Common learning

Econometrica

Volumn 76, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 909-933

  Cripps, Martin W ^a   Ely, Jeffrey C ^b   Mailath, George J ^c   Samuelson, Larry ^d  

^a UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

^b NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

^d YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Common belief; Common learning; Private beliefs; Private signals

Indexed keywords

EID: 47249142038     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: 14680262     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2008.00862.x     Document Type: Article

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