Dominating manipulations in voting with partial information

Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Volumn 1, Issue , 2011, Pages 638-643

  Conitzer, Vincent ^a   Walsh, Toby ^b   Xia, Lirong ^a  

^a Duke University   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES   (Australia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

INFORMATION SET; NP-HARD; PARTIAL INFORMATION; PARTIAL ORDER; STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR; VOTING RULES;

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE;

MANIPULATORS;

EID: 80055031259     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (18)

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