Asymmetric rent-seeking with more than two contestants

Public Choice

Volumn 113, Issue 3-4, 2002, Pages 325-336

  Stein, William E ^a  

^a TEXAS A AND M UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036034568     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1020877410243     Document Type: Article

References (11)

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2. Baik, K.H. (1994). Effort levels in contests with two asymmetric players. Southern Economic Journal 61: 367-378.
3. Hillman, A.L. and Riley, J.C. (1989). Politically contestable rents aud transfers. Economics and Politics 1: 17-39.
4. Gradstein, M. (1991). Intensity of competition in strategic contests, Mimeo. (Ben-Gurion University, Beersheva).
5. Katz, E., Nitzan, S. and Rosenberg, J. (1990). Rent-seeking for pure public goods. Public Choice 65: 49-60.
6. Kohli, I. and Singh, N. (1999). Rent seeking and rent setting with asymmetric effectiveness of lobbying. Public Choice 99: 275-298.
7. Leininger, W. (1993). More efficient rent-seeking - A Münchhausen solution. Public Choice 75: 43-62.
8. Nitzan, S. (1994). Modelling rent-seeking contests. European Journal of Political Economy 10: 41-60.
9. Nti, K.O. (1998). Effort and performance in group contests. European Journal of Political Economy 14: 769-781.
10. Nti, K.O. (1999). Rent-seeking with asymmetric valuations. Public Choice 98: 415-430.
11. Tullock, G. (1980). Efficient rent seeking. In J.M. Buchanan, R.D. Tollison, and G. Tullock (Eds.), Toward a theory of the rent-seeking society, 97-112. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.