Heterogeneous groups and rent-seeking for public goods

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 24, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 133-150

  Cheikbossian, Guillaume ^a,b  

^a UNIV MONTPELLIER   (France)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TOULOUSE CAPITOLE   (France)

Author keywords

Collective rent seeking; Free rider problem; Heterogeneous groups; Public goods

Indexed keywords

EID: 39049165849     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2007.03.004     Document Type: Article

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