Effort and performance in group contests

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 14, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 769-781

  Nti, Kofi O ^a  

^a PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Asymmetric contests; Comparative statics; D72; Group contests; Rent seeking

Indexed keywords

EID: 0040689761     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0176-2680(98)00036-6     Document Type: Article

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