Opinion dynamics and learning in social networks

Dynamic Games and Applications

Volumn 1, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 3-49

  Acemoglu, Daron ^a   Ozdaglar, Asuman ^a  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

Bayesian updating; Consensus; Disagreement; Learning; Misinformation; Non bayesian models; Rule of thumb behavior; Social networks

Indexed keywords

EID: 80053080717     PISSN: 21530785     EISSN: 21530793     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s13235-010-0004-1     Document Type: Article

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