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Volumn 37, Issue 6, 2011, Pages 1719-1746

Less pay and more sensitivity? institutional investor heterogeneity and ceo pay

Author keywords

CEO compensation; corporate governance; institutional investors

Indexed keywords


EID: 80053490300     PISSN: 01492063     EISSN: 15571211     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0149206310372412     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (54)

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