Problems with the appeal to intuition in epistemology

Philosophical Explorations

Volumn 11, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 131-141

  Feltz, Adam ^a  

^a FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Epistemology; Experimental philosophy; Intuitions

Indexed keywords

EID: 57749143345     PISSN: 13869795     EISSN: 17415918     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13869790802015650     Document Type: Article

References (18)

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