The political economy of U.S. foreign aid: American legislators and the domestic politics of aid

Economics and Politics

Volumn 22, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 200-232

  Milner, Helen V ^a   Tingley, Dustin H ^a  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

AID POLICY; ECONOMIC POLICY; FOREIGN POLICY; IDEOLOGY; POLITICAL ECONOMY;

UNITED STATES;

EID: 77954632210     PISSN: 09541985     EISSN: 14680343     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0343.2009.00356.x     Document Type: Article

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