Generous cooperators can outperform non-generous cooperators when replacing a population of defectors

Theoretical Population Biology

Volumn 77, Issue 4, 2010, Pages 257-262

  Kurokawa, Shun ^a   Wakano, Joe Yuichiro ^b   Ihara, Yasuo ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TOKYO   (Japan)

^b MEIJI UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

Author keywords

Cooperation; Finite populations; Fixation probability; Generosity; Mathematical model; One third law; Prisoner's Dilemma; Public goods games

Indexed keywords

COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY; GAME THEORY; NUMERICAL MODEL; POPULATION DYNAMICS; PRISONER DILEMMA; PROBABILITY; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR; STOCHASTICITY;

ARTICLE; COOPERATION; GAME; HUMAN; HUMAN RELATION; JAPAN; PRISONER; STATISTICS;

COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; GAME THEORY; HUMANS; INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS; JAPAN; PRISONERS; STOCHASTIC PROCESSES;

EID: 77951205087     PISSN: 00405809     EISSN: 10960325     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.tpb.2010.03.002     Document Type: Article

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