How two-party competition treats minorities

Review of Economic Design

Volumn 7, Issue 3, 2002, Pages 297-307

  Laslier, Jean François ^a  

^a ECOLE POLYTECHNIQUE   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33645930886     PISSN: 14344742     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s100580200083     Document Type: Article

References (25)

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