Local Replicator Dynamics: A Simple Link Between Deterministic and Stochastic Models of Evolutionary Game Theory

Bulletin of Mathematical Biology

Volumn 73, Issue 9, 2011, Pages 2068-2087

  Hilbe, Christian ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA   (Austria)

Author keywords

Evolution of cooperation; Evolutionary game theory; Moran process; One third rule; Replicator dynamics

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; BIOLOGICAL MODEL; EVOLUTION; GAME; HUMAN; POPULATION DENSITY; POPULATION DYNAMICS; STATISTICS;

BIOLOGICAL EVOLUTION; GAME THEORY; HUMANS; MODELS, GENETIC; POPULATION DENSITY; POPULATION DYNAMICS; STOCHASTIC PROCESSES;

EID: 79961031451     PISSN: 00928240     EISSN: 15229602     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11538-010-9608-2     Document Type: Article

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