The effects of IMF programs on U.S. foreign direct investment in the developing world

Review of International Organizations

Volumn 5, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 73-95

  Biglaiser, Glen ^a   DeRouen Jr , Karl ^b  

^a TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA   (United States)

Author keywords

Catalytic finance; Developing World; EFF; IMF; PRGF; SBA; U.S. Foreign Direct Investment

Indexed keywords

EID: 77949290643     PISSN: 15597431     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11558-009-9071-8     Document Type: Article

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