64049115647     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2008.10.005     Document Type: Article

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