Rent-seeking with asymmetric valuations: Addition or deletion of a player

Public Choice

Volumn 129, Issue 3-4, 2006, Pages 369-380

  Matros, Alexander ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33751094591     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-006-9037-9     Document Type: Article

References (5)

1. Hillman A., & Riley, J. (1989). Politically contestable rents and transfers. Economics and Politics, 1, 17-39.
2. Nitzan, S. (1994). Modelling rent-seeking contests. European Journal of Political Economy, 10(1), 41-60.
3. Nti, K. (1999). Rent-seeking with asymmetric valuations. Public Choice, 98, 415-430.
4. Stein, W. (2002). Asymmetric rent-seeking with more than two contestants. Public Choice, 113, 325-336.
5. Tullock, G. (1980). Efficient rent-seeking. In J. M. Buchanan (Ed.), Toward a theory of the rent-seeking society, (pp. 97-112). College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press.