Non-partisan 'get-out-the-vote' efforts and policy outcomes

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 27, Issue 4, 2011, Pages 728-739

  Kovenock, Dan ^a   Roberson, Brian ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF IOWA   (United States)

^b PURDUE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Colonel Blotto game; Get Out the Vote; Group based voter mobilization; Nonprofit advocacy organizations; Redistributive politics; Tullock game

Indexed keywords

EID: 80053133375     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2010.11.007     Document Type: Article

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