The rise and fall of experimental philosophy

Philosophical Explorations

Volumn 10, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 95-118

  Kauppinen, Antti ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HELSINKI   (Finland)

Author keywords

Conceptual analysis; Experimental philosophy; Intuition; Moral judgement; Semantic normativity

Indexed keywords

EID: 77349117919     PISSN: 13869795     EISSN: 17415918     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13869790701305871     Document Type: Article

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