Multi-player games on the cycle

Journal of Theoretical Biology

Volumn 292, Issue , 2012, Pages 116-128

  Van Veelen, Matthijs ^a,b   Nowak, Martin A ^a  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Cycle; N Player games; Strong selection; Weak selection; Well mixed population

Indexed keywords

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK; EVOLUTIONARY THEORY; FIXATION; STOCHASTICITY;

ARTICLE; COOPERATION; EVOLUTIONARY ALGORITHM; GAME; HUMAN; POPULATION STRUCTURE; PRIORITY JOURNAL; PROBABILITY; PUBLIC GOOD GAME; SNOWDRIFT GAME; STAG HUNT GAME; STATISTICS;

ANIMALS; BIOLOGICAL EVOLUTION; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; GAME THEORY; MODELS, GENETIC; SELECTION, GENETIC; STOCHASTIC PROCESSES;

EID: 82755192931     PISSN: 00225193     EISSN: 10958541     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.08.031     Document Type: Article

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